

HEROÏNE : STATINTL

LES POUR VOYEUR

Michel R. Lamberti et Catherine Lamour ont fait le tour du monde pour remonter toutes les filières qui mènent aux vrais patrons de la drogue

« Si nous ne venons pas à bout de ce fléau, c'est lui qui viendra à bout de nous », s'exclamait, le 17 juin 1971, le président Nixon devant des dizaines de millions de téléspectateurs. Les Etats-Unis ont, en effet, le triste privilège de compter le plus grand nombre d'héroïnomanes du monde : plus d'un demi-million actuellement, dont trois cent mille pour la seule ville de New York. Plus de 50 % des crimes perpétrés dans les grandes villes sont directement liés à la drogue : on tue pour se procurer l'argent nécessaire à l'achat d'une dose d'héroïne.

Le phénomène n'est pas seulement américain : tous les pays européens voient croître à une vitesse vertigineuse le nombre de leurs héroïnomanes. En France, où la pénétration de la drogue n'a été sensible qu'à partir de 1968, on en compte déjà vingt mille. Et le ministère de la Santé estime que le pays pourrait compter cent mille héroïnomanes en 1976.

Couper la source

La drogue n'est plus un simple problème de police. Partant du principe évident, exposé dernièrement à un journaliste américain de « U.S. News and World Report » par l'ancien directeur des Douanes américaines, Myles J. Ambrose, et selon lequel « on ne peut pas devenir toxicomane si l'on ne trouve pas de stupéfiants », Washington a décidé de remonter à la source, c'est-à-dire à la production même de l'opium, dont l'héroïne est un dérivé.

Couper la source d'approvisionnement des trafiquants, c'est intervenir dans les affaires des pays producteurs : de politique, la lutte contre la toxicomanie est devenue politique. Se posant une fois de plus en « gendarmes du monde » mais, cette fois, pour une cause dont personne ne songe à discuter le bien-fondé, les Etats-Unis se sont lancés dans une croisade que d'aucuns jugent d'avance vouée à l'échec.

On produit, en effet, chaque année, dans le monde, assez d'opium pour approvisionner les cinq cent mille héroïnomanes américains pendant cinquante ans : deux à trois mille tonnes, dont la moitié seulement est destinée à l'industrie pharmaceu-

tique. Le reste passe sur le marché entre les mains des trafiquants qui approvisionnent les fumeurs d'opium et les héroïnomanes.

Les trafiquants peuvent se fournir à deux sources différentes :

- 1) Les pays dans lesquels la culture du pavot est légale et contrôlée par l'Etat, mais où une partie de la récolte échappe aux autorités administratives.
- 2) Les pays dans lesquels la culture du pavot est en principe interdite, mais qui n'ont pas les moyens matériels et politiques — ou le désir — de faire respecter cette loi.

La Turquie, troisième producteur mondial, entraine dans la première catégorie. Jusqu'à ce que le gouvernement d'Ankara décide de proscrire la culture du pavot sur tout le territoire turc à partir de 1972, 25 % de la production d'opium était détournée vers le marché clandestin, alors qu'elle aurait dû, en principe, être entièrement achetée par l'Etat. Ce pays n'est pas le seul à connaître pareil problème, une enquête effectuée par le service stratégique des renseignements du Bureau des Narcotiques américain (B.N.D.D.) donnait, pour 1971, les chiffres suivants :

	Production (1) écoulee sur le marché licite	Production écoulee sur le marché clandestin
Turquie	150	35 à 50
Inde	1 200	250
Pakistan	6	175-200
Iran	150	?
U.R.S.S.	115	?
République popu- laire de Chine	100	?
Yougoslavie . . .	0,83	1,7
Japon	5	—
Triangle d'or (Thaïlande - Bir- manie - Laos)		750
Afghanistan . . .		100-150
Mexique		5-15

(1) En tonnes.

Contrairement à ce que l'on pourrait penser, les « fuites » ne sont pas proportionnelles à l'importance de la production licite ni à celle des superficies cultivées

en pavot. Elles dépendent du plus ou moins grand sous-développement administratif du pays concerné et de la capacité des autorités locales à exercer un contrôle effectif sur les paysans, au moment des récoltes.

Pourtant, même des contrôles rigoureux ne suffisent pas à éviter les détournements, compte tenu de la différence de prix pratiqués sur le marché officiel et sur le marché clandestin. L'exemple de l'Inde le prouve, où, en dépit d'un système de contrôle gouvernemental cité en exemple par toutes les instances internationales, les fuites s'élèvent à 18 % de la production totale. La Yougoslavie laisserait échapper près de 70 % de sa production. Le Pakistan, enfin, qui produit légalement six tonnes d'opium, contribuerait pour près de deux cents tonnes à l'approvisionnement des trafiquants.

Le pavot partout

Dans une deuxième catégorie de pays, la production de l'opium est illégale, n'existe évidemment aucun organisme d'Etat chargé de contrôler une production qui, en principe, n'existe pas. Clandestine, la récolte d'opium est entièrement écoulée sur le marché parallèle. Selon le B.N.D.D., ces pays contribueraient pour huit cent cinquante à mille tonnes à l'approvisionnement du trafic.

D'autres régions, sur lesquelles on ne possède absolument aucune information, produisent de l'opium en quantité appréciable : le Népal et, probablement, la Syrie et le Kurdistan irakien. On signale aussi l'apparition de champs de pavots en Argentine du Sud. Contrairement à ce que l'on a souvent affirmé, la culture du pavot requiert pas de conditions géographiques ou climatiques exceptionnelles. Elle réclame seulement une main-d'œuvre abondante et un bon marché car la récolte demande beaucoup de soins et de minutie.

Nombre de pays qui ne sont pas producteurs traditionnels d'opium pourraient, s'ils le voulaient, se mettre à cultiver du pavot. C'est le cas tout récent du Japon. La production d'opium a, de ce fait, tendance à croître en fonction de la demande et pourrait encore augmenter considérablement. Des indices nombreux in-

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I make money off the tax.
The day for me, one thing - the big green.
At least I'm not a parasite.

The CIA's Superpilots Spill the Beans

The CIA's Superpilots Spill the Beans

The CIA's Superpilots Spill the Beans

The CIA's Superpilots Spill the Beans

continued

7 SEP 1972

STATINT

British-Chinese pact hinted

Crackdown on Hong Kong spies

By Reuter

Hong Kong

Britain and China have apparently shelved ideological differences in a common effort to crack down on espionage networks based here.

Diplomatic sources charge there is an unspoken agreement between both sides to keep a tight leash on clandestine activities directed against China.

Government officials in Hong Kong, a British Crown colony on China's southern coastline, refuse to acknowledge that such an agreement exists — or even to discuss the matter for "operational and security reasons."

But diplomatic circles generally believe British authorities keep a watchful eye open particularly for Kuomintang (Nationalist Chinese) and Soviet-organized spy rings.

Scheme blown open

Anti-espionage activities were dramatically highlighted July 23 when a Soviet scheme to recruit local spies was blown open with the arrest of two Russian seamen from a Soviet cruise ship and two Chinese businessmen. Newsmen learned of the arrests only recently.

Reliable sources said the police special branch that deals with espionage found in the

trouser pocket of one of the Soviet agents a Kremlin plan to recruit spies throughout the Far East.

The two Russians were released with a warning and ordered to leave the colony. One of the Chinese businessmen is still under detention.

Cooperation between the British and Chinese is said to run in an oblique fashion.

Tips received

Police officers receive occasional tips on the existence of suspected Nationalist Chinese spy cells and crack down on them. The Communists in turn are careful not to upset Hong Kong's moneymaking activities — China's main source of foreign revenue.

The British Government, in an attempt to prevent the spread of espionage activities, has resisted Soviet and East European efforts to set up diplomatic missions in Hong Kong.

Hong Kong's freewheeling commercial bustle, cosmopolitan atmosphere, and booming tourist industry make it an attractive recruiting base for agents and a meeting ground for tentative approaches.

Largest network

The United States has by far the largest overt intelligence-gathering network in the colony. Some diplomatic sources say the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) also maintains one of its largest bases in Southeast Asia in Hong Kong.

The British and Australians are alleged to eavesdrop on Chinese military broadcasts with highly sensitive monitoring equipment. "just to keep in the picture."

Diplomatic sources say China and the Nationalist Chinese maintain the largest covert spy systems in Hong Kong.

Both the Communist and Nationalist Chinese are alleged to use the banks they maintain here to finance espionage operations.

by TOM SCHUSTER

THE CIA'S WAR WITH RED CHINA AND OTHER ASIAN LANDS

THE OLD WORLD WAR TWO C-46 bounced and yawed in the violent turbulence as its twin engines strained to maintain 160 knots. Its American pilot gripped the controls with every ounce of strength he could muster, and his eyes ached from the strain of searching the darkness to avoid the towering Himalayan mountains on each side.

They'd taken off from a secret base over three hours ago and were threading their way east of the Tibetan capital of Lhasa, long occupied by the forces of Red China. Their mission: drop agents and supplies to a band of Tibetan guerrillas who were still fighting the Communists.

The copilot, sweating over the air chart in his lap, tried to guide them to the drop zone that a mysterious American "civilian" at their base had earlier described. "Hold your course," he yelled. "Another two minutes should put us right on."

The pilot reached up, flicking on the "get-ready" light to alert the Tibetan agents who'd be jumping, and the plane crew who would kick the supplies out. "Go!" he yelled and switched on the buzzer.

Just as the last chute opened, the old plane was suddenly rocked by deadly Communist 37mm antiaircraft fire and the pilot cursed to himself, "Goddam—

bastards were waiting for us."

But he managed to drop down and contour fly the valley floors, below the Red radar, and just after dawn they landed back at their base. They climbed from the plane, their gray uniforms soaked through with sweat, and the pilot

muttered for the thousandth time, "There's gotta be an easier way to make a buck." The C-46 was ancient, but its skin had been polished to shine like a mirror. Back toward the tail were small blue letters that spelled out "Air America." The only other identifying marks were the fresh 37mm holes in the left wing panels.

Throughout Asia, people have come to recognize these strange aircraft and their even stranger American pilots. Especially the pilots. You learn to spot them wherever you are. They're the guys in the gray Air Force-type uniforms, crushed caps, cowboy boots, with pistols hanging at their sides. They can be found raising hell in the Suzy Wong section of Hong Kong or racing motor bikes along Tu Do Street in Saigon or joking with the girls at the Vieng Rattay Club in Vientiane.

They're the pilots of the cloak and dagger Air America, one of the world's least known airlines. Many are "old China hands" who first began flying for the "outfit" back when mainland China belonged to Chiang Kai-shek. They're the last of that breed known as soldiers of fortune, and these devil-may-care mercenaries will

continued

Free (drug) enterprise

Perusal of news dispatches about the Federal "World Opium Survey 1972" discloses several deficiencies in the report.

It does not deal with the role of the Central Intelligence Agency in conspiring in the opium traffic in the "golden triangle" in Burma, Thailand, and Laos. That CIA role is dealt with in detail in Alfred W. McCoy's "The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia," published yesterday by Harper & Row.

The Survey is, thus, a coverup for the CIA's drug operations.

The Survey does not deal with the drug traffic in Saigon where several of President Thieu's generals are major operators. That traffic has been protected by the U.S. command. One consequence has been the massive drug addiction among GIs, addiction which has returned to the U.S. with them.

The Survey reveals one useful consequence of President Nixon's visit to Peking. For years the U.S. Narcotics Bureau, and Harry Anslinger, its chief, carried on a slanderous war against the Peoples Republic of China as the main source of the world's opium traffic. The present report admits, in effect, that that was a lie. There is "no reliable evidence that China has either engaged in or sanctioned the illicit export of opium or its derivatives," it says.

The Survey concedes that, world-wide, government "seizures... represent only a small fraction of the illicit flow."

The obvious conclusion is that the flow of opium through the capitalist world is made possible by massive corruption of government officials, police agents, etc.

The inspiration for the massive business in opium is the same one that inspires other business — profit. In this respect, it is a shining example of "free enterprise."

See, e.
reference 1
S. C.

Drug Traffic:

6 AUG 1972

Furor Over the Asian Pipeline

WASHINGTON—A bill to cut off \$100-million in military and economic aid to Thailand as a penalty for failing to halt the flow of narcotics to the United States will come before the House on Tuesday. It is unlikely that the measure will ever become law—it has already been defeated in the Senate—but it does reflect a furor in Washington over official handling of the Southeast Asian drug traffic problem.

Behind the furor is the fear that a new wave of opiates, especially heroin, is on its way to the United States, particularly from Thailand, which in turn gets the narcotics from Burma.

Until now, the bulk of the illicit heroin supply entering the United States was siphoned off from the 200 tons of opium produced in Turkey. Turkey has promised to stop growing opium poppies by the end of this year. But a number of members of Congress are troubled by the knowledge that some of the 500 tons of opium produced each year by the hill tribes of Burma and neighboring countries could profitably be diverted to the United States.

Moreover, there is suspicion that certain corrupt Thais are pulling the wool over the eyes of officials in the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency who are supposed to block the flow of opiates. Or worse, that Americans have also been corrupted.

But many of the legislators who have been digging out "secret documents" and hurling accusations are ill-informed about the realities of the situation.

For a century or more, opium has been grown by the hill tribes in Southeast Asia. It was bought up by the Chinese traders and distributed to the addicts of Asia. Hardly anyone in America cared.

In recent years this pattern has been changed slightly as the main source of the Burmese opium has fallen into the hands of a Chinese named Lo Hsing-han, whose militia of about 1,500 men controls the mule train route to the refineries at Tajilik in southern Burma where the raw opium is converted to morphine base or heroin. The Burmese

Government does not interfere with Lo because he also helps them control Communists and other insurgents in the area. Nelson Gross, the State Department's senior senior adviser on narcotics, met Premier Ne Win of Burma last January and has had follow-up conferences at lower levels, but the Burmese have declined outside help and have done little or nothing on their own.

The shipments continue to reach Thailand, which, according to some American officials, faces a situation comparable to that which would confront the United States if Canada made no effort to control narcotics.

Nonetheless, Mr. Gross and William T. Wanzek, who headed the Southeast Asia regional office of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs for the past four years, feel that something can be done and is being done to stem the flow.

Mr. Gross and his colleagues argue that their critics have relied heavily on testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee by Alfred W. McCoy, a Yale graduate who in four years in Southeast Asia made it his business to find out about the narcotics traffic.

Mr. McCoy makes much of the fact that the opium is carried out of Burma by Chinese Nationalist paramilitary units that at one time were in the pay of the C.I.A. The American officials contend that this is no longer true. They say the two main Kuomintang units operating in Thailand left the narcotics trade last March when they were given

land in return for a pledge to give up dope-running and for turning over 26 tons of opium, which was burned.

The Narcotics Bureau claims other achievements:

- They have helped the Thai Narcotics Office to set up special anti-narcotics teams, one of which in the northern area of the country has been responsible for seizing \$347-million worth of morphine and heroin since March.

- New technological aid is being given the Thais to help curb the flow of narcotics on trawlers that carry the drugs from Thailand to Malaysia, Borneo, the Philippines and Hong Kong.

- The Thai Government is the first nation to enter into an agreement with the United Nations whereby farmers who give up growing opium will be recompensed. The Thais are contributing \$5-million towards the program, the United States \$2-million.

As Mr. Gross said last week, "Basically we are trying to anticipate what the narcotics operators are going to do to exploit Southeast Asian supplies. We have agents out. We have some chance of success."

—DANA ADAMS SCHMIDT

24 JUL 1972

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Report to U.S. Sees No Hope of Halting Asian Drug Traffic

By SEYMOUR M. HERSH

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 23—A Cabinet-level report has concluded that, contrary to the Nixon Administration's public optimism, "there is no prospect" of stemming the smuggling of narcotics by air and sea in Southeast Asia "under any conditions that can realistically be projected."

"This is so," the report, dated Feb. 21, 1972, said, "because the governments in the region are unable and, in some cases, unwilling to do those things that would have to be done by them if a truly effective effort were to be made."

The report, prepared by officials of the Central Intelligence Agency, the State Department and the Defense Department, noted that "the most basic problem, and the one that unfortunately appears least likely of any early solution, is the corruption, collusion and indifference at some places in some governments, particularly Thailand and South Vietnam, that precludes more effective suppression of traffic by the governments on whose territory it takes place."

The report sharply contradicted the official Administration position and Government intelligence sources say its conclusions are still valid today. In May, Secretary of State William P. Rogers told a Senate subcommittee that "we think all the countries are cooperating with us and we are quite satisfied with that cooperation."

Similarly, Nelson G. Gross, Senior Adviser to the Secretary of State and Coordinator for International Narcotics Matters, testified before Congress in June on the subject of narcotics smuggling that "the governments of Thailand, Laos and Vietnam have already joined us in the fight and, while we have a long way to go, we feel that during the past year some real progress has been achieved."

All officials concerned with the drug problem acknowledge that the United States agencies, under personal prodding from President Nixon, have begun an intensive effort to curb international narcotics traffic.

But critics contend that the effort is far less effective today than Administration officials say it is.

Critics' Charges Backed

Two leading critics of what they allege to be the Government's laxness in stopping the flow of narcotics are Representative Robert H. Steele, Republican of Connecticut, and Alfred W. McCoy, a 26-year-old Yale graduate student who has written a book on narcotics in Southeast Asia. The New York Times reported Saturday that Mr. McCoy's allegations concerning the C.I.A. and the drug traffic had been the subject of an intense and unusually public rebuttal by the agency.

The Cabinet-level report, made available to The Times, buttressed many of the charges made by the two critics, particularly about the pivotal importance of Thailand to the international drug smugglers. Thailand is also a major Air Force staging area for the United States.

In a report on the world heroin problem last year, Mr. Steele wrote that "from the American viewpoint, Thailand is as important to the control of the illegal international traffic in narcotics as Turkey. While all of the opium produced in Southeast Asia is not grown in Thailand, most of it is smuggled through that country."

Mr. Steele's report, filed with the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, noted that many American citizens had established residence in Bangkok, and had moved into the narcotics trade. The report added that the inability of the United States to have a few notorious smugglers deported had led some intelligence officials to conclude that the men were paying Thai officials for protection.

Mr. McCoy said in testimony before Congressional committees last month that hundreds of tons of Burmese opium passed through Thailand every year to international markets in Europe and the United States and that 80 to 90 per cent of the opium was carried by Chinese Nationalist paramilitary teams that were at one time paid by the C.I.A.

There are a number of opium refineries along the northern Thai border, he said, and much of the processed high-quality heroin is shipped by trawler to Hong Kong.

"Even though they are heavily involved in the narcotics traffic," Mr. McCoy testified, "these Nationalist Chinese irregular units are closely allied with the Thai Government." He said that Thai Government police had been sent to the border area and collect an "import duty" of about \$2.50 a

pound of heroin. In Thailand, All this activity, he said, is monitored by United States intelligence agencies.

Thai-U.S. Agreements Cited

Mr. Gross, the State Department's adviser on international narcotics, said in his Congressional testimony that "during the past year the Thais have increased their efforts in the drug field with United States and United Nations assistance." He cited two agreements, signed in late 1971, calling for more cooperation and more long-range planning between Thai and United States officials to stamp out the trade.

"Based on all intelligence information available," Mr. Gross testified, "the leaders of the Thai Government are not engaged in the opium or heroin traffic, nor are they extending protection to traffickers." He added that the top police official in Thailand had publicly stated that he would punish any corrupt official.

The cabinet-level report, submitted to the Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control, asked "highest priority" for suppression of the traffic by Thai trawlers, noting that each trawler "would represent something like 6 per cent of annual United States consumption of heroin."

The report said that the trawler traffic should have priority because "it is possible to attack the Thai trawler traffic without seeking the cooperation of Thai authorities and running the attendant risks of leaks, tip-offs and betrayals."


After such a seizure, the report said, the United States Embassy in Bangkok could "repeat with still greater force and insistence the representations it has already often made to the Government of Thailand" for more effective efforts "to interdict traffic from the north of Thailand to Bangkok and also the loading of narcotics on ships in Thai harbors."

At another point in the report, a general complaint was voiced. "It should surely be possible to convey to the right Thai or Vietnamese officials the mood of the Congress and the Administration on the subject of drugs," the report said. "No real progress can be made on the problem of illicit traffic until and unless the local governments concerned make it a matter of highest priority."

Representatives Steele, Lester L. Wolff, Democrat of Nassau County, and Morgan F. Murphy, Democrat of Illinois, have sponsored legislation that would cut off more than \$100-million in foreign aid to Thailand unless she took more action to halt the production and trafficking of heroin. Their measure cleared the House Foreign Affairs Committee on June 21


Foreign Assistance Act, now pending.

During a Congressional hearing into drug traffic last month, Representative Wolff disputed the Administration's contention that it was making "real progress" in stemming the narcotics flow and said, "we think the trade has got so much protection in high places in Thailand that the Administration is afraid they'll tell us to take our air bases out if we put too much pressure on them."



The New York Times

Nelson G. Gross asserted that there has been progress against smuggling.



United Press International

Robert H. Steele charged the Government is lax in halting flow of drugs.

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STATINTL

ESPIONAGE/BY PAUL MESKIL
AND FRANK FASO

PEKING'S SPIES IN AMERICA

All major political bodies spy on each other, no doubt, but Red China's activity in the United States—intelligence-gathering, smuggling and assassinations—has been the best-kept secret. Up to now

AT 6:30 ON the warm Sunday evening of September 20, 1970, the feature film ended in the Sun Sing Theater in New York City's bustling Chinatown. The house lights went on and about 150 men, women and children filed out of the small, boxlike movie house.

Among them were Jerry Ginn and Larry Wong, both 35 and members of the Hong Kong Seaman's Union (HKSU). They were tailed by Richard Wo (not his real name), an FBI agent investigating a Red Chinese spy ring that was pouring agents, aliens and narcotics into the United States.

Outside the theater, Ginn and Wong turned west on East Broadway and started towards Chatham Square, the crossroads of Chinatown. The setting sun was in their eyes and they probably never noticed the neatly dressed little man approaching them.

He was five-foot-two, 140 pounds, with a hatchet face, eyes like black almonds and bushy black hair combed straight back from a high, bony forehead. He walked up to Ginn and Wong, now about 50 yards from the theater and without a word fired four slugs at the seamen. The shots were almost drowned out by the roar of a subway train on the overhead bridge.

It happened so quickly that even the FBI man was caught by surprise. Instinctively, he reached for his revolver,

Paul Meskil and Frank Faso are investigative reporters for the New York Daily News.

then realized he could not interfere: the case he was working on was too important to lose his cover by making an arrest.

Three slugs hit Ginn in the chest; he was dead when he hit the pavement. The fourth bullet shattered Wong's jaw, but he survived. When the seamen fell, the little man holstered his gun and walked away.


Followed at a discreet distance by the FBI agent and several other witnesses, he soon paused outside a nearby two-story building which is the headquarters of a militant Chinese organization. There some 30 young men and women were attending some sort of meeting on the ground floor when the gunman opened the front door and shouted inside in Cantonese.

As if waiting for his signal, about a dozen youths rushed out and formed a human wall between the killer and his pursuers. Surrounded by the members, the little man continued down the street, turned and vanished from view. Three hours later he entered the bus terminal in midtown Manhattan and caught the 9:45 p.m. Greyhound to Montreal.

Carrying a small black bag containing clothes and other personal effects, plus a U.S. passport identifying him as John Lee, an American citizen and businessman living in Newark, New Jersey, he crossed into Canada without incident and arrived in Montreal at dawn, unaware that his presence there

[Continued]

Peking agent Jerry Ginn got greedy; his bosses eliminated him on a New York street.



July 1972

STATINTL

The Use of Force in Foreign Policy by the People's Republic of China

By ALLEN S. WHITING

ABSTRACT: President Nixon's "journey for peace" to Peking has implicitly modified the image of a Chinese Communist aggressive threat delineated by all previous administrations. However, it has not explicitly redefined the administration's assumptions on the Chinese use of force. This has left considerable confusion and unease among Asian and American audiences who accept the concept of massive Chinese military force being deterred from aggression primarily by American security commitments, bases, and force postures extending from Korea and Japan to India. The nine instances wherein the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has crossed customary borders in hostile array during the past twenty-two years provide prima facie evidence for the conventional image of a potentially expansionist regime contained by American commitments and force. However, closer examination of the use of military force by the People's Republic reveals an entirely different situation whereby the government in Peking, in most cases, deployed the PLA in defensive reaction against a perceived threat. The Chinese use of force primarily for defensive deterrence has remained remarkably consistent over twenty-one years, and considerable continuity may be anticipated for at least the next five years.

Allan S. Whiting, Ph.D., Ann Arbor, Michigan, has been Professor of Political Science at the University of Michigan since 1968. He previously taught at Michigan State, 1955-57, and Northwestern, 1951-53. He was a staff member of the Rand Corporation in the Social Science Division, 1957-61; Director, Office of Research and Analysis for the Far East, U.S. Department of State, 1961-66; and Deputy Principal Officer, American Consulate General, Hong Kong, 1966-68. Educated at Cornell and Columbia universities and the recipient of several fellowships, he is the author of Soviet Policies in China 1917-24 and coauthor of Dynamics of International Relations; Sinkiang: Pawn or Pivot?; and China Crosses the Yalu.

ACCORDING to a Gallup poll, in September 1971 more than half the American public saw China as the greatest threat to world peace in the next few years.¹ Nothing has eventuated from President Nixon's self-styled "journey for peace" to Peking to change this perception, nor has the administration given any systematic assurances to the contrary. Instead the Pentagon continues to demand new, complex, and costly weapons systems for the West Pacific, ostensibly to deter potential Chinese aggression. Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, warns we must prepare to fight two nuclear wars at once, with the Soviet Union and with China.² Our Asian allies from Korea to Thailand worry aloud about the credibility of America's deterrence in the aftermath of stalemate and withdrawal from Vietnam, against a rising weariness of military burdens in Asia, manifested by congressional pressures for cuts in military assistance.

American and Asian anxiety over the future use of force by the People's Republic is rooted in recent history. On nine occasions in the past twenty-two years, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has projected China's military power across its borders.³ In Korea (1950) and India (1962) major war resulted. In Laos (1964) and Vietnam (1965) PLA deployments risked Sino-American conflict. Two crises in the Taiwan Strait (1954-55 and 1958) ostensibly fell within the category of civil war, but nonetheless confronted the United States as protector of the Chiang Kai-shek regime. In March 1969 bel-

Continued

23 JUN 1972

Private arms dealers: legal—and illegal

Not all arms deals are between governments of nations. There are also private peddlers — both the legal (and sometimes large) traders and the illegal gunrunning variety. For a look at both the sunny and shady sides of private arms sales, read this fifth story in a series about who arms the world.

STATINTL

By John K. Cooley

Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor

LAST MONTH'S SOVIET-AMERICAN strategic arms limitation (SALT) treaty is viewed by many people and governments as a giant stride toward disarmament.

It has not, however, bothered the private arms traders. Quite the contrary.

Samuel Cummings, the 44-year-old American who heads Interarms — by far the world's largest private buyer and seller of arms — points out: "We don't worry about the SALT agreement because it will have no effect whatsoever on the movement of conventional arms, the arms we deal in."

"If anything, I would venture a modest prediction that it will cause an increase in conventional arms movement in the world, not only by private firms and producers, but also by governments."

"The inevitable result of denying or limiting strategic arms, the balance-of-power arms, is a greater movement of the conventional types."

"Anyhow, our business isn't controlled by us. It's controlled by the big powers who give the licensing."

"And we are merely, in my view, a reflection for better or for worse of the times in which we live. . . . The whole arms business . . . is essentially based on human folly and as such is self-perpetuating. It increases in direct proportion to human folly as the world's population increases."

Licensed arms dealer

"It's a sad commentary, and I don't make it in any hypocritical sense but strictly in a brutally realistic and, from our side, commercial sense."

Mr. Cummings spoke in a telephone interview from his residence in Monaco. From there, he controls a network of arms dealers and corporations in the U.S., with main offices and warehouses in Alexandria, Va., and a staff of about

40; and Interarms U.K. in Britain, with a staff of 100, and warehouses in Manchester and Acton outside London.

Mr. Cummings, who comes from Philadelphia, began his present career after his World War II Army service by buying up captured German helmets and reselling them at a profit. Since 1953 he has been registered with the U.S. Government as a licensed arms dealer.

Essentially, Interarms' work is to buy up surplus military arms and resell them, either as sport weapons — after "sporterizing" or converting them — or to other governments. The sale to other governments has included everything from surplus uniforms to heavy tanks and jet combat planes. It is shrouded in secrecy because, says Mr. Cummings, "our clients prefer not to have publicity, and governments keep the figures classified anyway."

Turnover top secret

Mr. Cummings says Interarms' turnover is "top secret" too, but adds that "while we have been aiming for \$100 million yearly, it is still in eight figures only, not nine."

Mr. Cummings has taken legal proceedings against some who called him a "trafficker." That, "by European definition," he says, "is someone who does not pay any attention to the law. . . . We are buyers and sellers under American and British Government licenses; we have only those depots physically in England and America, and every transaction is made only with the proper official approval by all governments concerned."

Clients of Interarms are found on every continent. Its Middle East business is so sensitive that even the names of its Mideast agents are kept secret.

Under the U.S. Gun Control Act of 1968, Interarms and other traders cannot import even sporterized ex-military guns into the United States. This has vastly helped U.S. gun manu-

9
LOS ANGELES, CAL.
HERALD-DISPATCH
MAR 2 1972
SEMIWEEKLY - 35,000

STATINTL
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"Earth" Mag. Says

U.S. Spy Agency

CIA - AGENTS PUSH DOPE

STATIN

WASHINGTON, D.C.—If, and we have every reason to believe it's true, the charges made in the March, 1972 issue of "Earth Magazine," that the CIA is now, and has been in the past, dealing in the dope traffic, it's deplorable. Drugs and its danger was brought to the attention of the American people of the National HERALD-DISPATCH newspapers in 1960. We pointed out in our initial drive against dope, the fact that it destroys American youth.

Hence, if the CIA as charged and documented by "Earth Magazine" is dealing in the dope traffic, they are singularly destroying a whole generation of American youth. Dope destroys the brain cell, it renders the individual, regardless of race, creed, or national origin, useless and powerless to think clearly. Dope, as it was fed to American soldiers in Asia is despicable and deplorable. In Asia America's finest young manhood was destroyed before being sent into battle in a senseless, useless, racist war.

In the article titled "The Selling of the CIA" text by Morton Kondracke, offers documentation, photographs of former CIA spies. The spy was quoted, and we have no reason to believe that Earth is lying on the CIA, that its history is a sordid one.

The HERALD-DISPATCH has been aware for a number of years that the CIA has had stooges in the universities and colleges throughout the nation where they recruit brilliant young students. These students were used as spies to overthrow the African and Asian countries, to murder, assassinate, and destroy people.

"Earth" cites facts that the CIA is involved in the opium traffic with the "fertile triangle" in the border areas of Laos, Burma, Thailand and the Yunnan province of southern China. They say, "about twenty-five percent of the heroin sold in America comes through this Southeast Asian channel. Ironically, the American taxpayer foots a six billion dollar a year bill for running the dope—the CIA, an organization which answers to nobody, is intricately involved in the destruction of the United States. U.S. tax mon


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Continued

April, 1972

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the opium trail



STATINTL

HEROIN
and

IMPERIALISM

This pamphlet was written collectively by a study group supported by the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars. The group included Pat Haseltine, Jerry Meldon, Charles Knight, Mark Selden, Rod Aya, Henry Norr, and Mara. Thanks to all who helped, especially Jim Morrell, Tod McKie, and Jancis Long.

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Second Edition

April 1972

continued

Heroin traffic:

Some amazing
coincidences linking
the CIA, the Mafia,
Air America,
several
members of
the Brook Club,
Chiang
Kai-Shek,
the Kuomintang,
Prince Puchatra
of Thailand,
many banks and
insurance companies
— practically
everyone except
Richard Nixon.

Wasn't he asked?
by Peter Dale Scott

Professor Samuel Eliot M
1903 Theodore Roose
national law and mor
US Navy to support the "re
Panama from Colombia. The
to the Canal Zone treaty, is de
"Panama businessmen, agem
[which stood to gain \$40 mill
the treaty] and United States a
to add that the "agents" of
Company were New York in
Seligman and their Washingto
who organized and financed
suite in the Waldorf-Astoria.

In some ways, the Panar
partition is an instructive pre
involvement in Indochina.² Le
be different today; for many
preparing for revolution and
lawed, under sections 956-60
In theory, at least, responsibi
of American "interests" is no
But in fact, the CIA still m
J. & W. Seligman and similar

These contacts have been
from Wall Street which succ
CIA into its first covert ope
who created the CIA in 19
unhappiness at the deflection

gence function: "I never had any thought . . . when I set
up the CIA that it would be injected into peacetime cloak-
and-dagger operations."³ His intentions, however, count-
ed for less than those of Allen Dulles, then a New York
corporation lawyer and President of the Council on
Foreign Relations. The Administration became con-
cerned that the Communists might shortly win the Italian
elections:

Forrestal felt that a secret counteraction was vital, but
his initial assessment was that the Italian operation
would have to be private. The wealthy industrialists
in Milan were hesitant to provide the money, fearing
reprisals if the Communists won, and so that hat was
passed at the Brook Club in New York. But Allen
Dulles felt the problem could not be handled effec-
tively in private hands. He urged strongly that the
government establish a covert organization with un-
vouchered funds, the decision was made to create it
under the National Security Council.⁴

continued

28 FEB 1972

**BOB CONSIDINE**

Visit to a Communist Church/

St. Mary's in Peking looks like any other old Roman Catholic Church whose neighborhood has grown seedy over the years. There is the old gray stone exterior, the cross at the crest, and inside are familiar wooden pews, the stations of the cross along the walls, altar rail dividing the parishioners from the main altar, and the Altar to the Sacred Heart to the left and to St. Joseph at the right.

The sanctuary light was burning when we entered the other day, passed the confessional and approached the main altar, over which is a fine painting of the Virgin. The tabernacle carried a purple silk curtain, sign of the Lenten season.

"But St. Mary's is no longer a Roman Catholic Church. It is a Catholic church under the control of the Peking Patriotic Catholic Association.

"WE HAVE REPELLED association with the Vatican since 1952," Tien Chun Len, a member of the association, told us as we stood in the pleasant courtyard.

"We are proud of St. Mary's. It is the oldest Catholic church in Peking — maybe 300 years old. It was built by German missionaries. I myself knew many foreign priests when I was a Roman Catholic — Frenchmen, Americans, Italians. We had a French rector when the association took charge. He was sent away and his assistant, Father Shim Yu Kun, is now our rector.

MR. TIEN GAVE US a tour of the rugged old church, pausing perceptively at a bright red collection box, then led us to a reception room to meet Father Shin Yu Kun.

The handsome Chinese priest entered the overstuffed room carrying his gold-edged missal under his arm. He greeted us with a paternal smile, lighted up a cigaret, and patiently and earnestly answered our questions. He began first by smiling and saying "I am over 40," then got down to cases.

"In the People's Republic there is complete freedom of religious belief," he said. "It's in our constitution."

I asked him if he had been aware of Maryknoll Bishop Walsh's years of imprisonment by the People's Republic, and his release last year.

"I READ A NEWS ITEM when he was arrested and another when he was released," Fr. Shih said, looking reflectively at his cigaret, "I believe Bishop Walsh used his priest's robes to practice espionage for your C.I.A. Many Roman Catholic priests were arrested at about the same time, 20 years ago. They were not arrested as Roman Clerics; they were arrested because they were counter-revolutionary. "China was exploited by foreign missionaries for many years. They fled after our liberation. They knew they had used their cloaks to carry out activities detrimental to the people of China. An Italian priest, a man named Martino, actually attempted to shoot the leadership of the People's Republic."

"Your leadership is atheistic," I said. "How do you relate that to your devotion to them?"

"WE ARE DOING our best toward constructing socialism," Fr. Shih said, imperturbably stamping out a cigaret that had burned down to his nails. "Yes, the Communists are atheists but this will not inhibit our contribution to the cause. Do I feel less close to God than if I were again a Roman Catholic? No, I don't. I believe in Catholic Doctrine. We retain the Latin Liturgy. We have communion, confessions, benediction, vespers. Also, we love our great Chairman Mao. We regard this as proper. The foreign priests were not in conformity with the teachings of the Bible. We are."

Sounds of children at play filtered through the walls. It was explained that this wasn't the parish school. It was a state school. Which prompted a question about Father Shih's altar boys.

"At the age of seven a boy goes to school," he, a former Roman Catholic altar boy, said with a smile. "They must study. Their parents don't want anything to interfere with their education."

21 FEB 1972

**HENRY J. TAYLOR**

Red China's Atomic Capability

Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird personally briefed President Nixon on Red China's atomic capability for hours on end before his departure for Peking.

Mr. Laird spelled out the unrevealed details of exactly where we stand and what we face. Their session was in the President's White House living quarters and the Defense Secretary came equipped with a map.

The root of Red China's atomic-strike capability is an immense gaseous diffusion atom-bomb plant which Mr. Laird called the Lanchow Complex. It covers a full 14 acres near Lanchow. The site is at the Great Bend in the Yellow River, and the complex takes hydroelectric power from that river.

BUT RED CHINA has now completed a second, and alternate, H-bomb production center. Much of the new construction underground, it is at Paotow, in Suiyuan Province. This is 260 miles west of Peking and due south of Mongolia's Gobi Desert.

AS LONG AGO AS 1962 Foreign Minister Chen Yi told some French visitors to Peking: "The Chinese people may not have enough trousers, but we will surely have the nuclear bomb." And Red China has succeeded in bringing in from Europe and Japan whole prefabricated sections otherwise unobtainable.

The Mannesman West German consortium provided a special steel and tube requirement and a noncorrosion alloy vital where uranium has the effect of devouring metal like putting an ice cube in hot water. VOEST, the inventive steel firm of Linz, Austria, installed its revolutionary LD oxygen converter. DEMAG, the French-Belgian consortium, shipped a \$150 million rolling mill. Japan poured in nonferrous metals and bottleneck chemicals. The British delivered electronic computers.

The Lanchow and Paotow complexes both serve a missile-testing site at Lop Nor, 500 miles inside Sinkiang Province from the Soviet border, and an additional outer-space facility at Shwangchengtze in the Gobi Desert, 400 miles northwest of Lanchow.

ALL EXPLOSIONS and satellite launchings are quickly monitored by our global satellite and detection system of the North American Defense Command headquartered at Colorado Springs, and Central Intelligence Agency operatives have penetrated Lanchow, Paotow, Lop Nor and Shwangchengtze alike.

Red China detonated its first atom bomb on Oct. 16, 1964, and its first H-bomb on Dec. 24, 1967. Then came a shocking, bewildering series of accelerations much faster than our estimates.

By Oct. 14, 1970, Peking successfully completed its 11th test and in it exploded a three-megaton device, much less than our major weapons but equivalent to three million tons of TNT. And, as of President Nixon's departure for Peking, Red China has completed its 14th test and launched its second earth satellite.

The first satellite, sent into orbit from Shwangchengtze on April 24, 1970, was a 381-pound package. It broadcast to the Oriental world: "The East is Red," in honor of Chairman Mao. The second evokes a mystery.

Mr. Laird told the President that the booster rocket used for the second might already be capable of delivering a small "blackmail" warhead on the United States but not the three-megaton device. Mr. Laird said, however, that he is convinced that Peking is developing an intercontinental ballistic missile that can deliver that three-megaton bomb on us, and others far, far larger. "We are under the gun right now," he stated.

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... the possibilities

And yet there is some business which both China and the United States would like to transact during the Nixon visit where a start of sorts can be made.

The Chinese would like American military power to recede from the Chinese coast and cease to occupy springboards in Taiwan, Korea, and South Vietnam from which it could, at least in theory, surge up against China's own borders.

President Nixon would like Chinese help in disentangling himself and his country from Vietnam.

Is there any possible matching of these two desires? Might China help Mr. Nixon out of Vietnam by giving some discreet "advice" to Hanoi which would unfreeze the peace talks in Paris? And if the Chinese were willing thus to use their "good offices" in Hanoi, what would they expect in return?

Of course they want Taiwan, but there one runs into difficulty. Mr. Nixon could no more abandon the Chiang Kai-shek regime on Taiwan than he can the Thieu regime in Saigon. All he can do is reduce the American involvement below the point where the American presence on Taiwan seems in Chinese eyes to be a military threat to them.

What other business is there?

American traders might like access to Chinese markets. But there isn't too much the Chinese have to sell, and most of it can get in and out through Hong Kong without a big increase in the number of Americans living in China proper.

American tourist agencies would love to send shiploads of tourists to Peking. But that would first require building a lot of new Chinese hotels and, second, the Chinese being willing to be gaped at and photographed by droves of American tourists one or so of whom just might happen to be CIA agents in disguise. Do they really want that?

Quite possible are new arrangements under which American technicians, physicists, engineers, etc. might visit China to exchange ideas with Chinese colleagues. Also China might send its own technical experts to America for technical meetings.

There might be some exchange of journalists.

And presumably Mr. Nixon will explore the possibility of an American aid program for China along the line proposed to him by André Malraux.

But, again, the Chinese remember 120 years of being pushed around and bullied and treated as inferior by successive waves of foreigners. They are not going to

want a new wave of American foreigners swarming all over China.

If there are to be American merchant-traders, scientists, technicians, advisers and journalists going to China, the chances are that the Chinese will treat them much as their ancestors did before the "Opium Wars" of the last century when the foreigners were limited mostly to a few coastal ports, admitted inland rarely and only on Chinese terms, and allowed to trade only under strict Chinese control.

It all comes down to the fact that the Nixon trip to Peking has already given China new room for maneuver and some degree of new protection against the danger of a military attack from Russia. Alongside that, nothing else Mr. Nixon has to offer is very large.

So the results, beyond that, are likely to be modest, as Mr. Nixon has warned.

COLORADO TO KOKO NOR

*The amazing true story
of the CIA's secret war
against Red China*

• The author, L. Fletcher Prouty, is a retired Air Force colonel who is now with the Center of Political Research in Washington, D.C.

By L. FLETCHER PROUTY

STATINTL

NIGHT HAD obscured the mountains when the Air Force cargo plane finally approached the Pikes Peak country from the west. Wearily, it seemed, the aircraft crossed the south shoulder of the peak, turned left, dropped flaps and began the long, gradual descent to Peterson Field which serves both as an Air Force base and the municipal airport of Colorado Springs.

The landing was uneventful. But from that point some strange things happened.

The aircraft, a heavy-bodied C130 powered by four turbo-prop engines, taxied to a remote end of the field rather than to the regular ramp. A military bus quickly pulled up alongside.

If any outsider had been there to witness some 20 men disembark, he would have been told they were soldiers from India scheduled for training at nearby Ft. Carson under a military aid program.

But the troops weren't Indians and they never got to Ft. Carson.

The loaded bus headed westward out of Colorado Springs, up the Ute Pass highway, and disappeared into the night.

During the months that followed, other men like those in the first company mysteriously and periodically in Colorado Springs in

the same mysterious manner and vanished into the mountains.

The identity of these men and the nature of their mission makes a fascinating story — and, in some respects, a frightening one — with vast international implications. Recent developments in relations between the United States and Communist China, which portend so much for an era of peace, give that story a special timeliness. The details of this operation are reported here for the first time.

To understand what this hush-hush operation was all about, it is necessary to set the time, which was August 1959, and to recall the ominous twilight zone — neither peace nor war — into which relations between East and West had drifted in that period. With an eye toward the successful culmination of his two-term administration, President Eisenhower announced a series of international events leading to a super-Summit Conference in Paris during May 1960.

The Korean War had settled into an uneasy truce six years earlier, in 1953. The Berlin Wall was still two years in the future, 1961. At the moment the point of East-West friction was at a most mythical land to most Americans

who connected it vaguely with a Ronald Coleman movie about Shangri-la.

There is nothing mythical about Tibet. It is an ancient country with an area four times that of Colorado, separated from India to the south by the Himalayan Range, many of whose peaks are twice as tall as Colorado's highest mountains. The country's average elevation is about 15,000 feet. Soon after the Communist government took over control of China in 1949, Peking announced its intentions of "liberating" Tibet. In October 1950 Chinese Communist troops invaded it.

Tibet's spiritual and temporal leader, the Dalai Lama, then only 15 years old, urged his people not to resist. The Chinese in turn left the Dalai Lama alone. But by February of 1959 it became evident the Chinese intended to seize him to gain undisputed control over that country.

Forewarned, the Dalai Lama and about 80 of his followers fled Lhasa, the capital city on March 17, 1959, heading for the safety of India. The Chinese were not aware of the Dalai Lama's departure for several days. They had been lulled by the fact that there were only two good routes out of Lhasa, both under Chinese control. The only way of leaving for India would have had to

When Britain pulled out of Rhodesia after the 1965 Unilateral Declaration of Independence, the CIA worked to ferret out details of the sanction-busting. In the popular traditions of spying, secret documents disguised were used to convey messages in invisible ink. It was a shock to one of the informers was a prominent lawyer. But it was not the CIA had expanded into an area where the British were una- active in Egypt, Iran and Syria. E. H. COOKRIDGE ends his column and looks at the Director, Richard Helms

DEAD LETTERS

MANY of the bright young men Allen Dulles had recruited to CIA from law offices and universities had gained their spurs in London, where they were sent to glean some of the methods of the British Secret Intelligence Service. Dulles enjoyed making wisecracks about the Victorian and Indian Army traditions still surviving in the British secret service, but he had a healthy respect for its unrivalled experience and great professionalism. He knew that CIA could learn a lot from the British about operations in the Middle East and Africa, where its stations were rapidly expanding.

After Archibald Roosevelt, one of CIA's foremost "Arabists", had restored cordial relations with SIS when station head in London, a plan of co-operation was devised for Africa, where most of the former British colonies had gained independence, and were becoming subject to strong Soviet and Chinese pressure. Roosevelt was still in London when, in 1965, Rhodesia made her momentous "Unilateral Declaration of Independence" (UDI), which led to the conflict with the British Government.

There is no better instance of the strengthening of CIA-SIS collaboration than the hitherto undisclosed story of the services CIA rendered the British authorities in Rhodesia, particularly since about 1968.

Indeed, in assisting the British SIS in its thankless task of implementing the policy of economic sanctions against the Smith regime, CIA put its relations with the Portuguese in jeopardy. It has an enduring understanding with the Portuguese Government and its PIDE secret service on many aspects: NATO security, anti-communist operations, the use of radio stations in Portugal and her colonies, and of bases for the U-2 spy planes and Special Forces in Angola, Mozambique and Macao. However thin the

British sanction policy became, British consular offices and SIS men were supposed to watch the steady flow of Rhodesian pig-iron, tobacco, and other products through the Portuguese ports of Lorenzo Marques and Beira in East Africa to Europe and the Far East. Merchants and shippers there had made fortunes out of the traffic which the Portuguese were bound, by United Nations resolutions and agreements with Britain, to regard as illegal.

After the closure of British missions in Salisbury all information about Rhodesian exports dried up at source. At this juncture CIA stepped in to assist the British. It was not merely a labour of love. American tobacco syndicates in Virginia, Georgia,

North and South Carolina, Tennessee and Kentucky greatly increased their production and sales to Europe when Rhodesian tobacco growers lost most of their trade through sanctions. Traditionally, Rhodesian tobacco was used for cigar and cigarette manufacture in Belgium, Holland, Germany and Switzerland. When these supplies dried up, European manufacturers turned to American growers. But by and by Rhodesian exports began to flow again, by the use of false certificates of origin and smuggling through the Portuguese ports and through Durban in South Africa, much to the displeasure of the Americans.

Thus, obliging the British and helping American business, CIA ordered its agents to ferret out the secrets of the sanction-busting schemes devised by Mr Ian Smith's regime. Soon the CIA station in Salisbury was bustling with activity. Since 1962 it had been headed by Richard La Macchia, a senior CIA official, who had joined it in 1952 from the U.S. Development Aid Agency.

Other CIA men were Cape Town, former Ambassador Francis M. Bissell, who had worked in Cuba and Congo and several others. Edward

Salisbury, from 1957 from the State Department; from 1959 he headed the East and South African section and, at the time of his new appointment, was Station Head in Pretoria. Among his various exploits he was reputed to have initiated the first contacts between the South African government and Dr Banda of Malawi.

The CIA agents were perpetually journeying between Salisbury and the Mozambique ports, and Murray was temporarily posted to Lusaka to maintain personal contact with British officials resident in Zambia. Mr Ian Smith and his cabinet colleague, Mr J. H. Howman, who looks after foreign affairs as well as security and the secret service of the Rhodesian regime, were not unaware of the unwelcome operations of the Americans. They suffered them for the sake of avoiding an open clash with Washington. Their patience, however, became frayed when it was discovered that secret documents had disappeared from the headquarters of the ruling Rhodesian National Front Party. Subsequently,

IN SALISBURY

STATINTL

THE LEGEND OF TONY POE, CIA

U.S. operations in Southeast Asia have often involved shadowy figures, perhaps none more shadowy than the elusive, Jekyll-Hyde figure of Anthony A. Poshepny
MEN AT WAR/ BY DONALD KIRK

HE'S A ROUND-FACED, cheery man with a cherubic smile and a charming family and, it is said, a penchant for preserving the heads of his victims in formaldehyde. He's a classic Jekyll-and-Hyde who has been waging the most secret phase of America's secret war in Southeast Asia for the past ten years.

To the boys at Napoleon Cafe and the Derby King on Bangkok's Patpong Road, a watering ground for Air America pilots, CIA types, journalists and other assorted old Indochina hands, he's just plain Tony Poe, but his real name is Anthony A. Poshepny. He's a refugee from Hungary, an ex-Marine who fought on Iwo Jima and a dedicated patriot of his adopted land, the United States of America, for which he has risked his life on literally hundreds of occasions while ranging through the undulating velvet-green crags and valleys of Red China, Laos and Thailand.

He also shuns publicity and hates reporters, as I discovered in a long search for him, beginning in the Thai capital of Bangkok and extending to the giant American airbases in northeastern Thailand and to the mountains of northern Laos. The search for Tony Poe ended where it had begun, in the lobby of the Amarin Hotel on Bangkok's Ploenchit Road, a crowded, six-lane-wide avenue that runs through a residential and shopping district supported largely by rich American "farangs," the somewhat demeaning Thai term for "foreigners." There, before leaving Bangkok for the last time, I picked up a note, signed simply "Tony," stating that he had to "decline" my request for an interview. "I believe [sic] that you can appreciate my reason for not seeking public commentary," wrote Tony in the formal "statement style" better befitting a public official and probably suggested, if not dictated, by a superior in the Central Intelligence Agency.

"C-I-A?" asked the cute little Japanese girl at the front desk of the Amarin, enunciating each of the letters, smiling slightly with glittering white teeth, raising her eyebrows flirt-

Poe is airplane pilot. He works for Continental Air Services." An assistant manager, also Japanese, showed me the registration card Tony had signed only a few days before my arrival at the Amarin last June, in the middle of my search for him. Tony, I learned, generally stayed at the Amarin, only a few blocks from the modernesque American embassy. He was a familiar, beloved character to the staff at the hotel—the opposite of his public image as a sinister, secret killer and trainer of anti-Communist guerrilla warriors.

"Anthony A. Poshepny," read the top line. "Air Ops Officer—Continental Air Services." So Tony, with a record of more combat jumps than any other American civilian in Indochina, had used Continental as his "cover" while training mountain tribesmen to fight against regular Communist troops from both China and North Vietnam. Tony's cover surprised me; I had assumed he would declare himself as some sort of U.S. government "official"—perhaps an adviser to border-patrol police units, the traditional cover under which CIA operatives masquerade in both Thailand and Laos. Still, Continental was a logical choice. Like Air America, Continental regularly ferries men and supplies to distant outposts throughout Indochina. Financed at least in part by the CIA, Continental could hardly balk at providing cover for full-time CIA professionals.

The next two lines on Poe's registration form were even more intriguing than his link with Continental, at least in terms of what he was doing at the present. After "going to," Tony had written, "Udorn," the name of the base town in northeastern Thailand from which the United States not only flies bombing missions over all of Laos but also coordinates the guerrilla war on the ground. And where was Tony "coming from," according to the form? His origin was Phitsanulok, a densely jungled mountain province famed for incessant fighting between Commu-

nist-armed guerrillas, most of them members of mountain tribes, and ill-trained Thai army soldiers and policemen. Tony, it seemed, had vanished into the wilds of Phitsanulok (where the jungle is so thick and the slopes so steep as to discourage the toughest American advisers) on a mysterious training venture not known even to most American officials with top-secret security clearances, much less to the girls behind the desk of the Amarin.

"Oh, he's such a nice man," one of the girls in the hotel assured me when I asked how she liked Tony—who, I'd been warned by other journalists, might shoot on sight any reporter discovered snooping too closely into his life. "He has very nice wife and three lovely children," the girl burred on, pausing to giggle slightly between phrases. "He comes here on vacation from up-country." The impression Poe has made on the girls at the Amarin is a tribute both to his personality and his stealth. As I discovered while tracing him from the south of Thailand to northern Laos, he already had an opulent home in Udorn for his wife, a tribal princess whom he had married a year or so ago. Mrs. Poshepny, a tiny, quick-smiling girl whom Tony had met while training members of the Yao tribe for special missions into China, liked to come to Bangkok to shop while Tony conferred with his CIA associates on the guarded "CIA floor," of the American embassy.

It was ironic that I should have learned that Tony stayed at the Amarin while in Bangkok, for it was only by chance that I had checked in there at the beginning of my search—and only during small talk with the desk clerks that I found one of Tony's registration cards.

The day after I arrived in Bangkok, local journalists gave me my first inkling of some of the rumors surrounding Tony Poe. One of the journalists; Lance Woodruff, formerly a reporter on one of Bangkok's two English-language newspapers and now with the Asian Institute of Technology in Bangkok, said Poe not only hated reporters but had been known to "do away with people he doesn't like." Woodruff compared Poe to a figure from *Terry and the Pirates* and told me the story of how Poe lined one wall of a house in northern Laos, near the Chinese border, with heads of persons he had killed. None of the contacts I met in Bangkok had the slightest clue as to Tony's whereabouts—except that he was somewhere "up-country" training tribesmen to fight the Communists,

Still unaware that Poe stayed at the Amarin, I drove to a town named Ithan some 325 miles northeast of

CHINA:

A Present From Chou

For the Fecteaus of Lynn, Mass., and the Harberts of Palo Alto, Calif., there were, indeed, glad tidings last week. Philip and Jessie Fecteau heard it first from Presidential adviser Henry Kissinger, who telephoned from the White House to tell them that their son, Richard, imprisoned in China for nineteen years on an espionage charge, was on his way home. "A wonderful Christmas present," exulted Philip Fecteau, "the best we've ever had." Out in California, a friend broke the news to Gene and Polly Harbert that the Chinese had also released their daughter, Mary Ann, who the Harberts believed had been lost at sea nearly four years ago. "Our reaction to the news was one of incredible, stunned joy," said Polly Harbert, "and instant belief."

In fact, the reappearance of Mary Ann Harbert, now 26, completely startled Washington officials, who were unaware that she had been a prisoner in China. She and a companion disappeared in 1968 while sailing on a private yacht near Hong Kong. As it turned out, their boat was stopped by a Chinese patrol craft and they were accused of intruding into Chinese territorial waters. Miss Harbert was never charged with a crime and was held for three and a half years in farm dwellings in the Canton region. "They wanted me to make [anti-U.S.] statements, but I declined," she said after her release last week. "After a while they stopped pressing me about it and I was treated well." But her sailing companion, Gerald Ross McLaughlin, also from California, did not survive his captivity. The Chinese said last week that he had committed suicide in 1969.

CIA Agents: More complex was the case of Richard Fecteau, now 43, who with a companion, John T. Downey, was captured during the Korean War in 1952. At the time, U.S. officials described the pair as "civilian employees of the Army" whose plane was downed when it strayed over China. Peking, however, charged that Downey and Fecteau were Central Intelligence Agency operatives assigned to infiltrate Nationalist Chinese

agents into the mainland and supply them there. Downey was sentenced to life imprisonment and Fecteau to twenty years. On his return last week, a year short of serving his full sentence, Fecteau said that he had been held in a Peking prison with the curious name of "Grass Green Mist," much of the time in solitary confinement. "You can get used to it," he said in a halting, laconic way last week.

While Washington officials have never publicly admitted that Downey and Fecteau were CIA agents, former U.S. intelligence officers told NEWSWEEK's Evert Clark last week that such, in fact, was the case. And Fecteau's former wife, Margaret (they were divorced before his capture), told reporters: "The Chinese haven't been lying." In any event, Fecteau's release evidently came as a result of Kissinger's conversations with Chou En-lai earlier this year in Peking. And China watchers interpreted the moves as a signal from Chou that the other Americans still imprisoned in China, including Downey, may come out with Mr. Nixon after the President's scheduled China visit in February.

STATINTL



Fecteau



Harbert

BRIDGEPORT, CONN.
POST

DEC 19 1974
E - 82,722
S - 85,633

Mr. Downey's Fate

For nearly two decades the American people have been led to believe that the Red Chinese had imprisoned two American men without just cause. The people of Connecticut continue to maintain a special interest in the case because one of the men, John T. Downey is a native of New Britain and a 1951 graduate of Yale University.

During the past week the Chinese released Richard Fecteau who, along with Mr. Downey, had been convicted by the Supreme People's Court in Peking of espionage. The Chinese claimed Mr. Downey and Mr. Fecteau were involved with the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) assigned to drop agents and supplies into China to foment a revolution.

Mr. Downey and Mr. Fecteau fell into the hands of the Chinese after a plane in which they were passengers became disabled and was grounded inside Red China.

The United States government claimed Mr. Downey and Mr. Fecteau were civilian employees of the Army who had become lost on a routine flight from Korea to Japan. The United States called the sentencing of Mr. Fecteau to 20 years in prison and the commitment of Mr. Downey to life in prison a "most flagrant violation of justice" insisting the charges had been "trumped-up."

The United States assumed and held a hard line. In fact, in 1957 there were reports China would release the two prisoners if the United States would allow American newsmen to visit mainland China. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles would have no part of such negotiations. He was willing to sacrifice the lives of two young men, whether they be innocent of the charges or patriotic Americans risking their all for their country.

Classmates of Mr. Downey have since reported that representatives of the CIA visited Yale to recruit members and talked to Mr. Downey among others.

With the release of Mr. Fecteau, spokesmen for the State Department have modified the American position, saying "it would serve no useful purpose at this time" to discuss the activities of Mr. Fecteau and Mr. Downey when they were captured.

The circumstances in the world are far different today than they were back in the 1950s when countless Americans feared infiltration of our own government by Communists. Then and even now it is difficult to admit that we engage in activities which, if discovered, would be embarrassing.

If Mr. Downey was working for the CIA and a confession coupled with an apology would bring about his release the United States government owes this man nothing less.

China's Prisoners:

Pawns In the Game of Peking Chess

Speaking barely above a whisper and wringing his hands nervously, Richard G. Fecteau last Wednesday held his first meeting with reporters following his release from 19 years of imprisonment in China. When asked whether he had been a spy, as the Chinese charged, Mr. Fecteau replied almost inaudibly: "No comment."

In November, 1954, the Supreme People's Court in Peking convicted Mr. Fecteau, of Lynn, Mass., then 27, and John T. Downey, 24, of New Britain, Conn., of espionage. Mr. Fecteau was sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment. Mr. Downey received a life sentence. According to the court, the two Americans were Central Intelligence Agency operatives whose plane had been shot down in Northeastern China on Nov. 29, 1952. They had been making contact, it was charged, with Chinese anti-Communists whom they had previously organized and dropped into China.

In announcing Mr. Fecteau's release, the New China News Agency reported that Mr. Downey's sentence had been commuted to five years' imprisonment, starting from the date of commutation, which was not specified. Said the agency: "In view of the fact that the two culprits . . . admitted their crimes during the trial and their behavior was not bad while serving their terms, Chinese authorities decided to grant them leniency. . . ."

Released at the same time as Mr. Fecteau was Mary Ann Harbert, 25, a Palo Alto, Calif. student. American authorities thought she had perished when a sailboat on which she was traveling from Hong Kong to Manila vanished in Chinese waters in April, 1968. But last week the Chinese revealed that she had been arrested as a spy and that a companion in the boat, Gerald L. McLaughlin, detained at the same time, had committed suicide in 1969. Nothing was said about two other Americans held by Peking, military pilots Philip E. Smith and Robert H. Johnson, who were shot down over Chinese territory during the Vietnam conflict.

It wasn't difficult to draw a connection between the Chinese actions toward three of the imprisoned Americans and the modest thaw in Sino-American relations and President Nixon's coming trip to Peking.

In 1955, the last time Peking initiated a serious effort at rapprochement with Washington, negotiations had sought the release of some 30 American civilians detained by China and 130-odd Chinese scientists and scholars who had been prohibited from leaving the United States. All of the detained Chinese and most of the Americans won their freedom, but, before Mr. Downey, Mr. Fecteau and a few others were released, the agreement broke down, amid charges of bad faith by each side.

Then, early in 1957, Peking, still seeking a variety of contacts with Washington and eager to have the American people learn of the accomplishments of "new China," indicated that it would release the remaining American prisoners if Washington would allow American newsmen to visit China. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles announced that he would not approve such an arrangement because it would constitute yielding to Chinese "blackmail." Mr. Dulles's justification of his decision rested on the assumption that the conviction of Mr. Downey and Mr. Fecteau was based upon "trumped-up charges."

The State Department last week officially still refused to concede the truth of the Chinese charges but privately officials admitted that Mr. Downey and Mr. Fecteau actually were C.I.A. agents. As Mr. Fecteau's divorced wife reminded the press last week, despite governmental instructions not to discuss the case: "The Chinese haven't been lying."

Since China's "Ping-Pong diplomacy" last spring, a succession of undisclosed communications from the United States Government, including some from Henry Kissinger, the President's national security adviser, and a personal plea by Mr. Nixon himself, made it clear to Peking that no gesture of reconciliation would be more welcome to public opinion in the United States than the release of detained Americans. It was recognized that the fate of the two detained military pilots may be linked to that of the American prisoners of war held by the Vietnamese Communists. But hope for the freedom of Mr. Downey and Mr. Fecteau began to rise.

There is a natural sense of disappointment at China's failure to release Mr. Downey. Yet, in view of the fact that the Supreme People's Court found him to have been "the chief criminal in the case" and accordingly gave him the more severe sentence, it is not surprising that he has been treated differently from Mr. Fecteau.

Commutation of his sentence to a five-year term, after 19 years in prison, was undoubtedly intended to signify the seriousness with which Peking continues to regard the case. (Four Chinese involved in the episode were executed.)

Moreover, because of the resentment that all patriotic Chinese feel about imperialist interference with China's judicial processes during the "century of humiliation," prior to 1949, China's leaders may have thought that to release both men at this juncture might suggest a readiness to sacrifice a prerogative of national sovereignty to American political pressures.

If Sino-American negotiators make progress during the coming months, and Mr. Downey's behavior continues to be "not bad," it is still possible that another commutation will lead to his immediate release. Much may depend on how the United States handles the return of Mr. Fecteau.

If Washington depicts him as the innocent, "brain-washed" victim of Communist despotism, it will alienate Peking and broaden the credibility gap at home. If it permits him to tell his full story, it may enhance prospects for the release of the remaining Americans, but it will further tarnish the reputation for veracity of previous Administrations. Thus far, the Government appears to be steering between Scylla and Charybdis.

—JEROME ALAN COHEN

Mr. Cohen, professor of law at Harvard, is author of "The Criminal Process in the People's Republic of China."

STATINTL

14 DEC 1971

Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA-RDP80-01601R00

China Frees 2 American Prisoners

By Stanley Karnow

Washington Post Staff Writer

The American prisoners freed by China on Sunday were apparently released as a result of efforts undertaken by White House national security adviser Henry Kissinger during his trips to Peking.

State Department spokesman Robert J. McCloskey disclosed yesterday that Kissinger, who twice visited Peking to arrange for President Nixon's forthcoming trip to China, raised the question of the U.S. prisoners in his talks with Chinese Premier Chou En-lai.

Although the details of Kissinger's discussions were not made public, the Chinese released Richard Fecteau, 44, of Lynn, Mass., and Mary Ann Harbert, of Menlo Park, Calif., in a gesture on the eve of the President's trip.

Speaking on behalf of the President, now meeting in the Azores with French President Georges Pompidou, White House press secretary Ronald Ziegler said that Mr. Nixon "welcomes the act of the People's Republic of China" and expressed "particular pleasure" that Fecteau and Miss Harbert would spend Christmas with their families.

Both Miss Harbert and Fecteau were reported in good health on their arrival in the United States last night.

The Chinese also announced on Sunday that they had commuted the sentence of John T. Downey, 41, of New Britain, Conn., who was captured with Fecteau during the Korean War in November, 1952.

Both men were identified by American officials as civilian employees of the U.S. Army whose aircraft disappeared on a flight from South Korea to Japan. The Chinese charged, however, that they were Central Intelligence Agency operatives engaged in setting up guerrilla bases in northeast China.

Convicted by the Chinese in 1954, Fecteau was sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment and Downey was given a life term.

Fecteau was scheduled for release next year. Downey's commutation will make him due for release in five years.

Announcing the changes in their sentences, Peking's official New China News Agency said on Sunday that the "two culprits" had "admitted their crimes during their trials and their behavior was not bad while serving their terms."

Miss Harbert was arrested by the Chinese in 1963 when she and a companion, Gerald Ross McLaughlin, strayed into China's waters off southern Kwangtung Province while sailing their yacht from Hong Kong to Manila.

The New China News Agency said on Sunday that Miss Harbert's release followed the confession of her "mistakes." The agency revealed, however, that McLaughlin had committed suicide in March, 1969, adding that he had "behaved badly, resisted investigation" and taken "the warders unawares."

Believed Lost at Sea

The Chinese had not disclosed the arrest of the couple prior to their announcement of Miss Harbert's release on Sunday. Until then, they were presumed to have been lost at sea.

Two other American prisoners still being held in China are Air Force Maj. Philip E. Smith, whose F-104 went down over southern Hainan Island in September, 1965, and Navy Lt. Robert J. Flynn, a crew member aboard an A-6 that strayed over China's southernmost province of Kwangsi in August, 1967.

Some sources believe that since the two U.S. military men were captured in connection with missions in the Vietnam war, their release will depend on any agreement between Hanoi and Washington on American POWs now held by North Vietnam.

Among the other U.S. citizens being detained in China are Americans who sympathized with the Communist regime and ran afoul of its political zigzags. These include Sydney Rittenberg, a propagandist in Peking who joined the Red Guards during Mao Tse-tung's Cultural Revolution for "ultra-leftism."


Praises President

Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.) called the release of the Americans "one of the most important symbols of the emerging era of improved relations between our two countries." Kennedy said further that the President "deserves the highest praise" for securing their release.

In Lynn, Mass., one of Fecteau's twin daughters posted a hand-lettered sign on a garage door, reading: "Aly Dad's Home at Last." Fecteau and

Harvard Law School Prof. Jerome A. Cohen made a similar proposal to the White House in July after discussing the prisoner issue with Chinese diplomats in Canada. Cohen, who was a classmate of Downey at Yale, said at the time that his suggestion had received "working-level" endorsement within the administration.

It is not known whether Kissinger conceded in his conver-



John Downey, left, whose life sentence was commuted by Peking, and Richard Fecteau, who was released.



his wife, Mrs. Margaret Fecteau, were divorced in 1951.

Mary Ann Harbert's sister, Mrs. Sue Carrington of Mountain View, Calif., said on hearing the news: "We're walking on air."

In Washington, meanwhile, a cousin of John T. Downey has asked Mr. Nixon to urge the Chinese leaders when he visits Peking in February to release Downey under presidential custody.

Sean Downey of McLean, Va., expressed the belief in an interview yesterday that the Chinese might free his cousin if the President concedes that Downey was indeed a CIA operative when he was captured. "That approach would give the Chinese an opportunity to save face," Downey explained.

Talks in Ottawa

Downey said that the Chinese ambassador to Canada, Huang Hua, had indicated during a conversation they had in Ottawa in October that John Downey's chances of release might be improved if the United States acknowledged the CIA.

sations that Fecteau and Downey had been CIA employees. But Cohen, an expert in Chinese law, has been in occasional contact with Kissinger.

Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000400280001-0

China Frees 2 Americans

Man Held 19 Years, Woman 3

HONG KONG (AP) — China today freed two Americans, a man held captive for 19 years and a woman captured on a yacht in 1968. The pair crossed into Hong Kong and left on a flight for the United States.

The Peking government announced it had reduced the life sentence of another American and that a fourth American prisoner committed suicide more than two years ago.

Richard Fecteau, 43, a civilian Army employe from Lynn, Mass., captured during the Korean War, and Mary Ann Harbert crossed the border in the early afternoon. A Royal Air Force helicopter flew them to Kai Tak airport, and there they boarded a U.S. military plane for the United States, a spokesman for the Hong Kong government said.

Undisclosed Destination

It was not revealed where the plane was taking them.

Peking announced that the life sentence being served by John T. Downey, 41, of New Britain, Conn., had been commuted to five years, starting from the date of commutation. That date was not announced, but presumably it was recent.

Fecteau and Downey were listed as civilian employes of the U.S. Army, but the Chinese contended they were CIA agents, air-dropping Nationalist Chinese spies, a charge the U.S. government repeatedly denied.

The fourth American listed by Peking today was Gerald Ross McLaughlin. The New China News Agency said he was captured with Miss Harbert aboard a yacht in Chinese territorial waters north of Hong Kong on April 21, 1968. The Communist agency said he committed suicide March 7, 1969, while under investigation.

First Positive Word

Peking's announcement was the first positive word of the capture of Miss Harbert and McLaughlin, and no information about them was available in Hong Kong.

"Are you sure?" Philip Fecteau asked a newsman who told him this morning in Lynn, Mass., that his brother Richard had been freed. Philip said his parents had listened late last night to a television newscast that mentioned a possibility his brother would be released today.

"But, we've had so many false alarms, we didn't really believe it this time," he said.

The New England Telephone Co. said later the Fecteau's had asked to have their telephone disconnected.

Fecteau is father of twin daughters, now 21. He and the girls' mother were divorced the year before he was captured.

Fecteau remarried, but his second wife died in a fire in 1953 in Avalon Shores, Md.

Fecteau and his daughters had kept in touch with letters until four years ago when the Chinese stopped giving the girls' letters to their father because of an address one of them inadvertently put on a letter.

She wrote "The Peoples Republic of Red China," and the word "China" underlined in red.

None of the letters from the girls, named Suzon and Sidnee, has been answered since then.

Fecteau had managed to buy gifts for his daughters on some occasions, such as Christmas or their birthdays.

In New Britain, Conn., Downey's brother William said, "After 19 years, my hopes don't get dashed. We're glad there was some commutation, but disappointed that it was not now." William said he and his mother, Mary Downey of New Britain, had been told that John's sentence was being reviewed when they visited John earlier this year. Downey's sister, Mary Walsh, said through tears, "I'm very happy for Richard Fecteau—I think it's wonderful. That's all I can say now."

In the Azores, President Nixon today hailed the release of the two prisoners and the shortening of the sentence of the third.

White House press secretary Ronald L. Ziegler said Nixon's national security affairs adviser Henry A. Kissinger negotiated with Chinese Premier Chou En-lai during his two trips to China on the subject of American prisoners.

"The President welcomes this act of clemency of the People's Republic of China," Ziegler told newsmen who accompanied Nixon to the Azores for a meeting with French President Georges Pompidou.

Ziegler said the U.S. government had been informed in advance of the Chinese plans to release the two Americans.

2 Others Still Held

Two other Americans are known to be still imprisoned in China: Air Force Capt. Phillip B. Smith, whose plane was shot down over the Gulf of Tonkin in September 1960, and Lt. Robert J. Flynn, a U.S.

Navy pilot presumed shot down over China's Kwangsi Province in August 1957.

Navy Lt. Joseph Dunn, whose plane was shot down off China's Hainan Island in February 1958, is listed as missing on the Chinese mainland.

The government spokesman said Fecteau looked healthy and wore a blue Chinese suit with blue cap. Miss Harbert, in Western-style clothes, appeared healthy but rather thin, the spokesman said. They had eight pieces of luggage with them.

Fecteau and Downey were captured in 1952 during the Korean War when a military plane on which they were passengers was shot down on a flight from Japan to Korea.

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Their Plane Downed

Fecteau and Downey were captured in 1952 during the Korean War when a military plane on which they were passengers was shot down on a flight from Japan to Korea.

Fecteau served 19 years of a 20-year sentence. He and Downey were visited last month by Downey's mother, Mrs. Mary Downey, 74, who told newsmen afterward that her son looked "well and in good spirits." Mrs. Downey predicted commutation of her son's sentence and said Fecteau was due for release soon.

Downey's sister, Mrs. Mary Walsh, contacted today at her home in New Britain, said through tears: "I'm very happy for Richard Fecteau—I think it's wonderful. That's all I can say now."

The Chinese Communists held two other Americans in prison for years. In July 1970, they released Roman Catholic Bishop James Walsh, 79, after holding him for 12 years on espionage charges. The other American was Hugh Redmond, 51. Peking said he committed suicide in April 1970. Arrested in 1951, he also was accused of espionage and was serving a life sentence.

STATINTL



NASHVILLE, TENN.

BANNER

DEC 1 1971
E - 97,879

Hard Times

BEING AT THE CROSSROADS of international intrigue has proven to be a headache for the French government. Recently, the French press has devoted considerable space to the difficulty Paris is encountering in finding suitable recruits for the government's counter-espionage agency.

France has only a handful of China experts to call on, against an estimated 10,000 in the United States. Even French attempts to lure Chinese-speaking Vietnamese living in France have met with complete failure.

According to Le Monde, the majority of candidates had to be rejected because they either sympathized with the Viet Cong, or were already in the pay of the C.I.A.

Keep trying, mon amis.

PHILADELPHIA, PA.
BULLETIN

E - 634,371
S - 701,743

NOV 29 1971

STATINTL



J. F. ter Horst: Mao's men at work

Spying on the Chinese spies

Washington — Reports that the Communist Chinese delegation at the United Nations in New York is loaded with spies naturally took Washington by surprise. I contacted my friend, C. Helms Richards, to find out how the CIA was handling the crisis.

"Everything's under control," he told me. "But don't breathe a word because we don't want to make the Chinese suspicious."

"I wouldn't think of it," I replied, putting away my notebook and flipping on my hidden tape recorder. "Tell me about it."

"We've got 'em all under surveillance," he whispered. "We've bugged their rooms on the 14th floor of the Hotel Roosevelt in New York. We've even got one of our top counterspies on the switchboard, monitoring all their calls."

Charlie Chan fan

"Gee, I didn't know our side had guys like that. I suppose he speaks fluent Pekingese?"

"No—Brooklynese. But he's seen all the Charlie Chan movies."

I inquired, as inscrutably as I could, whether we were getting any help from the Soviets in spying on the Chinese Communist spies.

"They've been invaluable," Richards said. "Thank goodness, there are so many Russian spooks among us. The FBI has given us a list of over 500 Soviet diplomats, trade officials and journalists — and they've really come through."

"Did you know, for example, that the Peking delegates think Chinatown

cooks put too much foo in the egg foo young?"

"I knew we could count on J. Edgar Hoover," I said. "What else have you uncovered about these Chinese espionage agents?"

Report for President

Richards pulled a long sheet from his inner pocket. "This is what we're reporting to the President," he said. He began reading.

"Kao Liang, the Chinese advance man at the UN, told a gal reporter the other day that the Chicoms have brought in a secret blend of tea which requires no sugar."

"Wow!" I cried. "If Castro finds out, he'll become a capitalist."

"Yeah, but think of the effect on the sugar lobby in Congress. Why, this tea could ruin our economy."

"I'm glad we're going to keep a lid on it," I murmured gratefully. "What else have you found out?"

Richards resumed reading.

Item two: Chicom mission member X slipped into a tailor shop in the New York garment district and let them copy his Mao-style worksuit."

"You're kidding!"

"Nope. It's obvious what they're up to. They're trying to revolutionize the fashion industry. First thing you know, Mrs. Jacob Javits or the wife of some Republican bigwig will be wearing a suit to the White House."

"Not to mention Joan Kennedy," I said, helpfully. "Have you alerted Martha Mitchell?"

'Great walls of China!'

Richards' phone rang. It was the

Charlie Chan fan man calling from the Roosevelt Hotel switchboard. Richards' face paled as he listened. "Great walls of China!" he exclaimed, banging down the receiver. "I've got to tell the President."

I managed to stop him at the door. "What's the big emergency?"

"Our man just overheard a conversation between Red Chinese delegate Chiao Kuan-hua and Henry Kissinger at the White House," Richards declared, trying to get by.

"You mean——"

"Yup! That Chinese laundry around the corner from the Roosevelt won't return Chiao's shirts. He wants 'em back before the President goes to Peking or Chiao's going to pass the word to Chou En-lai."

I laughed. "No tickee, no shirtee, eh?"

"Worse than that," Richards muttered, bolting out the doorway toward the White House. "No shirtee, no talk-ee."

MICRONESIA

STAGING AREA IMPERIALISM

STEPHEN CONNOLLY and PETER SHAPIRO
Mr. Connolly, formerly on the editorial staff of Journal of Contemporary Revolutions (San Francisco State College), is now working with William Lightbourne on a book to be called The Politics of U.S. Counterinsurgency. Mr. Shapiro is co-author of An End to Silence (Bobbs-Merrill), a history of the San Francisco State College strike.

"I want every wave in the Pacific to be an American wave," former Secretary of State Dean Rusk was once quoted as saying. Rusk might well have had Micronesia in mind. Spread out over an expanse of the western Pacific larger in area than the continental United States, this group of tiny islands has, in the last 100 years, been occupied by a succession of colonial powers—Spain, Germany and later Japan; after World War II another expanding empire, the United States, stepped into the void left by the defeated Japanese. All but oblivious to the existence of Micronesia, many Americans will recognize the names of specific islands within the group. World War II veterans remember Saipan, Kwajalein and Peleliu; for the nuclear generation, Bikini and Eniwetok come immediately to mind. And Americans who have never heard of the geographical entity to which these specks in the Pacific belong should go back to their school maps, for the Nixon Administration is turning the area into a military arsenal and training center for its Project AGILE Pacific Defense System.

Micronesia became an American "protectorate" in 1947, under a unique arrangement of the United Nations Trusteeship Council which invested the United States with full responsibility for the islands' economic, social and political development, full authority over their internal affairs, and permission to build military installations, conduct nuclear explosions, and generally use them as a buffer against powers in the Far East which long ago ceased to be hostile. Technically, the arrangement was provisional, it being assumed that eventually the Micronesians would be "ready for self-government." Their murky political status as a U.S. "trust" was underlined when Washington, anxious to avoid a colonial blemish, handed the job of administering the territory over to the Department of the Interior—which, for its part, followed a policy of "benign neglect" reminiscent of the behavior of its Bureau of Indian Affairs. Before 1964, the trusteeship proceeded on a shoestring budget that never exceeded \$7 million, half of which went to pay the salaries of Interior Department personnel. The Defense Department's Micronesia budget for nuclear tests alone exceeded the combined State Department and Interior Department budgets by more than \$1 million; not surprisingly, the DOD wound up making most of the important administrative decisions—including the forced evacuation of residents in the Marshall Islands group to make way for a series of thermonuclear explosions which nonetheless exposed the islands to previous levels of radiation and con-

taminated most of their food supply. "Social and economic development" remained almost moribund as the territorial administration, fearful of "outside influences" that might undermine U.S. control, enforced a near-total quarantine on foreign trade. At least one Micronesian died and many others were disabled by live bombs which the United States never bothered to remove after World War II.

By 1964 this blatant mismanagement succeeded in provoking a Trusteeship Council investigation, the upshot of which was a resolve by the investigators to come back again in three years to determine what changes, if any, had been made. The prospect that the United States might be stripped of its trusteeship if conditions on the islands did not significantly improve could not be taken lightly, particularly because of secondary effects stemming from recent escalation of the war in Vietnam. The Japanese leftists had responded to that development by stepping up their attacks on the Japanese-American Mutual Security Pact, which in 1960 had been extended for ten years. Fearing that the pact might not survive beyond 1970, United States policy makers were even more apprehensive lest sizable U.S. investments inside Japan be threatened by rising political instability there. To appease the Japanese, Washington began giving serious consideration to the idea of abandoning its base on Okinawa, itself the scene of growing anti-American demonstrations. What was needed was a site of comparable strategic value to which the Okinawa operation could be transferred. Thailand and South Korea were too close to enemy territory; the political situation in the Philippines was already too volatile. Micronesia was another story. Not only was it out of reach of Chinese and Soviet medium-range missiles; but if the United States could maintain the kind of control over the islands' internal affairs that it had once enjoyed, the political results of operating a military outpost there could be held to a minimum.

The impending U.N. investigation posed an immediate and irritating stumbling block to these designs. President Johnson and his advisers were well aware of the need to engage in some housecleaning in Micronesia before the investigators arrived; at the same time, they knew that if the Micronesian people could be prevailed upon to enter into a voluntary association with the United States, all U.N. authority in the matter would end. In 1966, without waiting for the customary invitation from the host nation, Mr. Johnson dispatched a contingent of Peace Corps volunteers to the islands, hoping simultaneously to mollify the U.N. and to persuade the natives that a permanent "free association" with the United States really was in their best interests. Most of the volunteers promptly busied themselves with land management, teaching (usually English or American history) and "community development."

Cancer Hope Found in Tree Substance

By Neil D. Rosenberg
of The Journal Staff

A research chemist for Eli Lilly & Co., a major pharmaceutical firm, says two substances extracted from tree bark—one type of which was smuggled out of China—might be highly effective against certain cancers.

Gordon H. Svoboda, a member of the Milwaukee section of the American Chemical Society, said he and others at Eli Lilly had extracted a substance from an Australian tree, known commonly as the yellowwood, that appears to have "the broadest application (in cancer therapy) of any compound, synthetic or natural known to date."

The substance, acronycine, is an alkaloid or natural chemical containing nitrogen.

He said preliminary research showed that in some types of myelomas—tumors of the bone marrow—the substance offered "100% suppression or total stopping of the growth of the tumor."

Works on Tumors

He said it had also proved effective in the treatment of 13 out of 21 neoplasms, types of cancer tumor. Svoboda talked about the treatment in a speech in Port Washington.

However, he said, one major obstacle to its use in humans is difficulty for the body to effectively absorb the substance. He said he hoped European researchers working on this problem would overcome it within a year.

He said another substance, camptothecin, had been shown to be effective against certain adult acute leukemia, gastro-intestinal cancers and melanoma, a particularly virulent

form of cancer known as "black wart" cancer because it usually first exhibits itself externally by a dark, malignant wart.

He said this substance, also an alkaloid, was extracted from a tree that grows only in mainland China. It is considered a sacred tree, he said, because it is rarely found growing near temples.

Seeds Smuggled

He said seeds from the tree were smuggled out of China, through Hong Kong, by the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and brought to this country. A small orchard of the trees is now growing in California, he said.

Svoboda said the discovery of these two substances was a direct result of research he began on higher plant forms in 1957. At that time, he said, these were experiments with a plant known as the Madagascar periwinkle to find a substance that might be a possible insulin substitute.

Instead it was found that one of the extracted substances had an antitumor capability. That substance, now known as leurocristine, has proved to be highly effective in the treatment of acute childhood leukemia.

In fact, he said, when used in combination with three other anticancer chemicals, there have been a number of cures.

The substance is also highly effective in Hodgkins disease, a cancer of the lymph glands occurring usually in teenagers and young adults, which was usually fatal.

Leurocristine has also been somewhat effective in treating breast, cervix and prostate cancer.

He said that because of success with that substance, he and his colleagues went on to investigate more than 10,000 plant specimens from about 6,000 species.

Svoboda received a doctorate in pharmaceutical chemistry from the University of Wisconsin in 1949. He has been with Eli Lilly since 1960.

25 Sept 71

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Drumfire on China

It is a topsy-turvy world when Premier Chou En-lai rebukes James Reston for having said the President lacks courage: "Deciding to come to China at this time is something which even the opposition party says others dare not do. So on this point he has some courage." How much courage it will take has yet to be fully determined. The new China policy was roundly rejected by the AFL-CIO executive council, 24 to 4 with two abstentions, while the American Legion has given it grudging approval on the express condition that no concessions are made by our side.

Anyone who rejects political acts because of the possible motives behind them had better avoid politics altogether. No doubt the President was fully aware of the domestic gains in his announcement, although we can hardly believe that he thought they could outweigh the gut issue: the domestic economy. More to the point is Chou's remark. Nobody thought the old China lobby amounted to much anymore. But the White House needed no Geiger counter to alert it to hostile right-wing reaction. The Vice-President's celebrated midnight remarks last April against the first flush of "ping-pong diplomacy" provided the modern instant communications counterpart to Paul Revere's ride. Immediately after the trip announcement in July, twelve conservatives, headed by William F. Buckley, announced suspension of "support" for Nixon, and a few weeks ago delegates representing 67,000 Young Americans for Freedom voted to dump Nixon, in part because the trip will threaten "the national sovereignty of the United States." The antics of the Rev. Carl McIntyre with his Taiwan table tennis team raise little more than smiles from sophisticated infighters. But in Middle America confusion and concern can become bitter hatred if properly aroused. Toward this end various reactionary revivalists of the early 1950's witchhunt are once again on the conspiracy trail. This time they can move against the background of an admitted betrayer of secrets, Daniel Ellsberg, as compared with the earlier accused but unproven "traitor," Alger Hiss.

Recently a Detroit FM station carried four hours of telephone interviews with a young American scholar on China. The moderator claimed no other program had evoked so many responses. The angry callers seemed awakened from a 20-years' sleep, so obsessed were they by the McCarran hearings, the Institute of Pacific Relations, and alleged Communist affiliations of such personages as Professor John K. Fairbank and Henry Kissinger. But these long-dormant memories did not spontaneously spring to life; they are cultivated. Visitors to San Clemente heard first-hand of the "hate Henry" campaign that is being waged in many localities in an effort to embarrass the President's trip through his emissary.

Mr. Nixon need only recall his own past to appre-

ciate the ignorance and fear that can be exploited against China. In this regard he faces a much tougher fight than did President Roosevelt in moving to recognize the Soviet Union in 1933. American business had built Russian factories. American journalists and tourists had traveled throughout that country. A positive subliminal image of Russia had established aesthetic and humanistic ties through intimate familiarity with Tchaikowsky and Rachmaninoff, Dostoevsky and Tolstoy. The savagery of civil war and foreign intervention against the new Soviet state had been followed with the Hoover relief missions.

No such counterforce exists on the China question. The bitter heritage of two wars, Korea and Vietnam, fuses in American perceptions as the product of Chinese Communist aggression. Total isolation from the mainland for 20 years combines with the most remote and random newsreel images of the previous decades, broken only by the familiar figures of a sturdy little generalissimo and his striking Wellesley-educated wife.

New versions of old tales fuel opposition fires. On the day Senator Proxmire's Joint Economic Committee heard three prominent professors attack secret subversion against the mainland conducted jointly by the Chinese Nationalists and the CIA, Senator Eastland released a study by Professor Richard L. Walker which estimated that between 34 and 60 million Chinese died over the past 50 years as a result of Communist activity. Walker included all the intermittent civil wars of 1927-49 as well as wholly unsubstantiated and unverifiable figures from every kind of source, including Radio Moscow. Another hate-China theme focuses on drugs. A few days after the Eastland report came a headline-grabbing story from Saigon. According to an alleged "high-level defector" out of North Vietnam, poppy fields in that country are so large it takes a harvesting tractor one whole day to cover a single planting. The produce is secretly processed in China, he said, and smuggled out through Hong Kong. Interestingly the defector admitted he had not revealed this information when first interviewed a year ago, claiming it had not seemed important then. Its importance now was obvious since only the previous week, two detailed accounts—one by the Associated Press Pulitzer prize winner, Peter Arnett, and another in *The New York Times*, had traced the Asian drug traffic to specific villages on the Burma-Thai border. From there it moves over land and air routes to South Vietnam, with the certain knowledge if not connivance of Thai and South Vietnamese officials. No matter that the *Far Eastern Economic Review* states unequivocally that Hong Kong is not a conduit for drugs from mainland China, or that the US Narcotics Bureau lays no charge against the People's Republic of China, such as it does against Turkey, Iran and a host of other countries.

We see no evidence of an all-out US campaign at the UN to retain Taiwan's seat and thereby block

continued

Peking's entry. We liked the way Mr. Nixon kept his cool after Peking had blasted Secretary Rogers for the regrettably wrong but understandably politic two-China ploy. The President has some tough steps to take in Washington and Taipei if his trip is to succeed, but he deserves good marks for what he has done so far in refusing the Pentagon bid to move nuclear weapons storage from Okinawa to Taiwan and reportedly canceling clandestine ground probes into China by CIA-supported groups in Laos.

Guess Who's Coming to Dinner!

BY MORRIE RYSKIND

Now it can be told! I am in possession of the entire 7,000,000 words of Sino-American discussion that led to the invitation to Mr. Nixon to visit the glorious People's Republic of China. (At least, that's the name it goes under, and I think Mr. Nader should investigate the claim.)

There has been much speculation about this, but the Administration has arbitrarily refused to reveal the content of the talks—even to Mr. Fulbright.

But I was determined the people should know, and made my plans for securing the data. I might have enlisted the aid of Daniel Ellsberg or Bill Buckley, but knew this was no time for amateurs. Instead, I appealed to my old friend, Charlie Chan, to come out of retirement in this crisis.

"Most happy to serve," agreed Charlie. "It is written that a cabbage has many leaves."

That threw me. "And what does that mean?"

"Not absolutely certain," said Charlie. "Is old Chinese proverb from the Shang Dynasty, most effective in imparting air of knowledge. My No. 1 son uses it in fortune cookies in his restaurant, if you take the \$1.50 dinner. With dollar dinner, you get 'Daisies are strong' which is from less cultured Hsia Dynasty."

"Ah, so?" I said, pretending interest. "Charlie, you know I'm just crazy about Chinese fortune cookies

and proverbs. But right now time is of the essence. The plane leaves in an hour and you'd better get packed." And I bade him a fond adieu with a quotation from P'an Ku.

Obviously, I cannot disclose Charlie's methods. Suffice it to say that he entered Peking as a Bulgarian merchant, aided by a false passport. Nor can I reveal how he got to meet the cutie who is Chou's private secretary and obtain from her a copy of all the secret talks. The confidences a spy gives to his employer are fully as privileged as though he were telling them to his lawyer or priest.

He left China by yak, fearing detection if he took the more familiar routes, and was at long last able to take a plane back to Los Angeles with 450 volumes of the secret papers intact.

I had hoped to run the first installment in this issue, but that, alas, must await further study. For, unfortunately, the notes are typed in Mandarin, whereas Charlie speaks only Cantonese and Pidgin English.

Indeed, he has the typical Chinese difficulty in differentiating between an "l" and an "r". This set us back further. When I asked him to find me a man who knew Mandarin, he returned with a fellow who played the mandolin.

Other contretemps have held us back, but I still have hopes we can get the articles ready before Christmas, when we expect Bantam Books to publish them under the title *The Red Dragon Papers*.

But we have enough to give you at

least some significant details never revealed before. When Mr. Nixon sent Kissinger abroad, he also sent with him, as his ostensible valet, a CIA man who looks like Henry, and who often appeared at public functions as Kissinger, while Henry himself was making whoopee.

Thus the night of the famous confrontation with Chou, Henry had already made another date. So the CIA man went in to hear Chou's conditions for the meeting. And the real Henry was actually dining that night in a Parisian cafe with Bella Abzug. And if that's not a seep, what is? Eat your heart out, Earl Wilson!

Happily, the actual invitation to Mr. Nixon is in English. It reads: "Honorable President Nixon, Dear Sir: We are most happy to accede to your plea for an audience with us, though we frankly doubt an imperialist warmonger has anything to say. We remain inflexible in our modest demands."

"We ask nothing but that you sell us some goods we badly need, get your troops out of Asia and maybe Hawaii, and that your country and Taiwan get off the U.N. Security Council and give us those seats. And, above all, no cracks about our opium traffic. Remember, cabbages have many leaves. Sincerely, Mao and Chou."

Who could turn down such a gracious invitation?

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STATINTL

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

CIA Eavesdrops on Kremlin Chiefs

By Jack Anderson

The Central Intelligence Agency has been eavesdropping, incredibly, on the most private conversations of Kremlin and other world leaders.

For obvious security reasons, we can't give a clue as to how it's done. But we can state categorically that, for years, the CIA has been able to listen to the kingpins of the Kremlin banter, bicker and backbite among themselves.

A competent source, with access to the transcripts of the private Kremlin conversations, tells us that the Soviet leaders gossip about one another and complain about their ailments like old maids.

It is evident from the conversations that Leonid Brezhnev, the party chief, sometimes drinks too much vodka and suffers from hangovers. Premier Kosygin, however, is in poor health, and his complaints are more authentic.

One of their favorite pastimes is visiting a private clinic to get their aches soothed. Like fat capitalists at the end of a hard day in their plush suites, the Kremlin chiefs stop by for steam baths, rubdowns and other physical therapy.

Brezhnev, in a typical conversation, might grump about

his back pains and announce he's going to have Olga give him a massage. "Olga Oh ho!" President Nikolai Podgorny might chortle, as if he is quite familiar with the masseuse.

Mao Close Up

Like the Kremlin crowd, the Red Chinese leaders are far less forbidding in private than they appear to the world. The mighty Mao Tse-tung, his appointed successor Lin Biao and Premier Chou En-lai are tired, old revolutionaries slowed down by the ravages of age.

Mao shares Brezhnev's taste for good food, strong drink and a woman's touch. But he is less grumpy and grim than the Soviet leader. There's an avuncular affability about Mao, and he has an infectious laugh.

But at 77, he walks slowly, though erectly, with his left arm dangling strangely. The CIA concluded from a careful study of film shots that Mao's eyes are dim from age. He seems unable to recognize old comrades until they are face to face.

The CIA has also caught the old fox using a ringer to stand in for him at long, dreary public parades. But it was the real Mao who made that publicized plunge in the Yangtze a couple years ago. The picture

of his moon face bobbing above the waves was carefully scrutinized by the CIA, which concluded after measuring his ears and other facial features that the swimmer was no double.

Pictures of world leaders routinely are blown up and studied by CIA doctors for clues to their health. Their behavior is also analyzed by CIA psychiatrists and psychologists.

Footnote: One of the CIA's greatest triumphs, heretofore untold, was fishing out some of the late Premier Nikita Khrushchev's excrement before it was flushed down the toilet. The great bathroom caper was pulled during his 1959 state visit to the U.S. The filched feces was eagerly analyzed by CIA medics who concluded that Khrushchev then was in excellent health for a man of his age and rotundity.

Strong-Arm Tactics

One of the most notorious regimes in the American labor movement may be near its end.

Pete Weber, the strongman, \$138,000 a-year boss of the Operating Engineers in New Jersey, has gone to jail for extortion. His brother Ed, who ran for his job, has been beaten by Larry Cahill, an honest, veteran union man.

But there is life in the old Weber machine yet. Cahill's supporters were subjected to bullyboy tactics to coerce them going along with Ed Weber.

Cars with Cahill bumper stickers had their tires slashed and windows broken. Three Cahill men were beaten up. Others were laid off work by pro-Weber union foremen. Even the ballots were deceptively designed so that Cahill supporters would mark their ballots for Ed Weber.

Nevertheless, the challenger squeaked home by 149 votes. The count is official and final under the union constitution. But the Weber boys are now trying to arrange a "recount". It would be carried out of course, by pro-Weber incumbent officers.

The man who could stop all this is the Engineer's International union President Hunter Wharton. Reached by telephone while eating lunch at La Chateleine, a swanky Washington restaurant, Wharton made it clear he is still unwilling to back the Weber crowd.

He claimed he had no official knowledge of Cahill's upset win. "We're not doing anything either way," he said. "We're not in the middle of it one way or another."

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HUMAN EVENTS
4 SEP 1971

The Case Against Red China

In the following pages, HUMAN EVENTS presents a variety of Asian experts—including some Old China Hands—who provide what we believe to be compelling reasons against our current policy of vigorously courting Peking. These men and women detail the horrors of the genocidal regime on the mainland, they remind us of Peking's arduous efforts to subvert free governments around the world, and they underscore the point that the compromising of Taiwan is far too dear a moral and strategic price to pay for a temporary détente with the band of cutthroats that rule 750 million Chinese.

There may be, of course, some merit in trying to "improve" our relations with Peking for the purpose of playing it off against the Kremlin. But such diplomatic gamesmanship should hardly be pursued if it involves the shattering of old alliances and the undermining of loyal friends. Yet what is so ominous about the Administration's public posture is that it looks as if this is precisely the sort of policy it is following. The current rulers of the regime on the mainland are so steeped in blood and treachery, as the articles in this supplement make clear, that it takes a great act of will to believe that any good can come from offering up our friends to win Mao's friendship.

The Administration, however, has gone about its business in a way almost calculated to unnerve our friends.

The short notice given the Chinese Nationalists about the President's journey to Peking amounted to nothing more than a crude insult. Ambassador Shen was told about the visit, despite its enormous implications to Taiwan, just 20 minutes before President Nixon's dramatic TV announcement. The Administration conveniently arranged to have Vice President Agnew, whose reservations on the Red China "détente" policies are well known, out of the country when the Kissinger-Chou liaison occurred.

The most vocal senatorial critics of the Administration's China policy—Senators Peter Dominick (R.-Colo.), John Tower (R.-Tex.) and James Buckley (C.-R.-N.Y.)—have been provided with no information to relieve their

anxieties about how far the Administration is prepared to go in sacrificing Taiwan's interests. "If the President is not about to stick the dagger into Chiang," asked one observer, "then why won't he reassure anyone in this regard?"

So shattering has the President's announced "journey for peace" been, in fact, that not only has it caused consternation in Taiwan, but it has stirred extreme concern in such anti-Communist Asian countries as South Korea, Thailand, South Viet Nam and Japan. Even neutralist India has been close to alarm, with Minister of External Affairs Swaran Singh having warned Parliament that he hoped that any "Sino-American détente will not be at the expense of other countries...."

Indeed, India's recent signing of a 20-year pact with the Soviets is said to be partly related to the President's softening policies toward Peking.

What is so extraordinary in all this adventurist diplomacy is that the President is openly relinquishing concession after concession to Mao, with no apparent yielding in return.

The President, for instance, has already lowered the trade barriers against Red China, called for its admission into the United Nations, insulted the Nationalist leaders, downgraded the importance of Taiwan and seriously harmed our relations with many of our Asian allies.

We have also abandoned our spy flights over the mainland and, according to recent reports, have ordered a halt in the dispatching of special CIA-supported teams of Laotian tribesmen into China on reconnaissance patrols from bases in northern Laos. Moreover, as officials of the International Security Affairs Department in the Pentagon have related, the Administration has turned down a proposal to shift American nuclear weapons from Okinawa to Taiwan in order not to take the bloom off our budding friendship with Mao.

Face-conscious Asians, furthermore, will undoubtedly be reassessing their allegiances as Richard Nixon, once Red China's mortal enemy, goes kowtowing to Peking. From Madagascar to Indo-

nesia, millions of overseas ethnic Chinese, dominant in trade and many of the professions in Southeast Asia, will be encouraged to shift their loyalties from Taiwan to the rising Red Star on the mainland. Taiwan and the mainland have competed for influence in the underdeveloped areas, and the U.S. move is bound to increase Red Chinese penetration.

The President's move has already shaken the pro-American governments of Japan and Australia, and may have dire consequences for pro-U.S. governments elsewhere. As columnist Kevin Phillips noted:

"Add it all up, and it is hard to avoid concluding that (1) the U.S. government has behaved badly towards its allies; (2) we are on the retreat in Asia; (3) the President's actions will injure pro-American parties in East Asia and Australia, tilting key internal structures leftward; and (4) the 'spirit of Peking to be' will greatly promote the international advance of Red China."

The statement issued by Secretary of State Rogers on U.S. policy toward Red China's admission to the United Nations only tends to confirm the thesis that we are about to betray Taiwan. In reversing a consistent policy of 22 years, Secretary Rogers said we would vote to let Red China into the United Nations.

The secretary also said that we would fight to keep Taiwan represented as well, but the secretary did not suggest, which he could have, if the Administration were seriously interested in preserving the Taiwan government, that we would only vote to admit Peking if Taiwan were not expelled.

As a result of our stance, rumors are still flying that we don't really intend to fight very hard to keep Taiwan in the world body—another concession, supposedly, to our new "friends" on the mainland. And that Taiwan could be tossed out—the incessant chant of Peking—hardly seems far-fetched at this time. Former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Arthur Goldberg has predicted as much. As he so aptly put it: "The floodgates are open and the battle is over."

While the U.S.—at least on the surface—will all over itself

CANONSBURG, PA.
NOTES

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The China Wind

The extent to which the United States has been monitoring activity in China in recent years is coming to light as secrets of the Vietnam war surface. President Nixon, it's reported, recently halted U-2 flights over China.

However, electronic equipped space craft continue to fly over China; thus intelligence agencies will continue to match military developments in the world's most populous nation. The President has called a halt to naval patrols close to the Chinese mainland involving Taiwan.


The Nixon Administration also recently announced a halt in the dispatch of Laotian reconnaissance teams into China, from Laos. These teams have been trained, financed and

directed by the Central Intelligence Agency; some of them have penetrated as far as 200 miles into China. No doubt widespread espionage activities have been carried on.

The incursion over the Chinese border were, obviously highly provocative. One can imagine the reaction in Washington if Mexico, for example, regularly engaged in sending such teams across the southwestern United States border.

Since the Korean War, China has avoided open confrontation with the U.S. and though no prophesy can be made, it's the hope of the free world that China and the U.S. can avoid war. Recent moves in both capitals strengthen that hope.

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Gaps in Nixon-Mao publicity

By TOM FOLEY

Henry Kissinger's trip to Peking and the forthcoming visit of President Nixon to the People's Republic of China are now getting tremendous publicity in the U.S. news media. But many questions about this apparent U.S.-PRC rapprochement remain unanswered—at least, publicly—and the detailed speculation in the U.S. press deliberately seems to avoid these areas. They are the following:

1) Northern Burma and Laos: ever since the Chinese civil war, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency has been deeply involved in this region just south of the Chinese province with the romantic name of Yunnan, or "Cloudy South" province. In 1949, the defeated remnants of Chiang Kai-shek's army crossed over into north Burma and Laos, seized control of these outlying areas, and began calling themselves the Yunnan Anti-Communist and National Salvation Army. Actually, they are the biggest opium dealers in Southeast Asia and they have been financed and armed since 1949 by the CIA.

In Laos, the CIA organized, trained and equipped the 50,000-man secret army led by Gen. Vang Pao, composed of his Meo tribesmen followers, who are the biggest opium smugglers in Southeast Asia. But everybody knows that the CIA created this Meo military force not only for use in Laos: in Yunnan, there are 4.5 million Meo tribesmen who form the most important national minority in south China and who have maintained their ties with their relatives across the Laos border.

2) Tibet and northern Nepal: in 1959, when revolt broke out among the Amdo and Khampa tribesmen of Tibet, it did not require great insight to see the CIA hand involved in it. The Khampas were armed with brand new U.S. equipment, including G1 fatigue uniforms and thermoboots. Since both Tibetans and Chinese hate and fear the Khampas, the CIA made a serious political mistake in backing them, because everybody else allied against them. They did get the Dalai Lama, however, probably because he is of Amdo, in China. About 20,000 Khampas

and Amdos fled mainly into northern Nepal after the 1959 revolt and simply took over the country in conjunction with the CIA and U.S. military in Nepal. As far as anybody knows, most of them are still there.

3) Taiwan and CIA air bases: as everybody except the ordinary American citizen knows, Taiwan is headquarters for the CIA's vast air operations in Asia. The CIA base is at Tainan and is run by a front organization called Air Asia, which also has an office in downtown Taipei. Air Asia in turn is a subsidiary of Air America, the CIA line which provides all supply and transport runs for CIA operations in Laos, Burma, Thailand, Vietnam and Cambodia. Air America has its offices in Okinawa; it is a Delaware corporation with about 4,000 employees listed on its records as working in Asia.

The CIA base at Tainan, in southwest Taiwan, was the launching point for all CIA operations against the Chinese mainland, including parachute drops and reconnaissance flights. This is also well known to everybody except the American people.

But the curious fact is that the U.S. news media have not mentioned a word about any of these areas, and neither has the U.S. government. The Chinese side has been completely silent about them as well.

Any real normalization of U.S.-China relations demands that all these CIA operations be ended—and not only in China—and that the American people finally be told the truth about them in detail.

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Student congress applauds veteran

Ex-Green Beret discloses U.S. guided China incursions

STATINTL

By Trudy Rubin
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Fort Collins, Colo.

The United States Central Intelligence Agency "equipped and directed" incursions by mercenaries into Chinese territory from northern Laos, according to a former Green Beret captain.

Lee Mond, now a student at Newark, N.J., State College and a delegate to the National Student Association Congress here says "no Americans have crossed the Chinese border." However, the CIA recruited ethnic Laos and Chinese for the crossings. In addition, he maintains the CIA "directed reconnaissance missions and monitored operations along the Chinese border."

Emotional speech

Mr. Mond repeated in an interview with the Monitor charges he first aired at a forum on war crimes sponsored by the Vietnam Veterans Against the War as part of the congress last Saturday.

The tall, black veteran of seven years, seven months service who left the Army in June, 1970, after being wounded three times—winner of the Silver Star and three Bronze Stars—struggled with his emotions as he told the cheering NSA delegates on Monday that he had "made up my mind after a year of deliberations to disclose this information because these things were part of an ongoing philosophy of . . . the executive branch of this country."

Mr. Mond said that about 3,000 Chinese were in northern Laos when he was in Thailand from June, 1969, to June, 1970, and that they then controlled the quarter of the country north of the royal capital Luang Prabang.

The majority were engineers, building a north-south road from China to Luang Prabang. He said "studies indicate" that they hoped to push down to Vientiane, the present provisional capital.

Chinese infantry units were in Laos to protect the road builders, he added, and anti-aircraft installations were built in Laos to protect them.

Incursions described

The incursions were aimed at watching Chinese movements.

He said the incursions were made at Lai Chau in the northern tip of Laos and Muong Sing, also in northern Laos, and that the units moved about 50 to 75 kilometers north and northwest into a large open area touching on the town of Lant Sang in Yunan Province in the People's Republic of China.

Mr. Mond said his information was based on studies he had read while serving as a plans officer in Thailand on the U.S. Army general staff and in conversations with military personnel.

He also served with the 101st Airborne in Vietnam.

The former captain cited as one main reason for his disaffection with American policies the massive flood of drugs pouring out of Laos into Thailand and then into the hands of American troops.

Opium smuggling

He charged that the CIA "actively encouraged the growing of poppies, the flower from which opium is made, by Montagnard tribesmen (on the opium rich Plain of Jars) whom the agency recruits as mercenaries."

He later qualified this statement by adding, "perhaps they (CIA) don't always need to encourage them (the Montagnards) to grow poppies because it is so lucrative." He added, "But I am sure they don't discourage them. If they cut off this source of income, they would have to support the tribesmen far beyond what they are paying them now."

Mr. Mond also charged that the opium is often flown illicitly to major populations in Laos by Air America, a private airline said to be controlled by the CIA. "Opium comes out of the Plain of Jars catch as catch can," he said in an interview with the Monitor, "but from Moung Suoi, a major CIA base which has an airstrip, . . . I am aware that pilots would fly it down to Vientiane for their own profit."

Planes carry drugs

He said he "knew" that Air America was flying opium from Vientiane to Udon Thant on the southern Lao border from where it would be transported to Bangkok and perhaps on to the United States. He said that the base at Udon had one of the biggest drug problems of any U.S. base.

Mr. Mond said he could not say whether

added "it is inconceivable that this much opium could be transported on American aircraft without their superiors knowing it."

Mr. Mond said he had never personally witnessed such shipments. However, he said, that while he was in Bangkok doing research for his study on Thailand "I talked with several young Air America pilots. They had been helicopter or fixed-wing pilots in Vietnam—and they told me that the drug trade from Vientiane to Bangkok was vast. They indicated that it was being flown in. I took it for granted that since they were relating this, they had firsthand knowledge."

While in Thailand Mr. Mond's unhappiness with the drug problem led him to write a letter in April, 1970, to the commander of U.S. Army Support Forces in Thailand in which he indicated that between 10 and 15 percent of the junior enlisted men on his base used hard drugs daily.


He also initiated a drug rehabilitation program on his base.

Secret U.S. Action Against Chinese Aired in Congress

By JAMES McCARTNEY
Herald Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — The story of clandestine U.S. military activities against mainland China has unfolded here before a joint House-Senate committee.

A former Chinese expert for the State Department testified that the United States, in 20 years, has played a key role in mounting "espionage, sabotage and guerrilla" activities against China.



BACKGROUND
REPORT

The witness, Allen S. Whiting, now with the Center for Chinese Studies at the University of Michigan, said "secrecy and censorship" have made it impossible for the public to know what was going on.

He blamed the secret activities for starting a whole series of wars in the Far East — and contributing heavily to the start of the Vietnam war.

Whiting's descriptions are believed to be the most detailed made public of secret activities against China mounted by the United States in cooperation with Formosa.

He blamed the U.S.-Taipei efforts for:

- Creating crises in the Taiwan Strait in 1954 and 1958.
- Adding to the flames of a revolt in Tibet in 1959.
- Heightening Chinese "alarm" of Indian advances on the Tibetan frontier in 1962, which led to a Chinese-Indian war in the fall of 1962.

HE SAID THESE CRISES "triggered Chinese Communist military reactions which, in turn, have been used to justify a vast expanse of U.S. military bases, alliances and military assistance programs throughout Asia, ostensibly to contain the threat of Chinese Communist aggression."

These expenditures, he said, have been made "largely in response to a nonthreat."

Whiting's testimony was praised by John Fairbank, who is director of Harvard University's East Asian Research Center and considered the nation's top Chinese expert.

"We should be outraged," Fairbank said, "about the way in which the military had their cap set under the argument of secrecy."

HE SAID WHITING'S testimony indicated the CIA is able "to conduct wars which in turn produced responses from the People's Republic (China) without the American public knowing about it."

It is not known whether the United States is continuing secret operations against China since President Nixon announced plans to visit the RE.

There have been reports that the Nixon Administration has ordered a halt to the dispatching of special, CIA-supported teams of Laotian tribesmen into China on reconnaissance patrols.

But Whiting described much more elaborate activities.

HE SAID THE "SHADOWY involvement" of the United States grew rapidly after the Korean War and the Geneva Conference of 1954.

He identified a Formosan airline, Civil Air Transport (CAT), as being connected with the CIA.

CAT, he said, provided a "commercial cover" for CIA and other secret government activities.

These included "more than 2,000 overflights of mainland China and Tibet, according to Whiting.

"These included "more than 2,000 overflights of mainland China and Tibet, according to Whiting.

"These were not reconnaissance, but airdrops of supplies and possibly men for guerrilla warfare."

IN THE 1960S, according to Whiting, CAT "gave way" to a new "cover."

It has been called China Air Lines, which began operations in Laos and later moved to South Vietnam.

China Air Lines has carried out "clandestine intelligence operations" as well as "more dangerous missions," Whiting said.

He said Formosa has also provided the headquarters for Air Asia, a subsidiary of Air America, a CIA-operated airline in Southeast Asia.

HE DESCRIBED AIR ASIA as the "only facility in the Far East — excluding Japan — with modern jet fighter maintenance and overhaul contracts."

"Well over 6,000 combat aircraft were serviced there in the fiscal year 1969," he said.

China Air Lines, Air Asia and Air America, he said, work together to support U.S. attacks in Laos mounted from bases in Thailand. All, of course, are secret.

These activities, he said, help to explain China's road-building activities in northern Laos as well as its efforts to provide anti-aircraft facilities.

STATINTL

16 AUG 1971

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THE WAR IN INDOCHINA

Ky: Bumped off the ballot

No Ky and a Big Win?

Among political cognoscenti in Saigon, Nguyen Van Thieu has earned the sobriquet of *le grand louvoyeur*—the grand maneuverer. And in his bid for re-election in next October's national election, South Vietnam's President has demonstrated some fancy—if questionable—political footwork. Last week, he pulled off a power play that apparently swept a major rival, Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky, right out of the electoral arena. But amid outraged cries of "foul" from his opponents, Thieu may yet find himself galloping all alone toward the goal line—and toward an empty victory.

Political passions in Saigon were churned to an angry froth last week when South Vietnam's Supreme Court rejected Ky's application to enter the Presidential contest on the ground that he had failed to secure the necessary number of valid endorsements for his candidacy. At the same time, the court duly certified Thieu and a third announced candidate, Gen. Duong Van (Big) Minh. But barely hours after Ky was bounced off the ballot, Big Minh again reiterated his threat to withdraw should he conclude that the election was being rigged. Charging that many of his backers have been harassed and even arrested by the police, Minh told NEWSWEEK's Kevin Buckley: "All these pressures and sharp practices lead to the conclusion that the election is not honest right from the beginning. In view of this serious situation, we deem it necessary to reconsider our decision to run." At the weekend, however, Minh was still thinking things over.

The candidate shortage in South Vietnam was caused by a controversial election law that the Thieu government rammed through the National Assembly in June. The measure required Presiden-

tial candidates to be endorsed by at least 40 members of the National Assembly, or by 100 members of provincial councils. Ostensibly, the move was designed to limit the candidate list to a manageable number. But few Saigon insiders had the slightest doubt that the real target of the law was Nguyen Cao Ky. For Thieu had already cornered the market on endorsements, collecting 452 out of a possible 550 signatures in the local councils. In the National Assembly, Thieu also sewed up a majority, but left enough legislators uncommitted so that Big Minh could accumulate 44 Assembly endorsements and qualify for the election.

Appeal: Despite the obstacles confronting him, Ky beat the bushes for signatures and appeared at the Supreme Court claiming 102 endorsements from provincial councilors. But the court promptly tossed out 40 of Ky's endorsements because the signatories had previously signed for Thieu. To no avail, Ky contended that the disputed 40 signatures had been obtained by Thieu through threats and fraud and that the signers now wished to switch to him. The Vice President's last slim hope of making the ballot now rests on an appeal this month before the full Supreme Court (six of the nine justices were abroad on vacation last week). But according to one Western diplomat in Saigon, "he hasn't got a hope in hell."

In the heated aftermath of Ky's initial disqualification, rumors of a possible *coup d'état* began to swirl through Saigon. The Vice President himself did nothing to stop the talk. Attacking Thieu's heavy-handed political maneuvers, Ky said he was "alerting the brothers of the army to the dangers of a dishonest election." And when he was asked whether he would rule out the possibility that someone might try to overthrow the government, the Vice President replied: "I don't know." To be sure, there were no signs at all that such a move was being planned, and Thieu seemed to be more than strong enough to put down a coup in the unlikely event that one actually occurred. But what made the rumors politically significant was the fact that such talk has not been heard in South Vietnam for years.

Prediction: For Thieu, the rewards of excluding Ky from the race were apparently worth whatever risk he was running. Thieu does not merely want to win the election; he wants to win big. For in a nation where public opinion is little impressed by narrow victory margins, Thieu has chafed in his role as a minority President (he received just 34 per cent of the total vote cast in 1967). And with Ky apparently barred from the race last week, Thieu serenely predicted that he would get 55 per cent of the vote this time. That prospect, however, dismayed most of Thieu's American supporters. "Thieu hates Ky's guts, but that's no rea-

son to discredit the election," grumbled one Pentagon official. "It was in his best interests, and the interests of the Vietnamese people, to hold an open, democratic campaign in which two or three major candidates would fight it out. Frankly, I think Thieu is the best man for the job, but he should make a run for it fair and square."

Course: It was unlikely, however, that American sensibilities would have much influence on Thieu. Earlier in his term, the former army general leaned heavily on the advice of U.S. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, who may well have helped to shape the quiet, methodical process by which Thieu stripped his main rival, Nguyen Cao Ky, of most of his political power. But in recent months, Thieu has increasingly spurned the ambassador's advice, and the caution and restraint that Bunker instilled in his prize pupil have begun to wear off. By charting his own course in the pre-campaign maneuvering, Thieu has proved conclusively that he is no puppet of Bunker's. But the President may have gone too far in the process, letting himself in for the farce of an unopposed election. And considering the volatile political situation that he has created out of what looked like a winning position to begin with, Nguyen Van Thieu may yet wish that he had hung onto the apron strings a little longer.



Vang Pao: Paycheck from the CIA

Open Secret

Last week, the United States finally admitted what much of the world had known for years: that the Central Intelligence Agency has been supporting a clandestine anti-Communist army in Laos. A staff report prepared for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee—and cleared by the CIA, as well as the State and Defense departments—revealed that the U.S. will pay \$322 million in the current fiscal year for a 30,000-man irregular army, including Meo tribesmen commanded by Maj. Gen. Vang Pao and 10,000 Thai "volunteers." Another report, published in The Washington Post, also maintained that the CIA has been sending Lao guerrillas across the Chinese border on reconnaissance missions, and that the Administration only recently in Washington, however, declined to confirm or deny that report.

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DES MOINES, IOWA
REGISTER

AUG 14 1971

M - 250,261

S - 515,710

Presidential Acts of War

Enemies and prospective enemies know when the United States invades them, or trains foreign guerrillas who invade, or sends spy planes or spy drone planes over their territory. Often Americans do not.

But what really gets to us is to learn this August that the United States stopped in July sending patrols of Central Intelligence Agency-supported teams of Laotian tribesmen on spy missions deep into mainland China; and to learn that the United States suspended U-2 spy flights over China about a year

ago, and unmanned drone spy flights over China some months ago.

All these are "acts of war" in international law. Presidents had no legal right to do them without permission of Congress, and no moral right to do them without the American people knowing about them and having a chance to roar, "Stop!"

But the public was not informed until long after they stopped, and then only by a leak from foreign diplomats in Washington.

Will Mao Tse-tung Throw Nixon a Bone?

The President's move to open up relations with Peking looks curiously and curiously, and it is difficult to suppress the feeling that we are experiencing another Munich. One searches in vain for the slightest trace of evidence showing that the mainland has any intention of tossing the United States a bone, but if concessions from Peking are to be forthcoming, they are being securely hidden from public view. Meanwhile, all the evidence suggests that the Red Chinese are more irreconcilable than ever.

Since the President's announced trip on July 15, Red China has laid down a steady barrage of anti-American propaganda and assumed the most inflexible diplomatic posture. Even Joseph Kraft, who, of course, favors the Nixon maneuver, remarks that the notion that Peking was going to turn pliable on a broad range of issues was just a set of illusions. "As it happens," he goes on, "the familiar sore spots have all been rubbed a little harder."

Indeed, they have. Just two days after Nixon's dramatic statement that he would voyage to the mainland, Peking radio blasted the "reactionary ruling circles" in America who "are actively carrying out the policies of aggression and war...."

New York Times correspondent James Reston, recovering from an appendicitis operation in Peking, writes from the Chinese Communist capital that "you live in an atmosphere of vicious and persistent anti-American propaganda...." While Chinese officials are pleased with Nixon's visit, Peking media "relentlessly characterize the American government as the 'arch criminal' of the world. The United States, they insist, has been 'beaten black and blue' in Viet Nam, but still goes on backing a 'fascist clique' there and is reviving 'Japanese militarism' and plotting new wars of aggression in Korea and the rest of Asia."

Peking, moreover, continues to talk of an end to the American military presence in South Viet Nam, South Korea, Formosa, Thailand and Japan. To underscore the point, Foreign Minister Chou En-lai, President Nixon's prospective host, says that in exchange for rapprochement, we must submit to the most humiliating and horrendous demands, including U.S. withdrawal "from all Indochina."

And now Peking has even turned its back on convoking a new Indochina conference to help settle the war in Viet Nam. As an article in *The People's Daily* put it, the United States is trying "to turn the tide and seek the way out" of Indochina through a conference, but "this can never be done."

Available evidence suggests that the Red Chinese are not only stepping up their propaganda warfare, but that they are heating up their guerrilla warfare operations in Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Laos. And the mainland is continuing to supply fresh military weapons for Hanoi as a result of a just-concluded agreement between Red China and North Viet Nam.

But where are the concessions? They are there, of course, but they are being unilaterally dispensed by the United States.

The President, for instance, has already lowered the trade barriers against Red China, called for the admission of the People's Republic of China into the United Nations, insulted the Nationalist leaders, downgraded the importance of Taiwan and seriously harmed our relations with nearly all our Asian allies.

We have also abandoned our spy flights over the mainland, and, according to reports last week, we have ordered a halt in the dispatching of special CIA-supported teams of Laotian tribesmen

into China on reconnaissance patrols from bases in northern Laos.

Our policy reversal has particularly damaged relations with the pro-Western government of Premier Eisaku Sato. Before Nixon's dramatic announcement, Sato, who prided himself on having close relations with the United States, had refused to bow to pressure from 100 parliamentary members of his own party to make his own direct approach to Peking. He almost slavishly followed U.S. policy in this area.

Over the years, America has persistently pressured Tokyo into keeping its distance politically from the Chinese mainland, while giving maximum support to Taiwan. By abruptly switching policies without informing Sato, we have caused him to lose face and many are predicting the downfall of his government in the next elections.

But for the present our view of what's happening coincides with that of Bruno Shaw, a China expert who wrote a scathing denunciation of President Nixon's trip to the mainland in a recent edition of the *Wall Street Journal*. Said Shaw:

"Having lived in China from the beginning of the Chinese Communist movement, witnessed the murder of countless Chinese farmers in Hunan Province at the hands of Mao Tse-tung in the mid 1920s and had a first-hand personal acquaintance with the leadership and the program of the Chinese Communist crusade, I am firmly convinced that if President Nixon persists in the folly of a visit to Red China in pursuit of world peace, he will go down in history as:

○ "In China, a barbarian chieftain who was permitted to enter the Middle Kingdom bringing tribute to Peking;

○ "In the West, as the Neville Chamberlain of our time. And Taiwan will become the disposable Sudetenland of the East, no matter what fine words are uttered by the politicians who are presently in charge of our destiny."

Continued

'Agenda In Peking

Fought, vilified, snubbed during the 22 years it has been sovereign, the Peoples Republic of China now takes note of the President's desire to talk and states that he will be welcome in Peking. It is a high-risk journey and those who want peace will wish him well. They will also keep their fingers crossed. The procedural arrangements alone are tricky: who can recall when a head of state visited another state that he did not formally recognize? Protocol covers such small but symbolic items as what flags will fly, in what position, and where; arrival and departure ceremonies; press and personnel privileges; security arrangements; the question of joint or separate communiques and the language they entail. Transportation may be thorny. Presumably the head of state has his own plane, and the intelligence implications of this are apparent to both parties. This is true also for communications facilities during the President's visit. In short, what is dismissed casually as "technical" consumes a great amount of time and may cause trouble - if either side at any point chooses to use "procedural" questions for that purpose.

The main item on the agenda is of course Taiwan. Here the President is in the position of a man wanting to hurdle a fence while keeping one foot, or at least one toe, in place. He would be faithful, in his fashion, to an Old Friend, while courting the Old Friend's enemy. Chiang has doubtless been informed that the United States will no longer resist Peking's claim to the Security Council seat in the United Nations. But if Chiang insists (and would he not?), the US will try to make the expulsion of Nationalist China from the General Assembly an "important question," thereby requiring a two-thirds Assembly vote. It is reasonable to assume that an agreement with Peking to disagree on this issue has already been reached, and that the trip was deemed sufficiently worthwhile by both sides to warrant separate positions, at least for the coming UN vote. It amounts to Mr. Nixon's telling the Chinese what he will do and the Chinese agreeing that this will not upset the visit, although they oppose his doing it. Then comes the hard part.

Chou En-lai's position has been consistent since the mid-fifties: Peking's relations with Chiang Kai-shek are Peking's business; the American presence on Taiwan is an international question on which Washington and Peking can deal. The US view has been that before our presence can be negotiated away, Peking must renounce the use of force. Mr. Nixon will probably not now insist on this explicit formulation; at the same time it is highly improbable that the US would "negotiate" an exit from Taiwan, unless the Chinese did in fact "renounce the use of force." So the differences must be deftly skirted; the game to be played is the eliciting of tacit positions which meet the other side's goals, without specifically devising a *quid pro quo* that loses too much face for anyone. This makes the shaping of an agenda a task of extraordinary intricacy. Peking's

objective, at a minimum, is the removal of all US military presence, materiel and personnel from the islands under Chiang Kai-shek's rule, including the offshore islands. Next in order of importance to Peking is cessation of all clandestine operations directed against the mainland from Chinese Nationalist bases with US assistance, whether mounted in this area or elsewhere. Third, less burning, is an end to intelligence collection (reconnaissance flights, infiltration teams). Fourth, and perhaps not foreseen by Peking as achievable in this round of talks, is US renunciation of its mutual defense agreement with the Nationalist Chinese. Finally, Peking would like Mr. Nixon to terminate diplo-

Nixon's China stunt scored: EXPERTS WARN NATION 'DON'T RE-ARM JAPAN'

By TIM WHEELER

WASHINGTON, Aug. 11--Scholars today cited President Nixon's move to rearm Japan, his "two-China" policy, his resort to spy flights over China and his \$29 billion budget for war in Asia as proof of unwavering hatred of People's China.

In scathing testimony before the Joint Economic Committee of Congress, the scholars exploded as a myth the story of "Chinese aggression" used to justify decades of U.S. intervention in Asia.

They charged that this lie has been the mainstay of the Indochina War. As they buttressed their case with facts and figures, Senator William Proxmire, (D-Wisc), chairman of the hearings, exploded, "If China's real intent is to live peacefully within her borders, how can we justify the enormous military expenditures in Asia?"

Throwing money away

Proxmire added that China is "not even threatening military action against Quemoy and Matsu, let alone Taiwan or the Philippines. We are just throwing our money away."

The senator pointed out that the U.S. spends \$16 billion annually for "defense" in Asia, not counting the \$15 to \$20 billion annually for the Indochina War.

Professor Jerome Alan Cohen of the Harvard East Asian Studies Institute said the U.S. has flagrantly violated Chinese rights under international law and has illegally intervened in a Chinese civil war on the side of dictator Chiang Kai-Shek.

If Nixon "ping-pong" diplomacy is to signal a genuine change in U.S. policy, he said, the U.S. must "sever diplomatic relations" with Chiang Kai-Shek and recognize People's China as the only legitimate government of China.

He termed Nixon's China stunt "a diplomatic maneuver . . . or a . . . his difficulties in coping with our other international and internal problems."

E - 634,371
S - 701,743

AUG 11 1971

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Peril to Nixon Trip Seen

Secrecy Is Charged In U.S. Aid to Taiwan

By RAY MOSELEY

Bulletin Washington Bureau

Washington — A former State Department official said today the Government is concealing the full extent of U.S. military and intelligence operations on Taiwan (Formosa) from Congress and the American public.

Such operations, directed against mainland China, must cease if President Nixon's forthcoming "journey for peace" to Peking is to succeed, said Allen S. Whiting, chief China specialist in the State Department from 1962 to 1966.

Whiting, now a professor at the University of Michigan, testified at a hearing on China policy conducted by the congressional Joint Economic Committee.

Quotes From Documents

Quoting official documents and news reports, Whiting outlined a variety of alleged U.S. intelligence activities in support of Chinese Nationalist forces on Taiwan that have

come to light over the last 20 years, and said:

"In sum, there is a credible case that overt and covert U.S.-Chinese Nationalist activities have aroused Chinese Communist security concerns, resulting in heightened military deployments toward and across China's borders. This activity, in turn, has been used to justify increased American and allied military investment throughout Asia to guard against the so-called Chinese Communist aggressive threat."

Whiting said a complete assessment of U.S. involvement with the Nationalists has been seriously hampered by secrecy and censorship.

"Certainly Peking has known more of what has been going on than has Washington, or at least the legislative branch of our government," he said.

May Block Settlement

Whiting said U.S. covert activities on Taiwan may block a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan problem by the Nationalists and Communists and lead to continued military



Allen S. Whiting

escalation on both sides.

"Only a convincing and credible reversal of our military-intelligence use of Taiwan can lay the basis for confidence necessary to make President Nixon's 'journey for peace' a successful reality," he said.

The Nixon Administration was reported recently to have ordered a halt to clandestine activities, including U.S. spy plane flights over China, to avoid upsetting plans for Mr. Nixon's trip.

In his testimony, Whiting cited these examples of covert activities allegedly supported by the U.S. against China:

Airlines' Activities

— The Nationalist airline Civil Air Transport (CAT), identified in the recent Pentagon Papers as owned by the Central Intelligence Agency, operated from bases in Thailand in the 1950s to ferry supplies to guerillas in northern Burma, Laos, Tibet and China's Yunnan Province.

— China Air Lines (CAL), another apparent CIA operation, provided planes and pilots to Vietnam and Laos and admitted involvement in "clandestine intelligence operations."

— A CIA line called Air Asia is headquartered in Taiwan, with the job of servicing jet fighter planes.

— U.S. Rangers have trained guerilla paratroopers in Taiwan, and some Nationalist forces have served secretly in South Vietnam.

— Nationalist China has received "a steady stream of cut-rate weapons out of the mammoth Vietnam stockpile" and some deliveries have been "unauthorized, uncontrolled and often unknown to the Congress."

STATINTL

THE ASIA LETTER

AN AUTHORITATIVE ANALYSIS OF ASIAN AFFAIRS

Published by THE ASIA LETTER Co. Tokyo Hong Kong Washington Los Angeles

STATINTL

10 August 1971

Dear Sir:

THE C.I.A. IN ASIA (III): MODUS OPERANDI (Part 1). Every Friday, at precisely 8:30 A.M., a clean-cut young American assigned to the Combined Studies Group in Saigon leaves the American Embassy and drives to a rendezvous house on Saigon's Tran Hung Dao Street.

There, he picks up a briefcase and a Vietnamese accomplice and begins a drive to Tay Ninh, located northwest of Saigon near the Cambodian border.

Inside the briefcase are bundles of Vietnamese piasters, U.S. dollars and Cambodian riels.

The man carrying the briefcase is a C.I.A. "bag man". The money is the payoff for local agents and tipsters who keep tabs on Communist activities and movements in the important area of eastern Cambodia, southern Laos and the western border of Vietnam.

He is one of a dozen or more C.I.A. "bag men" who make regular trips to various parts of South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos to pay for the services of agents and informants.

The "bag man" never sees what a businessman would call the "end user"---the men who get the money. He merely turns it over to the C.I.A.'s "control man" in the area. Sometimes he picks up data to take back to the higher-up agents where he works. But more often than not he returns empty-handed.

The "bag man" duty usually goes to junior C.I.A. men in the Indo-China area. It is a colorless, unstimulating assignment that usually leads to frustration and sometimes to resignations.

One day last February, a Chinese cargo junk from Canton sailed down the Pearl River, through the river estuary and tied up alongside Hong Kong's Western waterfront.

It was one of many that made the same trip the same day to the western waterfront of Hong Kong Island and to the waterfront along Macao's ancient Rua das Lorches.

The river junks, which ply between Hong Kong, Macao and Canton daily, carry very ordinary cargo ranging from vegetables to joss sticks.

But the cargo of cabbages carried by that junk last February was no ordinary cargo. Stuffed inside one of the innocent-looking Chinese cabbages was a report giving up-to-date information on China's missile program.

It came from a C.I.A. informant inside China and went through a half dozen intermediaries in Hong Kong before it ended up in the hands of a high-ranking agent, who forwarded it on to Langley, Virginia, for study and analysis.

The C.I.A. frequently receives reports and messages from its agents and informants in China by this method. And it often sends in messages or instructions through the same channels.

The best example of just how effective these channels are came during China's Cultural Revolution (1966-69), which threw the country into turmoil. In addition to a flood of Red Guard documents giving a very accurate picture of the turmoil, the C.I.A. also received hundreds---perhaps thousands---of very valuable documents pilfered during some of the Red Guard rampages against

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Continued

WASHINGTON POST
6 AUG 1971

CIA Patrols Into China Said Halted

By Michael Getler
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Nixon administration has ordered a halt to the dispatching of special CIA-supported teams of Laotian tribesmen into China on reconnaissance patrols from bases in northern Laos, according to well informed diplomatic sources.

These patrols—which sometimes range 200 miles inside China's Yunnan Province on road-watching, telephone-tapping missions—have been going on for a number of years, and their existence was known to the Peking regime.

Nevertheless, in a recent action designed to avoid any possible incident which could sour U.S. relations with Peking before President Nixon's forthcoming trip to the Chinese mainland, the forays have been halted, according to official sources here.

Some sources also suggest that the intelligence value of these operations may also have decreased somewhat.

Although no Americans go on these patrols, the Laotian hill tribesmen who carry them out are recruited, trained and equipped by the CIA, and the staging area for the patrols is a CIA outpost in northern Laos.

The Laotians are native to the border region, and the intelligence-gathering operation took advantage of the normal movements back and forth of these hill people.

While the White House, CIA and the U.S. embassy in Vientiane have never commented on or confirmed these activities—which reportedly date back to the Johnson administration—the patrols have been mentioned in numerous press reports by U.S. correspondents in Laos.

In late 1970 and early this year, articles by Michael Morrow of Dispatch News Service International described the reconnaissance operations in considerable detail.

As recently as June 27, Arnold Abrams of The Philadelphia Bulletin reported that the raids were still being carried out despite the onset of Ping Pong Diplomacy.

The order to stop these patrols, according to informed sources, came very recently. Presidential aide Henry Kissinger's secret trip to Peking was made July 9 to 11.

In another move relating to the forthcoming Nixon visit, a press report last week, citing administrative sources, said the United States had suspended flights over Communist China by high-flying SR-71 spy planes and unmanned reconnaissance drones. This concession was also depicted as a move designed to avoid any incident which could interfere with the President's journey.

However, well placed defense and intelligence officials, asked about the reported suspension, said privately that to the best of their knowledge there had never been any SR-71 flights over the Chinese mainland.

Officials say there was a suspension of the unmanned drone flights some months ago, partly for diplomatic reasons and partly because of technical problems and the vulnerability of these drones to Communist gunners. At least two of the drones were shot down since late in 1969, one over the mainland and one over Hainan Island.

There have been flights of the older-vintage U-2 spy plane over mainland China carried out by the Nationalist Chinese, but officials hint that these flights, too, have not been scheduled for about a year.

The United States for some time has relied on satellites for photographic coverage of goings-on inside China. The SR-71s based in Asia, sources say, are used primarily for flights over North Korea.

Expert Calls Taiwan U.S.-China Spy Base

By JEROME CAHILL

Washington, Aug. 11 (NEWS Bureau)—The United States and the Chinese Nationalists for 20 years launched espionage, sabotage and guerrilla forays against Communist China from Chiang Kai-shek's island bastion of Taiwan, a former State Department official told Congress today.

Allen S. Whiting, professor of political science at the University of Michigan, who served in the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and in the U.S. Consulate in Hong Kong from 1961 to 1968, said the covert operations included support of the ill-fated uprising in Tibet in 1959.

Increased After Korean War

Whiting said America's "shadowy involvement" in the clandestine operations grew steadily after the Korean war and the 1954 Geneva Conference. He said they triggered the Formosa Strait crises of 1954 and 1958 and helped set the stage for the Sino-India war in 1962 along the Tibetan frontier.

Testifying before a subcommittee of the Senate-House Joint Economic Committee, Whiting said the publication of the Pentagon papers provided partial documentation of the operations, particularly U. S. and Nationalist Chinese overflights of mainland China.

Quoting from a top-secret memorandum from Brig. Gen. Edward

Lansdale to Gen. Maxwell Taylor, Whiting said a Nationalist Chinese airline called Civil Air Transport carried out "more than 200 overflights of mainland China and Tibet." In addition, the line provided aircraft for an abortive CIA effort to overthrow the Sukarno regime in Indonesia in 1958, and helped transport sabotage teams into North Vietnam as early as 1954, the witness said.

Airline Linked to CIA

In 1960, Whiting told the subcommittee, a new Taiwan-based airline, China Air Lines, came into being, and engaged in "clandestine intelligence operations" as well as commercial flights to Laos and Vietnam. He linked the airline to the CIA-backed Air America, which raided Northern Laos in the course of the CIA's "secret war in Laos."

At times, he said, the bombers strayed over the border, hitting mainland Chinese territory. This may explain "much of Peking's expanding military presence in road construction and anti-aircraft activities in Northern Laos," he went on.

STATINTL



BOB CONSCIENCE

Avoiding Another Gary Powers

For the time being, we're going to stop sending spy-in-the-sky planes over the Peoples Republic of China, formerly Red China. We don't want to risk the chance of having one of our latter-day Francis Gary Powers shot down over Peking while President Nixon is on his way to tea with Chou En-lai.

Whether we'll request or demand that the Nationalist Chinese follow suit has not yet been leaked. But the chances are that we'll take care of that, too. We gave Chiang Kai-Shek's forces their U-2 spy planes, taught his pilots how to use them, and asked only that they keep a peeled eye on mainland China.

It would be relatively simple to knock that off until further notice, just as -- in massive mortification -- President Eisenhower cancelled out U-2 flights over the Soviet Union in the wake of the shoot-down of Powers, Khrushchev's angry protests, and the State Department's clumsy attempt to fob off a heax to the effect that Powers' U-2 was a weather plane that had been blown off course.

SPYING ON CHINA will not be suspended completely during the period of the new rapport. Our inquisitive satellites will continue to criss-cross the world's most populous ntion night and day, taking pictures, sniffing out nuclear tests and production, keeping tabs on steel production, counting missile installations and bombers parked on runways, and watching for unusual movements of large armed forces.

Russia's many satellites will be attending to the same flabbergasting chores at the same time. In addition, they will also be checking over every part of the U.S., and ours will be zipping over the great land mass of the Soviet Union.

But the administration has decided wisely that it wouldn't be cricket to continue our spying from within the Earth's atmosphere. Spying from space is different, as any UN diplomat can explain at great length. It is different principally because nobody yet has come up with a sure-fire way to knock down the other fellow's orbiting robot spies. The Russians amply proved when they knocked down Powers from 68,000 feet over Sverdlovsk, even the best of spy planes operating in the at-

mosphere with a guy at the wheel can be knocked out.

WE'VE BEEN LUCKY with our spying on China from manned planes. U-2 pilots who have been shot down have been Nationalist Chinese. So have the unmanned planes the mainland gun batteries have claimed -- remote control drones that zip across the Straits of Formosa, cross over into China, take a few pictures, and try to zip home.

We've been using a super version of the old UAWN the SRAUQN which has a top speed three times that of sound. This is the plane that will now be grounded voluntarily to avoid a foul-up in the Peking talks.

We'll probably put it to work elsewhere, but not over the Soviet Union. We still give Cuba a regular lookassee from on high, just to make certain Castro isn't stashing any missiles or moving his guns too close to the wire fence at Guantanamo.

THE HAYOO RAISED by the shooting down of Francis Gary Powers is still unnerving, even after a Japanese of 11 years. The incident gave Nikita Khrushchev the sledgehammer he needed to break up a summit conference in Paris attended by himself, President Eisenhower, Charles De Gaulle and Harold Macmillan.

Khrushchev's dressing down of Eisenhower at the Elysee Palace was the most humiliating moment in the President's life. The Soviet Premier's news conference the following day in Paris sounded for a time like a declaration of war.

The scheduled Eisenhower trip to the Soviet Union -- returning Khrushchev's U.S. visit to the year before -- was revoked. It had promised to be the high point of his life as Chief Executive. It was planned for him to make half a dozen major speeches to the Soviet people. They had been written for him and, in the opinion of one of the writers, Dr. Kevin McCann, could have brought about a fine relationship between the world's two great powers. Dr. McCann is also sure that the speeches, which had to be junked, would have eliminated all chance of the subsequent eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation and threat of thermonuclear war during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962.

So, this time we'll play it cozier. President Nixon does not want a fly (or a flier) in his colong.

gional conditions. Smaller, less obstructive issues will be resolved in further negotiations at another level.

Mr. President, I believe that when Congress reconvenes in September we must move with speed and intensity to build a new bargaining framework for the rail industry and the millions of Americans it serves. The interests of all parties must be dealt with in a manner sensitive to individual group needs, but most importantly, sensitive to the larger needs of all our Nation's people.

WARMMAKING AND WAR-CONDUCTING POWERS--ADDRESS BY LUCIUS AEMILIUS PAULUS

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, as the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate and other Members of this body seem determined to take over the warmaking and war-conducting powers of the President conferred on him alone by the Constitution, I am reminded of a statement made over 2,000 years ago by Lucius Aemilius Paulus, a Roman consul, who had been selected to conduct the war with the Macedonians. He appeared before the Senate-House and went out from into the assembly of the people and addressed them as follows:

In every circle, and, truly, at every table, there are people who lead armies into Macedonia; who know where the camp ought to be placed; what posts ought to be occupied by troops, when and through what pass that territory should be entered; where magazines should be formed; how provisions should be conveyed by land and sea; and when it is proper to engage the enemy, when to lie quiet. And they not only determine what is best to be done, but if anything is done in any other manner than what they have pointed out, they arraign the consul, as if he were on trial before them. These are great impediments to those who have the management of affairs; for every one cannot encounter injurious reports with the same constancy and firmness of mind as Fabius did, who chose to let his own ability be questioned through the folly of the people, rather than to mismanage the public business with a high reputation. I am not one of those who think that commanders ought at no time to receive advice; on the contrary, I should deem that man more proud than wise, who regulated every proceeding by the standard of his own single judgment. What then is my opinion? That commanders should be counselled, chiefly, by persons of known talent, by those who have made the art of war their particular study, and whose knowledge is derived from experience; from those who are present at the scene of action, who see the country, who see the enemy, who see the advantages that occasions offer, and who, like people embarked in the same ship, are sharers of the danger. If, therefore, anyone thinks himself qualified to give advice respecting the war which I am to conduct, which may prove advantageous to the public, let him not refuse his assistance to the state, but let him come with me into Macedonia. He shall be furnished with a ship, a horse, a tent; even his travelling charges shall be defrayed. But if he thinks this too much trouble, and prefers the repose of a city life to the toils of war, let him not, on land, assume the office of a pilot. The city, in itself, furnishes abundance topics for conversation; let it confine its passion for talking within its own precincts, and rest assured that we shall pay no attention to any counsels but such as shall be framed within our camp.

What the distinguished consul had to

say in 168 B.C. would be very apropos if made at this time; so, not having been chosen to conduct a war, I will use the Record as my audience.

AMERICAN PRISONERS IN CHINA

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, in light of the continuing developments this year toward the improvement of relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China, I believe that the time is now ripe for the President and the Secretary of State to take a new initiative to obtain the release of American prisoners in China.

So far as I am aware, there are four American prisoners now held in China--two civilians and two servicemen. One of the civilians, Richard Fecteau, is a constituent of mine from Lynn, Mass., who was convicted of espionage in China in November 1952. He was sentenced to a 20-year prison term, which is due, therefore, to expire in November 1972. The other civilian is John Downey of New Britain, Conn., who was associated with Fecteau, and who was convicted at the same time and sentenced to life imprisonment.

The servicemen now held in China are two American flyers captured during the Vietnam war. One, Maj. Philip E. Smith, of Victorville, Calif., is an Air Force officer whose plane was forced down in 1965 on Hainan Island. The other, Lt. Robert J. Flynn, of Oak Harbor, Wash., is a Navy officer who was shot down over Southwest China in 1967, while apparently maneuvering to escape from North Vietnamese jets.

In the wake of the new atmosphere of reconciliation brought about by the visit of the American ping pong team to Peking last April and the announcement by President Nixon of his forthcoming visit to China, there could be no more appropriate representation of the developing good will between our two nations than for the administration to secure the release of these four prisoners. In the case of Smith and Flynn, the flyers whose detention arises out of the Vietnam conflict, it seems likely that their release will be determined by developments in connection with the release of the American prisoners now held in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia as a result of the war, and I am hopeful that the current negotiations in Paris will accomplish their early release.

In the case of Fecteau and Downey, however, the situation is different. Both men, now in their early 40's, have spent nearly half their lives in a Chinese prison. Sporadic contacts through public and private channels over two decades have made no apparent progress toward securing their release.

Throughout their imprisonment, Fecteau and Downey have stood as symbols of the generation of hostility that has grown up between the United States and the People's Republic of China. When their convictions were first announced by Peking in 1954, both nations exchanged bitter charges over the circumstances surrounding their capture. Peking accused Fecteau and Downey of being agents of the CIA who were air dropping Chinese Nationalist spies onto the

mainland and providing them with supplies. According to Peking, at the time Downey and Fecteau were apprehended, the two Americans were captured along with nine Chinese.

At the beginning, the State Department maintained that Downey and Fecteau were "civilian personnel employed by the Department of the Army in Japan." According to the State Department, the men were "believed to have been lost on a flight from Korea to Japan in November 1952." Simultaneously, the Defense Department stated that the men had been lost on a routine flight from Seoul to Japan. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles described the charges against the men as "trumped up" and called the sentences "a most flagrant violation of justice." For years, this pattern of recrimination and counter-charges was maintained.

In recent months, however the administration has quietly moderated the official U.S. position on the imprisonment of Fecteau and Downey. The charges are significant in at least two respects.

No longer do we maintain that the men were civilian employees of the Army. Instead, they are now described merely as "civilian employees of the U.S. Government."

And, no longer do we maintain that their mission was a flight from Korea to Japan. Instead, it is described merely as an "official flight during the Korean conflict."

Subtle as these shifts in the administration's position may seem, their implications are important. Obviously, the administration's explanation is current ambiguous enough to be read as consistent either with Peking's assertion that Downey and Fecteau were engaged in espionage, or with our Government's original insistence that the flight was innocent.

Public interest in the plight of Fecteau and Downey has increased recently as a result of the China hearings held by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last June. Prof. Jerome A. Cohen of Harvard Law School raised the issue clearly in his testimony on June 25 before Senator J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT, the chairman of the committee, and suggested that a resolution of the matter could be facilitated if, by analogy to the Pueblo case, the administration were to formulate an appropriate apology to Peking if the facts of the case so warrant.

I have today written a letter to the Secretary of State, urging him to make a prompt review of all the issues in the case, including Professor Cohen's proposals, and to take whatever steps may be suitable to secure the release of both Fecteau and Downey at the earliest possible date.

President Nixon himself has declared, in connection with his newly evolving China policy, that he is not a "prisoner of history." It is my hope that Downey and Fecteau, who are so clearly prisoners of history and of the passions of the Korean war, may become real beneficiaries of the President's new policy. Simple justice and humanity cry out for their quick release.

Undoubtedly, the optimism generated by the visit of the Ping-Pong team and

WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS
28 JUL 1971

Ray Cromley / The Peking men



THESE are earthy men that President Nixon is going to meet in Peking. They like the broad-fisted, almost-insulting give and take of the men's locker room.

This is especially true of Mao, Lin Biao and Chu Teh.

It is my opinion that President Nixon is perhaps the best suited president this country could have found to negotiate with these particular men. My opinion is based on observations during eight months spent at Mao Tse-tung's headquarters in Yen-an during the war with Japan. I was a member, and later acting commander, of a U.S. Army, Navy, Air Corps, State Department, OWI, OSS mission to Communist China.

IN that job I had to deal in practical terms daily with members of Mao's hierarchy. These were practical talks, in which we had to get things done in areas of Japanese-occupied China and Korea. This meant meetings with most of the men who ran Communist China then — numbers of whom are still in top positions today, 27 years later.

These men grew up in a difficult time. They were not used to or comfortable with small polite table talk.

There were exceptions of course. Chou En-lai was a Mandarin, even in Yen-an, and his residence was essentially that of a sophisticated man.

MAO and the men closest to him did not hesitate to speak in the most blunt and insulting terms about proposals or opinions they didn't like. And they were willing to stand and listen while you tore apart their proposals or thoughts in equally-strong language.

They do not care for long fingernails on scholars. They do not cotton to scientists who make esoteric theoretical discoveries but who are unable to apply these to the working world. They don't care for a man who can't work unless he has all the right tools.

They don't care for goodwill treaties. They want practical working agreements that will move Communist China along the lines it wants to go.

And they have no objection to your knowing exactly where they want to go. Mao and the other top Chinese Communist leaders I knew shared one idiosyncrasy. They put little trust in fellow travelers. They were very suspicious of those foreigners who went part or all the way. They seemed to feel instinctively that these people were wolves in sheep's clothing, or that they might be.

It is my belief, therefore, that Mr. Nixon, with his anti-Communist record, his known conservatism and his strong belief in capitalism, is probably the best type of President to negotiate with the Communists in Peking.

They will know he is openly and directly working for U.S. interests as they are working for Peking China's.

26 JUL 1971

The Other Prisoners

With President Nixon's announcement of a proposed visit to Communist China there is renewed interest in Americans believed to be held prisoner on the mainland. This issue, widely debated in the early 1950s, has been revived by Prof. Jerome Cohen of Harvard University law school, who has been seeking to obtain freedom for four men now thought to be in Chinese jails.

Two of the prisoners, John Thomas Downey and Richard Fecteau, were listed as civilian employees of the Army when their plane was shot down in 1952 on a flight from Korea to Japan. The Chinese claimed they were agents of the Central Intelligence Agency engaged in dropping Nationalist spies. The other two, Air Force Capt. Philip E. Smith and Navy Lt. Robert Flynn, were shot down separately much later.

Prof. Cohen's plan, offered to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last month, would be to have the United States acknowledge that Messrs. Downey and Fecteau were in fact CIA operatives. If they were, the U.S. might consider admitting it as part of a deal to get all of the


men back. But even better would be the voluntary release of all Americans held in China as a gesture of good will by the Chinese aimed at improving the climate for Mr. Nixon's planned visit. The United States could make some counter gesture.

A year ago the Chinese released Roman Catholic Bishop James Edward Walsh, who had been in captivity 12 years; he was sentenced to 20 years for espionage. He was almost surely not a spy in the American sense, but he acknowledged he might have been in the Chinese legal sense. The point is that the merit of the Chinese position in these cases is not simple to evaluate.

But it is readily apparent that since the United States has no diplomatic relations with Peking, and since China is not even in the United Nations, negotiations in matters of this kind are next to impossible. If U.S.-China relations were normalized, as we hope they will be soon, one benefit ought to be the elimination of this sort of cold war practice.

STATINTL

Ray Cromley // Mao needs us



MAO TSE-TUNG desperately needs some sort of an understanding with the United States.

This can best be illustrated by a most private conversation an associate had with Mao almost 30 years ago in the middle of the war with Japan, when the Soviet Union and Communist China were friends and allies.

I was then in the United States Army, in Yenai, Mao's headquarters in the war, as part of a mission composed of Army, Navy, Air Corps, State Department, OSS and OWI specialists.

Some of the men on this mission had known Mao for years. As a result, we had long talks with Mao during those days in the caves when he was building his base of power in the party and in the countryside.

IN one long and quite personal conversation during these months, Mao unburdened himself and discussed very freely with one American he trusted, his thoughts on Russia, China and the United States.

In the course of that talk, Mao said an agreement with the United States was vitally necessary to offset the Soviet Union, even tho, as noted above, Moscow was then an ally. (This was before the blowup.)

This was no idle conversation. The American Mao talked to was a State Department official.

He had been born in China, spoke Chinese fluently, and understood the nuances of Chinese Communist idiom. Mao and his aides had known this American for many years. It was thru this man, in fact, that the United States Army had arranged for this American military mission to be stationed in Mao's headquarters during the war with Japan.

HIS conversation was late in 1944. Mao did not trust the Russians then. He had not trusted them in 1927 or in the 1930s. He was early convinced, and remained certain, that the Russians were playing their own game in China. And that game often ran counter to what Mao wanted for the Communists and Communist China.

The Russians in those years worked with the nationalist Chinese against Mao's people when it was convenient.

What was true then is even more true today. The Communist Chinese need the United States to balance the Russian threat.

Word out of mainland China thru contacts in Hong Kong and Tokyo is that the Chinese are dreadfully worried that the Soviet Union and the United States will combine to attack them. This fear was intensified as the result of U.S. and Soviet cooperation and joint pressure on Peking during the short Chinese invasion of northern India.

If the threat of China war with Russia is as serious as some analysts have reported, then most surely the Chinese will attempt some accommodation with the United States.

24 JUL 1971

STATINTL

Agreement on Chou's 5 principles

ONE of the likely results of President Nixon's trip to Peking will be an American-Chinese agreement in some form of Premier Chou En-lai's five principles of "peaceful co-existence."

Chou first enunciated the principles as a guide for international relations during a recess in the Geneva Conference on Indochina in the summer of 1954. The five principles are:

- "Mutual respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity."
- "Mutual nonaggression."
- "Mutual noninterference in each other's internal affairs."
- "Equality and mutual benefit."
- "Peaceful co-existence."

ROGERS OVERTURE

In one of his first acts as secretary of state, Rogers disclosed his willingness to discuss the five principles with mainland China, expressing regret, on Feb. 18, 1953, that Peking had just canceled one of the periodic meetings in Warsaw of the American and Chinese ambassadors. The meeting had been scheduled for Feb. 20.

China canceled the meeting because, in late January, its charge d'affaires in the Netherlands, Liao Ho-shu, had defected. He arrived in the United States on Feb. 4 and asked for political asylum. Peking accused the Central Intelligence Agency of luring him "to betray his country and of carrying him off to the United States." The United States has never commented on this charge.

Had the Warsaw meeting of ambassadors occurred, Mr. Rogers said, the United States was ready to consider China's proposal on peaceful co-existence "consistent with our treaty obligations in the area"—a reference to the U.S. defense treaty with the Nationalist Chinese on Taiwan.

14-YEAR DEADLOCK

Mr. Rogers' offer to discuss the "peaceful co-existence" principles represented an effort to break a 14-year deadlock in the ambassadorial meetings which had resulted in only sterile exchanges.

All of Mr. Rogers' predecessors had rejected the "peaceful co-existence" formula and insist-



By
R. H.
Shackford

Scripps-Howard Staff Writer

ed that the Chinese first sign a formal declaration renouncing the use of force against Taiwan. This the Chinese would not do, insisting that Taiwan was an internal domestic matter. Both Red China's Mao Tse-tung and Nationalist China's Chiang Kai-shek consider Taiwan — and Tibet — provinces of China.

The American-Chinese ambassadorial meetings, the first at Geneva in 1954 on American prisoners in China, and then more formally at Warsaw in 1955, were on Chou's initiatives. At the Bandung conference of Afro-Asian national nations, Chou issued this press statement:

"The Chinese people are friendly to the American people. The Chinese people do not want to have war with the U.S.A. The Chinese government is willing to sit down and enter into negotiations with the U.S. government to discuss the question of relaxing tension in the

Far East and especially the question of relaxing tension in the Taiwan area."

U.S. CHANGES POSITION

The Eisenhower administration at first rejected the suggestion and said it wouldn't talk with Communist China unless "free China" — Chiang's government — was present as an equal. It changed its mind after a few days and said it would consider talks with Peking alone. Ultimately the ambassadorial talks started.

But for years the routine was the same at each twice-yearly meeting: the Chinese demand for a "peaceful co-existence" agreement was rejected by the United States and the American demand for a "renunciation of force" agreement was rejected by the Chinese.

After the Chinese defector incident U.S. Ambassador to Poland Walter Stoessel managed to get the ambassadorial talks started again on Jan. 20, 1970, the frequency of meetings picked up and hopes were high for a new era.

But two days before the 137th meeting, scheduled for last May 20, the Chinese canceled it because of the American-South Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia.

There have been no meetings of the ambassadors in Warsaw since. Their liaison officers met a month after the canceled May 20 meeting and agreed to continued postponement.

LYNN, MASS.

POST

JUL 18 1971

S - 10,211

Bring Him Back

When President Nixon crosses the Pacific ocean sometime between now and next spring to endeavor to effect an entente with Red Chinese leadership, part of his entreaties for future peace in Asia should revolve around a plea that the Peking government liberate a Lynn man who has been their captive for going on 19 years.

Presidential efforts to get Hanoi to budge at the interminable Paris talks have been bound up with U.S. insistence that American prisoners of war in Viet Nam be freed. When the Chief Executive has his mainland China chat with Premier Chou En-Lai, it is only just that a request be made for the freeing of Richard Fecteau of Lynn, upon whom a 20-year prison sentence was imposed by the Chinese Communists in 1952 after they felled an airplane on which he was a passenger.

Fecteau's parents say that they will formally ask Mr. Nixon to make that plea. The Lynn man and others were incarcerated after they were accused of dropping supplies into China as part of a CIA attempt to foment rebellion in the Communist country. The U.S. contended, however, that Fecteau and the others had done no wrong, and that they actually had become lost while on a flight from Korea to Japan.

All this is pretty academic now, especially in Fecteau's case. He was handed a 20-year prison term, and a year from November the 20 years will be over. If table tennis and a Nixon visit can bring Red China into the United Nations, the U.S. ought to see to it that they also bring the Lynn man home again.

There was a "revelation" in one quarter recently that Red China offered in 1957 to liberate Fecteau if the U.S. would allow newspapermen to visit Peking. It sounds incredible and preposterous, but the contention in the report was that the late Secretary of State John Foster Dulles refused to accede, claiming that the arrangement would be tantamount to the Eisenhower administration's submitting to Communist blackmail.

Mr. Nixon, of course, was the Vice President at that time. He has an opportunity now to undo that wrong---if wrong it was. He and newsmen will be visiting Red China before many moons pass.

Lynn, the North Shore, Massachusetts, and the whole country would like to see Richard Nixon bring Richard Fecteau out of China with him when he returns.

APPLETON, WISC.
POST-CRESCENT

E -- 43,430

S -- 48,310

JUL 15 1971

Who Controls C.I.A. Activities?

The current dickering about how to get the American prisoners of war released from North Vietnam without the United States losing face or honor brings up the fate of two Americans still imprisoned in China.

Jack Downey and Richard Fecteau were captured in 1932 in China. They were convicted of espionage for dropping supplies and agents into China as part of a Central Intelligence Agency plan to stimulate rebellion against the Communists. The United States has consistently stuck to the story that they were merely "civilians employed by the Department of the Army" and that their plane had strayed off course over China on its way from Korea to Japan. Fecteau was sentenced to 20 years and Downey to life.

According to Jerome Cohen, professor at the Harvard Law School and a Yale classmate of Downey, the C.I.A. did indeed recruit Downey and others at Yale for what it called a "purely . . . hypothetical" idea that the C.I.A. might want to stir resistance within China. But in 1937 when China offered to release the two men if the United States would permit American newsmen to visit China, then Secretary of State John Foster Dulles refused because it would be paying "blackmail" to China.

The ridiculous nature of the stance can only be seen in after years. We were on the verge of ending the Korean war.

We still saw the Communist world as a monolithic one and there had not yet been an open break between Russia and China. No one in power actually thought that we could really be sucked into an open end land war in Asia; we were too smart and too powerful for that. The mere threat of using our massive air strength not to mention our possession of nuclear weapons was bound to frighten off an enemy. No concessions had to be made.

But today the only thing that keeps American newsmen out of China is China and it has eased restrictions. President Nixon, in 1952 certainly agreeing with the American official attitude toward China, now is trying to open the doors and with some success. Suppose we had agreed to the Chinese proposal in 1937 -- at least we would have had some better idea of what has been going on in China ever since and the two men would be free.

If the C.I.A. was indeed trying to stir up rebellion, the Chinese had a right to protect their national interests. Perhaps even by conceding that the men were involved in a plot, their release could be effected today although Fecteau's sentence will be up next year.

The incident once again brings up concern over the exact role of the C.I.A., exactly who has control over its activities, and how they are determined.

STATINTL

CONFIDENTIAL

THE ASIA LETTER

AN AUTHORITY ANALYSIS OF ASIAN AFFAIRS

Published by THE ASIA LETTER Co. Tokyo Hong Kong Washington Los Angeles

29 June 1971

STATINTL

Dear Sir:

THE C.I.A. IN ASIA (II): No intelligence operation in Asia is as well-heeled as that of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (C.I.A.).

The annual working budget of the C.I.A. runs over US\$600 million.

That's just a starter.

The agency spends far more than that in Asia alone if you count the cost of some of the "borrowed" services from other U.S. Government agencies. For instance:

---U.S. Air Force planes are used to monitor foreign nuclear tests and collect air samples. The agency, while having its own cryptographers, draws on the Army's corps of 100,000 code specialists and eavesdroppers to tap Asian communications.

---C.I.A. specialists often operate off U.S. Navy ships in the Pacific, usually involved in electronic surveillance.

---The agency also is privy to information from the Defense Intelligence Agency (D.I.A.) which has a substantial operation of its own in Asia.

The D.I.A. spends from its own budget more than US\$1 billion a year flying reconnaissance planes and keeping satellites aloft.

Those satellites allow C.I.A. analysts to know more---from photographs taken 130 miles up---about China's topography than do the Chinese themselves.

---The U.S. State Department's intelligence section also feeds a considerable amount of confidential data it collects through its embassies, consulates and travelling diplomats to the C.I.A. This includes information gathered by agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (F.B.I.) the Justice Department and the U.S. Treasury (Secret Service) often attached to diplomatic missions abroad.

The C.I.A. also works closely with the intelligence services and police forces of the countries considered America's allies in Asia, exchanging information with them.

Where does all the C.I.A. money go?

It funnels out in myriad directions: To pay for the agency's overt intelligence gathering activities, to finance "dirty tricks" and other clandestine capers, to prop up ousted or failing politicians and to pay for "disinformation" and other psychological warfare ploys.

Despite the C.I.A.'s oft-deserved sinister image, a good deal of its funds are expended on open intelligence gathering operations.

These go for subscriptions to newspapers, periodicals and other publications and salaries for those who must scan them for intelligence tidbits.

It is estimated that more than 50% of the C.I.A.'s world-wide intelligence input comes from such overt sources. (An estimated 35% comes from electronic spying and less than 15% from JAMES BOND-type, cloak-and-dagger operations.)

An exception is Asia.

A greater amount of the C.I.A. funds expended in Asia go into covert activities.

GOLDSBORO, N.C.
NEWS-ARGUS

JUN 29 1971
E - 16,034
S - 16,322

Price Was Too High

Whether the Pentagon papers contain anything that might jeopardize national security remains a topic of international debate.

But there can be little debate over the impropriety of a story printed Sunday by the Philadelphia Bulletin and the Seattle Times.

The newspapers reported that the Central Intelligence Agency is sending Laotian hill tribesmen on spying missions from Laos into Communist China.

Their purpose is to obtain in-

formation as to troop movements and political developments.

Publication of a story informing an avowed enemy of this country of such activity, it seems to us, is a reckless form of irresponsible journalism.

It could jeopardize the acquisition of intelligence information necessary to competent planning. It could jeopardize the lives of intelligence agents.

If the two newspapers regard this as some colossal "scoop", it wasn't big enough to justify the potential cost.

-28 JUN 1971

World-Wide

CIA reconnaissance teams from Laos have been sent into Communist China to obtain information on troop movements, political developments and other data, the Philadelphia Sunday Bulletin said. The intelligence team members are native tribesmen of the same ethnic stock as is prevalent in southern China, the paper said, quoting "qualified sources." The sources said U.S. officials in Vientiane, Laos, discounted any potential threat the operations pose to slowly improving U.S.-China relations. CIA officials declined any comment.

CIA Is Reported Sending Laotians To Spy In China

Philadelphia, June 27 (AP)—The Philadelphia *Sunday Bulletin* has quoted "qualified sources" as saying the Central Intelligence Agency has been sending reconnaissance teams from Laos into China to obtain information on troop movements, political developments and other data. ✓

"Those forays," the *Bulletin* said in a copyright story, "involve sending reconnaissance teams from northern Laos as much as several hundred miles into southern China's Yunnan province."

The newspaper said the sources reported that United States officials in Vientiane, Laos, discounted any potential threat to slowly improving relations between Washington and Peking.

The members of the intelligence teams, the *Bulletin* said, are native hill tribesmen of the same ethnic stock prevalent in southern China.

"They have been recruited, equipped and trained by the CIA to infiltrate Chinese territory and obtain information on troop movements, political developments and other data."

Officials at CIA headquarters in McLean, Va., declined any comment on the story, as did American Embassy officials in Vientiane, the newspaper reported. ✓

The *Bulletin* said its sources reported U.S. authorities believe local security needs and the intelligence value of such operations justify their continuation.

STATINTL

CIA Reported Sending Spies Into China

Associated Press

The Central Intelligence Agency has been sending Laotian hill tribesmen on spying missions from Laos into Communist China to obtain information on troop movements and political developments, according to a report published by the Philadelphia Bulletin and the Seattle Times.

"Those forays involve sending reconnaissance teams from northern Laos as much as several hundred miles into Southern China's Yunnan Province," said a copyright story written by Arnold Abrams, published by the two newspapers yesterday.

The dispatch, as published in The Bulletin, said unaltered sources reported that U.S. offi-

cials in Laos discounted any potential threat the operations may pose to slowly improving relations between Washington and Peking.

"They believe this threat is small, according to reliable sources, because the operations are not commando raids or sabotage efforts and Americans do not participate in them," the Bulletin said.

Native hill tribesmen are of the same ethnic stock as found in southern China. "They have been recruited, equipped and trained by the CIA to infiltrate Chinese territory and obtain information on troop movements, political developments and other data," the Bulletin said.

Abrams said his sources claim

such intelligence missions have long been known to Chinese authorities and that several teams have been captured in recent years.

"Consequently, American officials reason that Peking will continue to tolerate these terri-


torail incursions as long as they are conducted solely to gather intelligence."

Officials at CIA headquarters in McLean, Va., declined any comment on the story, as did American Embassy officials in Vientiane, the Bulletin said.

PHILADELPHIA, PA.
BULLETIN

E - 640,783
S - 681,831

JUN 27 1971



these operations. Qualified sources report, however, that U. S. authorities believe local security needs and the intelligence value of such operations justify their continuation.

Moreover, U. S. authorities largely discount any potential threat the operations pose to slowly improving relations between Washington and Peking.

They believe this threat is small, according to reliable sources, because the operations are not commando raids or sabotage efforts and Americans do not participate directly in them.

Sources note, in addition, that such intelligence missions have long been known to Chinese authorities; several teams have been captured in recent years.

Consequently, American officials reason that Peking will continue to tolerate these territorial incursions as long as they are conducted solely to gather intelligence.

Worse Threats Elsewhere

U. S. authorities also believe that, if the Chinese want an excuse to reverse the friendly trend of their ping-pong diplomacy, they can do better than focusing on these operations.

"We're still fighting in Vietnam, we have a military presence on Taiwan, and we are standing by our treaty commitments to Chiang Kai-shek," observes one source close to U. S. policy-making levels. "If the Chinese are looking for something to whip us with, any one of those three will do."

In Laos, American officials' major security concern about the Chinese stems from a Peking road-building project in the north. An estimated 14,000 Chinese, including several thousand soldiers, are constructing a road network leading toward the Thai border.

Thais Disturbed

Thai authorities repeatedly have expressed deep concern

about the road's potential as a supply route for Communist-led guerrilla forces in northern Thailand.

American officials privately voice similar concern. While conceding that Chinese forces in Laos have not been acting hostile, they insist the project must be kept under scrutiny.

Peking's construction project originally was requested by the tripartite government established in Laos with the signing of the 1962 Geneva Accord. While technically still existent, the coalition was abandoned in 1963 by Communist Pathet Lao representatives.

Ironically, while American officials privately fret about Chinese intentions in Laos, Peking's pingpong diplomacy has prompted positive reaction from the leader of this nation's neutralist government.

In an interview, Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma stressed China's historically nonaggressive attitude toward Laos.

Prince Souvanna noted that the unhappy history of this landlocked kingdom includes invasions by neighboring Thais, Cambodians, Burmese and Vietnamese — but not by the Chinese.

Reds Aware

CIA Sends Spies Deep Into China From Laos

By ARNOLD ABRAMS

Special to The Bulletin

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Vientiane, Laos—Intelligence operations that penetrate deep into China have been directed from here for years by the Central Intelligence Agency and are continuing.

These forays involve sending reconnaissance teams from northern Laos as much as several hundred miles into Southern China's Yunnan Province.

The team members are native hill tribesmen of the same


ethnic stock prevalent in southern China. They have been recruited, equipped and trained by the CIA to infiltrate Chinese territory and obtain information on troop movements, political developments, and other data.

U. S. Won't Talk

[A Bulletin inquiry at the Central Intelligence Agency headquarters in McLean, Va., brought this response: "The CIA never comments about news stories concerning its operations."]

American embassy officials in Vientiane refuse to discuss

STATINTL



Newsday Map by Phillip Dionisio

Chinese Communists are building a road network, indicated by the dotted line, in northern Laos toward Thailand. At the same time, intelligence teams trained and financed by the CIA are entering Yunnan Province in China.

Report From Laos: China Watch

By Arnold Abrams
Newsday Special Correspondent

Vientiane, Laos—The recent thaw in Sino-American relations has not halted U.S.-directed intelligence operations that penetrate deep into Communist Chinese territory.

Those operations, which have been conducted for years here by the Central Intelligence Agency, send reconnaissance teams from northern Laos as far as several hundred miles into southern China's Yunnan Province.

The agents are native hill tribesmen of the same ethnic stock prevalent in southern China. They have been recruited, equipped and trained by the CIA to infiltrate Chinese territory and obtain information on troop movements, political developments and other pertinent security matters.

American embassy officials in Vientiane refuse to discuss the intelligence operations. Qualified sources report, however, that U.S. authorities believe that local security needs and the intelligence value of such operations justify

authorities largely discount any potential threat that the operations may pose to the slowly improving relations between Washington and Peking.

American officials believe that any such threat is small, according to reliable sources, because the operations are not commando raids or sabotage efforts, and Americans do not participate directly in them. The missions supplement activities of the Laotian government's so-called secret army, which has been covertly directed and supported by the CIA for the past decade.

Informed sources add, moreover, that the intelligence missions have long been known to Chinese authorities; several teams have been captured in recent years. Consequently, American officials reason that Peking will continue to tolerate the territorial incursions as long as they are conducted solely to gather information and do not pose a direct security threat.

U.S. authorities also believe that if the Chinese want an excuse to reverse the friendly trend of their Ping Pong diplomacy, they can do better than focus-

CLEVELAND, OHIO
PLAIN DEALER

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M - 409,414
S - 545,032

CIA Slipping Spy Teams Into China

By Michael Morrow

© Dispatch News Service International

VIENTIANE, Laos — U.S. intelligence operations include the sending of armed Laotian reconnaissance teams into China from northern Laos. Teams are reported to have gone as far as 200 miles into China, dispatched from a secret CIA outpost 15 minutes' flying time north of the Laotian opium center of Houei Sai.

According to sources close to the Central Intelligence Agency, and confirmed by Western diplomatic sources in Vientiane, the CIA is sending out hill tribesmen armed with American weapons, a three-pound radio with a range of 400 miles and equipment to tap Chinese telegraph lines, watch roads and do other types of intelligence gathering.

"There is always a team in China," according to sources close to the CIA.

Staging area for the operation is a small, Luntain-valley airstrip called Nam Lieu (also known as Nam Yu). The strip, which one Air America pilot describes as "difficult as hell to get into," is surrounded by mountains. It is serviced by both Air America and Continental Air Service and is also a way-station for opium traders from northern Laos and Burma enroute to drug factories at Houei Sai.

DURING 1968, five Chinese functionaries caught up in the purges of the cultural revolution defected to a Nam Lieu reconnaissance team. They were treated well by the Americans for a time but eventually were turned over to the Royal Laotian government.

According to sources close to the CIA, the five were thrown into a 12 by 12 by 12 foot pit exposed to the elements. They were eventually executed.

Like most CIA operations in Laos, the one out of Nam Lieu is directed from a headquarters at Udorn Air Base in northeastern Thailand. There are several Americans at Nam Lieu, however, including CIA and military intelligence personnel. Source close to the CIA report the number has increased recently from 4 to more than 10.

In addition to activities inside China, the Nam Lieu Americans also help direct a joint operation of "SGU" (Special Guerilla Units) and the Thai army at Xieng Lom south of Houei Sai on the Lao-Thai border. They also run intelligence gathering missions, on a road being built by the Chinese government (under an agreement reached with the now defunct coalition government of Laos) in the same vicinity.

UNTIL MID-SEPTEMBER of last year, the Nam Lieu operation was headed by a tough-and-tumble veteran guerrilla organizer named Anthony (Tony) Poe. Poe is a legendary figure in Laos known best for his dislike of journalists, disregard for orders and radio codes, capacity for Lao whisky and expertise at clandestine guerrilla operations.

Poe was removed almost immediately after an article last September by Dispatch News Service International on the Nam Lieu operations, ostensibly because the article "blew his cover." According to sources close to the CIA, however, this rea-

son was an excuse used by the American Embassy here to get rid of Poe, whose dashing style has been a source of long-term friction with members of the American Mission in Laos, including Ambassador McMurtrie Godley.

As for the missions into China, however, sources close to the CIA and Western diplomatic sources both report that to their knowledge they continue.

Since leaving Nam Lieu Poe has spent most of his time at Udorn Air Base, although one source reports Poe continues to do "odd jobs" on the Thai-Cambodian border. Those who know him say he is unhappy away from Nam Lieu.

POE IS AN ex-Marine noncommissioned officer, wounded at Iwo Jima, who remained in Asia after World War II. In the 1950s he helped organize CIA-trained Tibetan insurgents, escorting them to Colorado for training and going back with them into Tibet.

Later he worked in the Thai-Cambodian border area with the Khmer Serai, anti-Sihanouk guerrillas receiving assistance from the CIA, and other parts of Thailand. He has been in and out of Laos since before the Geneva accords of 1962 and was one of the first Americans involved in arming and training paramilitary groups in Laos.

Poe is considered stubborn and brusque, sometimes going into fits of anger over the radio, his lifeline with the outside world. He is said to prefer working with hill tribes to working with Americans and looks down on most American operations because of their heavy reliance on American personnel.

He has been wounded at least once during his career in Laos and reportedly a price has been put on his head by the Pathet Lao. He is perhaps the only American legally married to a woman of the hill tribes.

L.A. Times/Washington Post Service

LAOS

Change of Tune

BY ARNOLD ABRAMS

Vientiane: The thaw in Sino-American relations has not halted US-directed intelligence operations which penetrate deep into Chinese territory. These operations, which have been conducted for years by the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency), involve the sending of reconnaissance teams from northern Laos as far as several hundred miles into southern China's Yunnan province. Team members are native hill tribesmen whose ethnic stock — Meo — is prevalent in southern China.

The tribesmen have been recruited, equipped and trained by the CIA to infiltrate Chinese territory and obtain information on troop movements, politi-

Chinese authorities have known for some time about the missions; several teams have been captured in recent years.

Consequently, American officials reason that Peking will continue to tolerate such territorial incursions as long as they are conducted solely for intelligence-gathering purposes and do not pose a direct security threat. US authorities also believe that, if the Chinese want an excuse to reverse the friendly trend, they can do better than simply focus on these operations.

"Americans are still fighting in Vietnam, they have a military presence on Taiwan, and they are standing by their treaty commitments to Chiang Kai-shek," observes one source close to the US embassy here. "If the Chinese are looking for something to whip them with, any one of those three will do."

In Laos, American officials' major security concern about the Chinese stems from a Peking road-building project in the north. An estimated 14,000 Chinese personnel, including several thousand soldiers standing guard and manning anti-aircraft batteries, are constructing a route leading toward the Thai border.

Thai authorities repeatedly have expressed deep concern about the road's potential as a supply line for communist-led guerilla forces in northern Thailand. American officials privately voice similar concern. While conceding that Chinese forces in Laos have not shown hostility, they insist the construction project must be kept under closest scrutiny.

The Peking project originally was requested by the tripartite government, established in Laos with the signing of the 1962 Geneva Accord, which collapsed in 1963.

Ironically, while American officials fret about Chinese intentions in Laos, Peking's new diplomacy has prompted a positive reaction from the leader of this nation's neutralist government. In a recent interview, Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma stressed China's historically non-aggressive attitude toward Laos.

The 70-year-old prince noted that the unhappy history of this landlocked kingdom is replete with tales of invasion by neighbouring Thais, Cambodians, Burmese and Vietnamese — but not by the Chinese. He also expressed the hope that China's attitude, coupled with a

possible Sino-American rapprochement, would restrain further North Vietnamese aggression in Laos.

Although Souvanna Phouma is still said to harbour private fears about Peking's longrange designs on this region, his current public stance marks a departure from the position he assumed earlier this year, prior to the US-supported South Vietnamese invasion of his country. Then, he warned that the allied move might prompt open intervention by Peking in the Indochina war. Now, his tune is different. Like everyone else, he can only guess about the intentions of China's leaders.

Fateful Flowering


BY A CORRESPONDENT

Vientiane: Asia's latest opium war is hotting up. East of the Annamite mountains, the US military is reported to be reeling under the effects of heroin, and in Saigon US leaders have been pressing the government into a series of emergency measures to stop the flow of supplies — including a mass transfer of customs agents from Ton Son Nhut airport, the centre of large scale trafficking, and sweeps through the city to arrest suspected peddlars.

A widely publicised amnesty-cure programme has been offered addicted soldiers. All chemists and known peddling centres have been placed "off limits" and medical tests instituted to detect addicts among homeward bound troops.

But these measures are preliminary skirmishes in the great war. The problem of stamping out or otherwise controlling opium can only be solved by an international campaign of which Laos is already feeling the impact. An American narcotics investigator is in Vientiane tracing the legend that heroin is produced in Laos and seeking information to map out strategy in the war against opiates. Early this month Laotian national police were pressured into a general round-up of Vientiane's opium den operators, most of whom have a licence from the Laotian government. More than 120 operators were held for questioning.

But Laotians find it difficult to take seriously a campaign which conflicts with local customs, tolerances and economy. The opium den operators were



Souvanna Phouma: Stressing China's non-aggressive attitude towards Laos.

cal developments and other pertinent security data. American embassy officials in Vientiane refuse to discuss these operations, but qualified sources report that the officials believe local security needs and the intelligence value of such operations justify their continuation.

American authorities largely discount any potential threat these operations pose to slowly improving relations between Washington and Peking. They believe this threat is small because the operations are not commando raids or sabotage efforts, and Americans do not participate directly in them. Moreover,

ment in Veterans' Administration hospitals.

The VA has made plans to provide 30 special units to care for narcotics victims by July 1972, with five units already in operation capable of treating 200 addicts each. Yet those dishonorably discharged prior to the enlightened Pentagon policy still cannot receive VA treatment.

Therefore, I am introducing today a bill which would authorize the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs to provide care and treatment for certain former members of the Armed Forces addicted to narcotic drugs. The "certain" members are those who were discharged dishonorably, because of drug addiction.

I believe it is important for the Armed Forces to assert national leadership in identifying drug abusers, and once recognized, insure that treatment and rehabilitation are available to all who have served their country. This is no less important for those addicts now serving on active duty who are now receiving treatment as it is for those who were treated punitively in being released dishonorably from the Army. Military leadership in handling the drug problem would be a distinct contribution toward the abatement of this national tragedy.

The bill which I am introducing today provides the possibility of treatment for thousands who have been sent home with an addiction which is all too often supported by regular criminal activity. It is madness to allow the military to return addicts to civilian life and not provide for their treatment.

OPIUM TRAFFIC IN INDOCHINA

HON. JEROME R. WALDIE

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, June 15, 1971

Mr. WALDIE. Mr. Speaker, I would like to include in the RECORD a news article on the recent testimony of John E. Ingersoll, Director of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, before the House Select Committee on Crime during hearings on the importation of opium into the United States. The article was written by Tom Foley and appeared in the Los Angeles Times on June 3.

Mr. Foley's coverage of the proceedings of that day are excellent and describe some of the startling findings we learned on the involvement of the governments and some high officials in many Southeast Asia countries in illegal drug traffic.

I commend this article to the attention of all who have an interest in this subject.

[From the Los Angeles Times, June 3, 1971]

ASIAN OFFICIALS PROTECT HEROIN SALE, PANEL TOLD—THEY MAY PROFIT FROM SUPPLYING DRUGS TO U.S. SOLDIERS, NARCOTICS CHIEF SAYS

(By Thomas J. Foley)

WASHINGTON.—The government's chief narcotics enforcement officer said Wednesday that officials of friendly Southeast Asia governments are protecting and may even

have an interest in heroin traffic to American servicemen in Vietnam.

In testimony before the House Crime Committee, John E. Ingersoll, director of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, also said Heroin had been unwittingly smuggled into South Vietnam on airplanes of the CIA-operated Air America.

Committee Chairman Claude Pepper (D-Fla.) and other members urged the Administration to take a stronger stand with foreign friendly governments to force a halt to illicit drug traffic.

These included Turkey and France, which respectively grow and process the overwhelming amount of the opium smuggled into the United States as heroin.

RIGHT TO ASK AID

"We're committed to risk our own cities in a nuclear war if any French city is attacked by the Communists," Pepper said, "and we have the right not only to ask but to demand that the French take emergency action to help us."

Ingersoll, who recently returned from discussions with Southeast Asia leaders on the heroin problem, said he doubted that any policy-making officials of the countries—Thailand, Laos and South Vietnam—are involved in the illicit drug traffic.

Burma, Thailand and Laos account for about 80 percent of the world's opium production, he said.

But he told newsmen after the hearing that many lower-level officials, including members of the South Vietnamese Legislature, deal in opium. He said some legislators have friends in President Nguyen Van Thieu's cabinet.

Ingersoll told the committee that heroin refineries were under control of insurgents in Burma and Thailand but that those in Laos are protected by elements of the royal Laotian armed forces.

RAMPARTS DISCLOSURES

He said that while management and ownership of the Laotian refineries appear to be primarily in the hands of ethnic Chinese citizens of that nation, "some reports suggest" that a senior Laotian air force officer may have an ownership interest in some of the plants.

When Rep. Jerome R. Waldie (D-Calif.) noted that Ramparts magazine had identified the official as Gen. Ouane Rathigoune, Ingersoll replied that "general speculation" conceded this.

Ingersoll denied one contention of the Ramparts article. It maintained that remnants of Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang army left in the area are involved in heroin production and are in the employ of the CIA for operations on the China mainland.

But Ingersoll conceded that Air America planes had been used in the past for smuggling heroin—just as regular commercial airliners have been used to smuggle it into the United States.

He told newsmen later that 80 kilograms were seized on an Air America plane at the huge Tan Son Nhut Air Base outside Saigon only three or four weeks ago.

During the hearing, Waldie also asked Ingersoll about a Ramparts report that the secret CIA base of Long Cheng, used to support the U.S.-paid Meo tribesmen, was a distribution point for heroin to be shipped into South Vietnam.

Ingersoll said he had not heard of that. However, he later said he had discussed the general illicit drug problem with CIA Director Richard Helms. He said Helms denied the CIA was involved in any way, and that he believed him.

"The Meo tribesmen are something else," Ingersoll said, "but I don't blame the CIA for what the tribesmen do."

POOR CIA SECURITY

Waldie said CIA security was apparently "abysmally poor, since those in the CIA em-

ploy used the base and facilities for the illicit traffic."

The narcotics chief sought to allay criticism by congressmen of U.S. efforts to get the cooperation of the Asian governments to crack down on the drug traffic.

He said the United States had virtually no leverage over the Burma government, since the last existing aid program is being phased out. The opium-growing area in Thailand is in the hands of insurgents, Ingersoll said, but the Bangkok government is taking steps to try to control it.

He said Laotian officials were "most responsive" even though some high-ranking officials were involved.

VIETNAM SMUGGLING

Ingersoll said the Saigon government had taken several steps to crack down on the smuggling, including a shakeup of its customs officials, an increase in the size of its central police force dealing with the problem and the appointment of a special task force by President Thieu.

He also said he was assigning three additional agents to the Far East and that the Defense Department had placed off limits areas of open heroin dealing.

A SYMBOLIC FLAG CEREMONY

HON. FRANK HORTON

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, June 15, 1971

Mr. HORTON. Mr. Speaker, during these times, when, on one hand, the patriotism of some of our Nation's finest leaders is questioned; and when, on the other, it is often scorned to be patriotic, we must stop to consider what the flag and patriotism actually mean.

Sunday, in Rochester, N.Y., in my congressional district, I attended a flag ceremony at the Rochester Polish People's Home. It was the first flag raising at the home. I would like to share the ceremony with my colleagues for it vividly made the significance of the flag clear to all who attended.

Mr. Ray Gatz, president of the home, introduced the guests, who represented local, county, State, and Federal legislative bodies, as well as the Polish-American and American Legion Posts.


Officials included Rochester Mayor Stephen May, State Assemblyman Raymond Lill, City Councilman Urban Kress, Monroe County Legislators Nicholas Santaro and Sam Poppick.

County Judge Arthur Curran also attended. Judge Curran was especially aware of the value of the flag. He recently received the flag from the coffin of his son, a marine, who was killed in Japan.

Also present were James O'Grady, commander of the Michalski Post; Joseph Zabuchek, commander of the Pulaski Post; Joseph DeMeis, commander of the Monroe County American Legion Post; and Edmund R. Przysinda, president of Hudson Avenue Area Association.

During the ceremony, I presented a flag which had flown over the Capitol to Mr. Gatz. It was blessed by Father Pietrzykowski and raised by Mr. Gatz. County Commander DeMeis led the Pledge of Allegiance.

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Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000400280001-0
8 JUNE 1971



"Now, men, with this type of ping-pong ball you can pick up a conversation three miles away."

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3 JUN 1971

Asian Officials Protect Heroin Sale, Panel Told

They May Profit From Supplying Drugs to U.S. Soldiers, Narcotics Chief Says

BY THOMAS J. POLEY
Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON — The government's chief narcotics enforcement officer said Wednesday that officials of friendly Southeast Asian governments are protecting and may even have an interest in heroin traffic to American servicemen in Vietnam.

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John E. Ingersoll
in Washington

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Ramparts Disclosures

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Poor CIA Security

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Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000400280001-0

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STATINTL

25 May 1971

Dear Sir:

THE C.I.A. IN ASIA (I): When United States Central Intelligence Agency Director RICHARD HELMS was getting ready to visit Saigon last fall for talks with South Vietnamese President NGUYEN VAN THIEU, he sent ahead an unusual calling card.

It was in the form of a news leak to the New York Times.

A story quoting "government officials" related in considerable detail the C.I.A. finding that there were some 30,000 agents of the Vietcong that had insinuated themselves into the Saigon government apparatus.

The findings revealed Hanoi intentions to increase that number to 60,000 by the end of 1971.

The conclusion was that the Saigon government would not be able to cope with these agents in shaping the country's future.

The information had very little to do with fact.

The figures came out of a hat---Richard Helms' hat.

The story was, frankly, designed to scare the hell out of President Thieu and make Helms' bargaining position a little easier.

What Helms was selling was the C.I.A. line of a need for a tougher security stance internally. Basically, President RICHARD NIXON had asked Helms if there was something he could do about the rampant corruption inside the Thieu government---officers squandering aid funds on luxury cars, wine and women and allowing an unacceptable amount of Uncle Sam's cash to turn up as flight capital to Swiss and French banks.

It was one of the rare (but increasing) instances when Helms and the C.I.A.---generally close-mouthed adherents to the "no comment" school---had ever used the press for leverage.

But it tells a lot about the C.I.A., which often feels frustrated about "not getting its message across" to the people it wants to reach in and out of the administration.

For the last few months, for example, the C.I.A. has been peddling in Washington and elsewhere details of an intensified Communist Chinese road-building effort in northern Laos.

But correspondents involved with Peking ping-pong and other developments have found the story not glamorous enough, nor different enough, from earlier ones on the same subject to get much space.

Helms visited Laos, which has come to be known as "C.I.A. Country", after twisting Thieu's arm and then went on to Tokyo to discuss Red China's nuclear, rocket and submarine developments with officials of Japan's intelligence-defense establishment.

These events were not reported in your daily newspaper and the exact details will never be known.

The C.I.A. is a many tentacled thing.

It operates in many diverse ways.

Approved For Release 2000/08/16 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000400280001-0

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WORKERS, PRISONERS

Some Americans Already in China

By HENRY S. BRADSHAW
Star Staff Writer

HONG KONG—The Americans who visit China under Peking's new policy of widening relations will find some Americans living and working there.

About 33 U.S. citizens are believed to be voluntarily in China. Some are Communists, others are merely sympathetic to the ideology and are working for the country.

In addition, there are four known American prisoners in China. Two are military pilots who were shot down during the Vietnam war, and two were convicted by the Chinese of being agents for the Central Intelligence Agency caught on an espionage mission.

One of the latter, Richard George Fecteau, of Lynn, Mass., has served all but 19 months of a 20-year prison sentence.

The Chinese have given no reason to expect, and observers here find no reason to believe, that the improvement in Sino-American relations might speed the release of Fecteau or the other alleged CIA agent, John Thomas Downey of New Britain, Conn.

Downey was sentenced to life imprisonment. He is now 41 years old.

Observers do not expect the Chinese to release the two pilots, Air Force Maj. Philip E. Smith and Navy Lt. Robert J. Flynn, so long as North Vietnam holds the airmen it captured during the war.

Smith's and Flynn's planes were reported by U.S. authorities to have strayed over Chinese territory and been shot down while on raids of North Vietnam. They were not attacking China itself.

Some of the Americans who went voluntarily to China were reported to have been imprisoned during the Cultural Revolution.

So far as is known here, one of them, Sidney Rittenberg, might still be under arrest. He was in charge of the "central broadcasting bureau" in Peking when he was picked up in December 1967 on suspicion of spying, reports said.

The leading American resident for many years was Anna Louise Strong, a colorful woman who published a newsletter about China until her death in March 1970.

The official account of a memorial service for her said those attending included "comrades and friends from the U.S. and other countries in Peking, including Frank Coe and his wife, Ma Hsi-teh (George Hatem), Julian Schuman and his wife, Sol Adler and his wife, and Rewi Alley."

Coe and Adler worked for the U.S. government and were mentioned in Washington investigations of alleged Communists in the late 1940s and early 1950s. They have been listed as "American friends" attending several Peking rallies.

Both are believed to work in editing jobs. Peking employs a number of foreigners to polish translations for distribution abroad.

Hatem, known by his Chinese name, is a doctor who practiced in Shanghai's foreign community in the early 1930s. In 1938 he went to Yenan, the headquarters of Mao Tse-tung's Communist forces, and he has stayed with the Communists ever since. He has a Chinese wife and two children.

Schuman reportedly first went to China in 1947 as a free-lance journalist. He returned to the United States in the early 1950s but went back to China about eight years ago to work at the Foreign Language Press.

When the American table tennis team visited China recently, Schuman sent an article to The Star.

According to United Press International, for whom Schuman wrote a number of dispatches on the team's tour, he said the Chinese Foreign Ministry asked him to provide coverage for some media whose applications to send their own staff correspondents had been refused or ignored.

One unconfirmed report said Schuman was the ghostwriter of Mrs. Strong's newsletter during her last years, marked by ill-health. Alley is a New York Times reporter and her.

Nine of the 21 Korean War prisoners who chose to stay in China are still there, by last report. Most information on them is a decade old.

Four of them were reported to be working in Tsinan, 220 miles south of Peking. They are Howard G. Adams, chemist; Albert C. Belhomme, metal worker; and Lowell D. Skinner and James C. Veneris, both lathe operators.

Scott L. Rush was a lathe operator in Wuhan. Clarence C. Adams and Harold H. Webb were reported studying at Wuhan University some years ago but might have moved since then.

William C. White was studying at People's University in Peking and John R. Dunn was reportedly in poor health and unemployed in Peking.

The four American prisoners are also believed to be in Peking, at an old "model prison" at 13 Lane of the Grass Green Mist, near the National Library.

Other Americans whose names are listed in various sources, but about whom information is not publicly available, are Sydney Shapiro, a lawyer married to a Chinese woman; Joan Hinton, born in China and variously listed as an agricultural scientist and a nuclear physicist; David and Nancy Milton, Erwig Ernst, and Israel Epstein, who reportedly once had American citizenship but is now stateless.

The New Opium War

by Frank Browning and Banning Garrett

"MR. PRESIDENT, THE SPECTER OF heroin addiction is haunting nearly every community in the nation." With these urgent words, Senator Vance Hartke spoke up on March 2 in support of a resolution on drug control being considered in the U.S. Senate. Estimating that there are 500,000 heroin addicts in the U.S., he pointed out that nearly 20 percent of them are teenagers. The concern of Hartke and others is not misplaced. Heroin has become the major killer of young people between 18 and 35, outpacing death from accidents, suicides or cancer. It has also become a major cause of crime: to sustain their habits, addicts in the U.S. spend more than \$15 million a day, half of it coming from the 55 percent of crime in the cities which they commit and the annual \$2.5 billion worth of goods they steal.

Once safely isolated as part of the destructive funkiness of the black ghetto, heroin has suddenly spread out into Middle America, becoming as much a part of suburbia as the Saturday barbecue. This has gained it the attention it otherwise never would have had. President Nixon himself says it is spreading with "pandemic virulence." People are becoming aware that teenagers are shooting up at lunchtime in schools and returning to classrooms to nod the day away. But what they don't know—and what no one is telling them—is that neither the volcanic eruption of addiction in this country nor the crimes it causes would be possible without the age-old international trade in opium (from which heroin is derived), or that heroin addiction—like inflation, unemployment, and most of the other chaotic forces in American society today—is directly related to the U.S. war in Indochina.

The connection between war and opium in Asia is as old as empire itself. But the relationship has never been so symbiotic, so intricate in its networks and so vast in its implications. Never before has the trail of tragedy been so clearly marked as in the present phase of U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia. For the international traffic in opium has expanded in lockstep with the expanding U.S. military presence there, just as heroin has stalked the same young people in U.S. high schools who will also be called on to fight that war. The ironies that have accompanied the war in Vietnam since its onset are more poignant than before. At the very moment that public officials are wringing their hands over the heroin problem, Washington's own Cold War crusade, replete with clandestine activities that would seem far-fetched even in a spy novel, continues to play a major role in a process that has already rerouted the opium traffic from the Middle East to Southeast Asia and is every day opening new channels for its shipment to the U.S. At the same time the government starts crash programs to rehabilitate drug users

among its young people, the young soldiers it is sending to Vietnam are getting hooked and dying of overdoses at the rate of one a day. While the President is declaring war on narcotics and on crime in the streets, he is widening the war in Laos, whose principal product is opium and which has now become the funnel for nearly half the world's supply of the narcotic, for which the U.S. is the chief consumer.

There would have been a bloodthirsty logic behind the expansion of the war into Laos if the thrust had been to seize supply centers of opium the communists were hoarding up to spread like a deadly virus into the free world. But the communists did not control the opium there: processing and distribution were already in the hands of the free world. Who are the principals of this new opium war? The ubiquitous CIA, whose role in getting the U.S. into Vietnam is well known but whose pivotal position in the opium trade is not; and a rogue's gallery of organizations and people—from an opium army subsidized by the Nationalist Chinese to such familiar names as Madame Nhu and Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky—who are the creations of U.S. policy in that part of the world.

The story of opium in Southeast Asia is a strange one at every turn. But the conclusion is known in advance: this war has come home again—in a silky grey powder that goes from a syringe into America's mainline.

MOST OF THE OPIUM IN Southeast Asia is grown in a region known as the "Fertile Triangle," an area covering northwestern Burma, northern Thailand, and Laos. It is a mountainous jungle inhabited by tigers, elephants, and some of the most poisonous snakes in the world. The source of the opium that shares the area with these exotic animals is the poppy, and the main growers are the Meo hill tribespeople who inhabit the region. The Meo men chop back the forests in the wet season so that the crop can be planted in August and September. Poppies produce red, white or purple blossoms between January and March, and when the blossom withers, an egg-sized pod is left. The women harvest the crop and make a small incision in the pod with a three-bladed knife. The pod exudes a white latex-like substance which is left to accumulate and thicken for a day or two. Then it is carefully gathered, boiled to remove gross impurities, and the sticky substance is rolled into balls weighing several pounds. A fraction of the opium remains to be smoked by the villagers, but most is sold in nearby rendezvous with the local smugglers. It is the Meos' only cash crop. The hill tribe growers can collect as much as \$50 per kilo, paid in gold, silver, various commodities, or local currency. The same kilo will bring \$200 in Saigon and \$2000 in San Francisco.

There are hundreds of routes, and certainly as many methods of transport by which the smugglers ship opium—

MIAMI, FLA.

NEWS

(APR 21 1977)

E - 93,538

CIA's learning
to play ping pong

To The Editor:

Now that a U.S. pingpong team has been welcomed to Peking, the administration in Washington appears overjoyed and they are making speeches about more friendly relations with China.

To the inexperienced it would appear that our policy towards China is one of peace and benevolence. However, knowing that our government is run by staunch anti-communist fanatics, and diehard right wing extremists, I suspect the CIA is frantically training its agents to play ping-pong and have secretly let contracts to the electronics industry to devise ways of putting spy and surveillance equipment inside the ping-pong balls.

L. E. CROSSMAN, Pompano Beach.

M - 541,086

S 697,866
APR 15 1971

STATINTL

JACK GRIFFIN

Ping-Pong is paddled from parlor to politics

There was a time, if a Ping-Pong player wanted to get his name in the newspapers, he'd have to take a shot at his wife, or at least try to rob a bank.



"Mind looking at these snaps? I like to tell my girl friend I showed that guy a thing or two on the tennis court!"

But now, in this enlightened day, Ping-Pong is spelled in headlines inches high, and is the subject of deep and thoughtful editorials. And a guy with a paddle is likely to walk out on his doorstep and find himself surrounded by courteous Washington diplomats and curious CIA agents.

Ping-Pong, in one swift stroke, has risen above a parlor game, even above a sport, and become an international affair.

For 22 years, Red China had closed its bamboo curtain to this country. Not the wisest of the Washington diplomats nor the slickest of the CIA agents could penetrate it.

When Red China at last held out a hand to the United States, it was not to the great statesman, the thoughtful philosopher. It was to eight American Ping-Pong players.

"I am not surprised that when the break came," said Dan Pecora, "that it came through table tennis. In Red China, it is the national sport. There are 75 million registered players there."

Migawd, with that many Ping-Pong players, Red China doesn't need the hydrogen bomb. They can smother the rest of the world in Ping-Pong balls.

Always in condition

"THE CHINESE, in fact the entire Orient, are very serious, very dedicated to the sport," Pecora said. "They train for it, many hours, every day."

Pecora, a Carpentersville car wash operator, pings a pretty fair pong himself. And he was of international caliber until he retired two years ago at the advanced age of 24. He twice met Red Chinese in competition, and he was the first American to paddle a game away from the mainland of the People's Republic.

"First guy I met was Chou Lan Sun, in 1963, and he wiped me out in straight sets," Pecora said. "But two years later, I met Wang Chia Sheng, and I took one game away from him before he won the match."

"I remember them as carrying themselves very friendly, always smiling and polite. But at the parties, they didn't really mix. They were there to win, not to party. And they were always in superb condition."

It is generally felt that a guy got into condition for a Ping-Pong match by putting the ice cubes in the lemonade jar. But they way Pecora tells it, the fellow might be training for a decathlon.

"The Chinese go in for special weight-lifting," Pecora said. "They put weights, five or 10 pounds, on their arms and legs and hit 2,000 strokes at a time. They swim, and they run. Sometimes, the better ones run 10 miles a day."

A ping-pong stadium

ALTHOUGH TABLE tennis is mainly a parlor or basement game in this country, it is almost an obsession throughout Asia and much of Central Europe.

Chuang-Tso-tung is the Ping-Pong darling of Red China, and Ichiro Ogimura is much adored in Japan, and Hans Alser became a millionaire swinging a paddle in Sweden.

"In Peking, they built a table tennis stadium that seats 20,000 persons," said John Reed, Chicago insurance salesman and vice president of the U.S. Table Tennis Assn. "And they fill it every game."

Reed is properly grateful for the recent publicity, but he sighed and added, "The day they invited our people to Red China, I looked in the sports pages for results of the international tournament in Japan. Not one line. But then we have only 3,500 members."

That's likely to increase, as soon as the State Department, CIA, Army and Navy intelligence, and the FBI start issuing paddles to their people.

BOSTON, MASS.
GLOBE

M - 237,967
S - 566,377

APR 1 3 1971

Talk at the ping pong table

To the West, ping pong seems an unlikely tool of diplomacy and it is a fair assumption that neither Henry Kissinger nor the CIA's Richard Helms had table tennis at the top of their list of tactics for parting the bamboo curtain.

This is precisely what makes the current cracking of the Chinese door the most cheering note of the spring season.

The most significant step in international relations in years is being taken, not by men in grey flannel, but by a towering 19-year-old sophomore from Santa Monica College who wears flowered shirts and hair down to his shoulders; not behind the closed door of a government palace, but in the Easter Sunday sunlight of Peking's Gate of Heavenly Peace Square with a young American housewife using a newly-learned word of Chinese to tell a young Communist mother that her child is "good looking."

The rhetoric is correspondingly gentle. "We have received a warm welcome everywhere we have been in China," the president of the US Table Tennis Assn. told his hosts. "It warms my heart to see the Chinese players generously giving their time and talent to our players. On behalf of all Americans, I thank you from the bottom of my heart." No sneak punches; no hidden threats. In fact, no politics. And the answering toast: "we express our good wishes for the American sportsmen and people."

The Chinese, who lead the world as experts at ping pong, are proving they can also excel in hospitality. Gone from the indoor stadium is the picture of Mao and the hard-line slogan about "the US aggressors and all their running dogs." Instead there are eight red flags and a message in English, Chinese and Spanish saying "Long live the great unity between

the peoples of the world." The 15 visiting Americans are free to explore the streets and the shops and are besieged, not by political slogans, but by smiling, waving Chinese.

The food is good; the streets are clean; the train is air-conditioned. And a deputy chief of information at the Foreign Ministry stays up until midnight to greet the first three American newsmen ever given accreditation to work inside Red China.

Obviously international relations cannot be run by three newsmen and 15 ping pong players. And in the background is America's lifting of restrictions to travel to China earlier this year, plus the President's notably more open attitude toward establishing a dialogue with Peking in his State of the World message of February 25.

The President has recently warned American oil companies to respect Red China's restrictions on oil explorations in the China Sea and the US government is expected to ease the embargo on non-strategic trade with Red China soon. Another opportunity for increased communications between the two countries is bound to follow the naming of a top-level Chinese diplomat, fluent in English and reportedly familiar with the United States, as ambassador to Canada.

But, while these essential negotiations proceed at a deliberate pace, those who have learned to give limited credence to governmental positions cannot help responding with hope and excitement to the reports of the American sportsmen in China.

The team will certainly not see all of China and they will certainly get put down at ping pong but, as one team member reports, his twice-victorious opponent at table tennis "explained that he had learned something from me, especially from got to be real.

18 APR 1971

Capitol Punishment

Ping-Pong Gap

By Art Buchwald

STATINTL

It's very rare that the CIA gets caught flatfooted, but the other day when Red China invited the United States to send a table-tennis team to Peking, the Central Intelligence Agency discovered it had no champion ping-pong players in the organization whom it could send along on the trip.

CIA officials were going crazy trying to find someone before the U.S. team left for Peking last Saturday.

In panic, the CIA officials decided to hold a crash program in ping-pong. Neighbors who live around Langley, Va., where the top-secret agency is located, reported seeing truckloads of ping-pong tables going through the gates.

They have reported that they can't sleep at night because of the noise of thousands of balls being hit back and forth across the tables set up in the CIA gymnasium.

Any agent who ever played ping-pong in boy's camp or at the beach had been given leave from his regular duties and brought to Langley in hopes he might be developed into a champion ping-pong player before the U.S. team took off for Peking.

The CIA also held an Employees' Ping-Pong Tournament during lunch hour with cash prizes of up to \$100,000 of unaccountable funds to encourage more people to take up the sport.

Yet, despite these desperate measures, officials of the agency are pessimistic that they'll be able to develop anybody worthy of playing Red China at table tennis.

"What difference does it make if he isn't a champion?" I asked a CIA official.

"We have a serious problem," he said. "This is the first time we're playing Red China at any sport. Table tennis is the most important game in China."

"The USIA and the State Department want the United States to field the best team it can find, because they believe that if we can defeat the Chinese at ping-pong, it would be the greatest propaganda victory of the Cold War."

"On the other hand, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the CIA feel it would be better to send a mediocre team and risk defeat in exchange for finding out what Mao-Tse-Tung is really thinking."

"The ideal, of course, would be to send a champion ping-pong player who also can figure out what is going on in Peking. But so far we can't find anybody."

"Why is that?" I asked. "Surely in this vast organization you must have some excellent table-tennis players."

"Unfortunately, most of our agents are golfers," he said sadly. "We also have some tennis players and a few people who play croquet. But no one here ever thought to recruit ping-pong players."

"Couldn't you borrow a champion player from another agency of the government?"

"The only one who could have qualified was a man who worked for the FBI and had won the intercollegiate ping-pong championship of 1956. But, unfortunately, he was fired a month ago for telling a friend he didn't like J. Edgar Hoover's barber."

"Then it looks like the United States table tennis team may have to go to Peking without CIA representation?" I said.

"Unless we can come up with a sleeper," the official said. "Our recruiters are out on the college campuses right now and their orders are to find someone, anyone. It doesn't make any difference if he can pass a security clearance, as long as he has a vicious backhand."

"Will anyone be punished because the CIA was unprepared to provide an agent for the Red China table tennis tournament?" I asked.

"Our personnel director was demoted and transferred to Iceland the other day, but at the last minute President Nixon commuted his sentence."

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Maxine Cheshire is ill. Her VIP column will resume when she returns.

CHICAGO, ILL.
SUN-TIMES

M - 541,086
S - 697,966

APR 11 1971

Don't starch the net, Charlie

Lights, we imagine, are burning late at the Central Intelligence Agency and the State Department these nights. A team of five men and five women who represented the United States (not very successfully) at the world table-tennis championships in Japan have accepted a Chinese Communist invitation to visit Peking.

Thunderation, what can those fiendishly clever Red devils be up to? Table-tennis players? What back-

handed oriental guile! The ball is obviously now in the CIA's court. We trust that intelligence agents will not stop merely at issuing the players trench coats, but will give them a thorough indoctrination in what to say about world peace, Tricia and Ed, Vietnam, Jackie Onassis, John Lindsay and Martha Mitchell. We wouldn't want one of our table-tennis players to be caught on the Summer Palace lake without a paddle.

STATINTL

WILMINGTON, DELA.

NEWS

APR

5 1971

M - 44,027

Editorials

A cheer for China

The Red Chinese have been accused over the past generation by the West of exporting everything from opium to the flu, but it may be that those inscrutable legions of Chairman Mao have solved the obnoxious problem of one form of export—the hijacker who takes a plane-load of hostages with him.

China received its first hijacked airplane recently. Six Filipinos—described only as young, male and long-haired—used guns and scissors as weapons to take over a Philippine Air Lines jet and took the crew and 39 other passengers for an unscheduled stop in Canton.

The Chinese were not amused. It was a violation of their jealously guarded air space, and as suspicious as the Chinese are, it would be a delightful irony if they are now treating the hijackers as suspected infiltrators from the CIA. That's a supposition not entirely out of bounds. The plane's captain said on his return to Manila that the Chinese who talked to him were em-

phatic in saying they "don't favor this hijacking business." Castro has deplored it a couple of times but never in tones as terse as the Chinese.

That's a refreshing change of pace. Other countries chosen for asylum by hijackers have said nothing like it to other unwilling guests on hijacked planes. The play undoubtedly given the story in the Philippines must give pause to anyone toying with the idea of escape to China. It leaves the impression that the next hijacker to China may find his victim toasted and himself the toast.

The potential for tragedy in any aircraft hijack has touched off an international alarm. The number of hijacks has fallen off, but there is always that chance, sky marshals or not. Maybe China has the solution. If all nations could be as equally emphatic as China apparently was, maybe the sky marshals, the detection devices and the painstaking searches would be a thing of the past.

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

Scant Data Cramps Paris Negotiators

By Jack Anderson

Our negotiators in Paris have been restricted to the most routine intelligence about the war they are supposed to be settling. This has led to some grumping inside the delegation over the difficulty of negotiating in the dark.

The Paris delegation receives only a routine intelligence digest dealing with the Vietnam war. The top-secret stuff—battle plans, position papers, contingency plans and policymaking documents—aren't sent to Paris.

The air strikes at missile sites, antiaircraft emplacements and other tactical targets in North Vietnam in late November, for example, caught Ambassador David K. E. Bruce completely by surprise. He received his first word of the attacks from the North Vietnamese.

This left him poorly prepared to handle the North Vietnamese delegation's protests in Paris. The Communist negotiators let loose a propaganda blast, threatening to stonewall the talks.

Ambassador Bruce asked urgently for more details about

the raids. He needed the background information to help him respond to the Communist charges.

His request was forwarded by his military liaison man, Lt. Gen. Julian Ewell, in a "flash" message to the Pentagon.

Admiral Thomas Moorer, the Joint Chiefs chairman, sent back a detailed account of the raids from the Washington Post. The reply was regarded in Paris as an insulting message to Bruce that he should be satisfied with what he reads in the newspapers.

Poe's New Quest

Beat poet Allen Ginsberg, the unhappy hippie, has embarked upon the new role of investigative reporter in pursuit of evidence that the Central Intelligence Agency is supporting the opium racket in Laos.

Ginsberg, sandalled and balding, his long beard streaked with white hairs, has even managed to interview the exclusive CIA director, Richard Helms, about the CIA's suspected opium smuggling.

Helms vigorously denied his agents are flying opium out of Laos. But Ginsberg has collected a thick packet of con-

trary evidence from ex-CIA men, State Department informants and classified U.N. documents.

The poet's theory is that the CIA has been compelled to help the opium farmers in the mountains of Northern Laos in order to keep them fighting the Communists.

The CIA has raised a 10,000-man army from these Meo tribesmen. Without their opium trade, they might require massive U.S. economic aid.

Informants have told Ginsberg that the renegade Chinese Nationalists in Northern Laos and Thailand also make their living from opium. The CIA would like to keep these Chinese active, too, against the Communists.

Poe's Transformation

We discovered Ginsberg's transformation from poet to muckraker when he came to our office, clad in his hippie garb, seeking proof of his own opium story. To our surprise, his detailed files and probing questions were thoroughly professional.

He asked us for a copy of a letter that has disappeared from the files of Senate Government Operations Subcom-

mittee. The letter, written by a former CIA employee named S. M. Mustard, charges that South Vietnam's Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky once flew opium out of Laos.

The New York Times and Ramparts magazine, which are also working on the opium story, had called us about the letter. But Ginsberg came to our office and pressed in person for the missing evidence.

We dug a photostat of the letter, addressed to former Sen. Ernest Gruening (D-Alaska) out of our files. It told how Ky, during his missious as an Air Force colonel, "took advantage of this situation to fly opium from Laos to Saigon."

My associate, Les Whitten, verified several details in the letter but could come up with no additional evidence that Ky engaged in opium smuggling. The colorful South Vietnamese Vice President also denied the charge.

But the ragged, bearded Ginsberg tucked a copy of the letter into his impressive portfolio and strode off for an interview with Walter Pincus, a former Senate Foreign Relations investigator with inside information on Indochina.

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STATINTL

17 FEB 1971

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PX Probe Told of Payoffs, Villas

Major Scandal Is Hinted as Hearing Opens

By JAMES DOYLE
Star Staff Writer

A network of payoffs, kickbacks and favors such as villas and party girls in exchange for beer, liquor and other distribution rights has dominated the military post exchanges in Vietnam, senators were told today.

There were hints of a major scandal that could touch general officers and the top administrators of the PXs and servicemen's clubs as the Senate Permanent Investigations subcommittee, chaired by Sen. Abraham Ribicoff, D-Conn., opened hearings into supply operations of the club and PX systems.

Duffy Leads Off

LaVerne J. Duffy, assistant counsel for the subcommittee, led off with a 45-page statement devoted mostly to activities of a liquor and slot machine distributor who left Korea after the war there with the Criminal Investigations Division of the Army investigating him for alleged corruption.

The distributor, William J. Crum, an American citizen born in Shanghai in 1918, ended up as one of the biggest businessmen in South Vietnam, with access to many of the top executives in the PX system, Duffy said.

Duffy said the subcommittee would show "that William Crum had considerable capabilities for extracting favors and contracts from sergeants who were club custodians, from senior officers and from ranking civilian officials."

"He apparently worked on the assumption that, even thousands of miles from home and family, in an alien environment, can be bought for a price," Duffy said.

Methods Cited

"At times in Crum's activities, the line between bribe and favor was hazy — the action might be questionable but not unlawful. On other occasions, the gift was blatant and obvious, a clear-out bribe or kickback and all parties to it knew its illegality," Duffy said.

According to Duffy's testimony, Crum used methods in Vietnam that he had been under scrutiny for in Korea, only more extensively.

He would smuggle merchandise into the country under the cover of post exchange manifest, then sell some of it either legitimately or on the black market without paying duty.

He would offer kickbacks to service club custodians and PX procurement officials in return for pushing his merchandise in the clubs and exchanges. And he would provide "lavish entertainment and gifts of value for U.S. civilian and military officials," the statement said.

Duffy read from records of sworn depositions showing that Crum was welcomed into the homes of general officers and was awarded in 1936 a "certificate of achievement" by Brig. Gen. Charles R. Meyer, then commanding general of the U.S. Army Support Command in Qui Nhon.

Villa Supplied

In 1936 he supplied a lavish Saigon villa with six bedrooms and a corps of servants and often party girls for the commander of the Vietnam post exchanges, Lt. Col. John G. Goodlett Jr., now retired, according to a deposition from Goodlett which Duffy introduced.

Goodlett paid \$100 a month for food, but the villa cost \$1,600

a month in rent and another \$100 in maintenance, the testimony said. Crum said in a letter he spent \$5,000 decorating it, Duffy said.

Goodlett said that while he spent little of his time in the villa, "I know that arrangements were made for women to be part of the entertainment," Duffy said.

Besides Goodlett, the villa occupants included the top four civilians working in the exchange system, Duffy testified. They were:

Peter B. Mason, general manager of PXs in Vietnam, who controlled much of the system; Richard Lewellyn, chief of procurement, who set the levels of all needed merchandise; Clarence Swafford, chief of the food branch and concessions, who determined how much and what food was ordered, as well as the jukeboxes and slot machines and other entertainment devices, and Ralph White, who decided where retail exchanges were set up.

\$6 Billion Estimate

In this period, 1935-1936, the PXs were expanding from facilities catering to 150,000 men to an operation that could sell to 450,000, the testimony showed. The system grew to generate \$6 billion a year at its peak, the subcommittee has estimated.

Crum, who reportedly did jobs for the Central Intelligence Agency in China shortly after World War II, controlled almost all sales and maintenance of slot and pinball machines, jukeboxes and other coin-operated amusements on U.S. military reservations from 1937 until last year.

Swafford recommended that a large jukebox contract be awarded to a company owned by Crum in 1933, while he lived in the Vietnam villa, and Lt. Col. Goodlett, who also had access to the villa, approved the contract, Duffy said.

Crum also represented the James B. Beam Distilling Co. of Chicago and the Carling Brewing Co. of Cleveland, whose products he promoted with the help of special promotion funds which the committee expects to show were used for payments to club operators and favors for procurement officers.

Wrote of 'Old Buddy'

In 1955, according to letters Duffy introduced, Crum wrote to officials of the beer company saying, "An old buddy of mine is now the Navy chief in charge of stock records and distribution in Saigon. What could be greater? He has promised me to escalate our orders. . ."

The same friend, Crum told a Beam company vice president "has promised faithfully that he will not order any more Old Crow until it runs out, and also will increase his Jim Beam orders so we will be in the No. 1 position even during the month of June."

The committee was told that Crum has been invited to testify but has been eluding a committee subpoena. He lives on a palatial yacht in Hong Kong harbor. Mason, the chief civilian executive, is assuming permanent residence in Greece, having voluntarily given up his federal retirement funds because "to apply for them, Mason would have to return to the United States," Duffy said.

The second scheduled witness is retired CIA investigator Augustine G. Manfredi, who probed Crum's dealings in Korea in the 1950s.

Ribicoff said among those to be called would be Martin J. Bromley, a colleague of Crum's in the slot machine distribution business; "officials in the beer and liquor industry" and military personnel, including former Brig. Gen. Earl F. Cole.

Cole was the Army's deputy chief of staff for personnel administration during this period.

Continued

CIA-Backed Laotians Said Entering China

By Michael Morrow

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VIENTIANE, Laos—United States intelligence operations include the sending of armed Laotian reconnaissance teams into China from northern Laos, sources here say. Teams are reported to have gone as far as 200 miles into China, dispatched from a secret CIA outpost 15 minutes' flying time north of the Laotian opium center at Houei Sai.

According to sources close to the Central Intelligence Agency, and confirmed by Western diplomatic sources in Vientiane, the CIA is sending out hill tribesmen armed with American weapons, a three-pound radio with a range of 400 miles and equipment to tap Chinese telegraph lines, watch roads and do other types of intelligence gathering.

"There is always a team in China," sources close to the CIA said.

Staging area for the operation is a small mountain valley airstrip called Nam Lieu (also known as Nam Yu). The strip, which one Air American pilot describes as "difficult as hell to get into," is surrounded by mountains. It is serviced by both Air America and Continental Air Service, and is also a way-station for opium traders from northern Laos and Burma en route to drug factories at Houei Sai.

During 1968, five Chinese functionaries caught up in the purges of the Cultural Revolution defected to a Nam Lieu reconnaissance team. They were treated well by the Americans for a time but eventually were turned over to the Royal Laotian government.

According to sources close to the CIA, the five were thrown into a 12 by 12 by 12 foot pit exposed to the elements. They were eventually executed.

Like most CIA operations in Laos, the one out of Nam Lieu is directed from a headquarters at Udorn air base in northeastern Thailand. There are several Americans at Nam Lieu, including CIA and military intelligence personnel. Sources close to the CIA report the number has increased recently from four to more than 10.

In addition to activities inside China, the Nam Lieu Americans also help direct a joint operation of "SGU" (special guerrilla units) and the Thai army at Xieng Lom south of Houei Sai on the Lao-Thai border. They also run intelligence-gathering missions on a road being built by the Chinese government (under an agreement reached with the now-defunct coalition government of Laos) in the same vicinity.

Until mid-September of last year, the Nam Lieu operation was headed by a rough-and-tumble veteran guerrilla organizer named Anthony "Tony" Poe. Poe is a legendary figure in Laos known best for his dislike of journalists, disregard for orders and radio codes, capacity for Lao whiskey and expertise at clandestine guerrilla operations.

Poe was removed almost immediately after an article last September by Dispatch News Service International on the Nam Lieu operations, ostensibly because the article "blew his cover." According to sources close to the CIA, however, this reason was an excuse used by the American embassy here to get rid of Poe, whose style has been a source of long-term friction with members of the American mission in Laos including Ambassador McMurtrie Godley.

The September story was re-

when he visited Laos in the fall. Helms was quite upset that there might be a leak within the CIA in Laos, sources close to the CIA report.

Whether by design or coincidence, Vince Shields, in charge of CIA operations at Long Cheng on the edge of the Plain of Jars north of Vientiane, and Patrick Devlin, station chief for the CIA in Vientiane, have both been transferred.

As for the mission into China, sources close to the CIA and Western diplomatic sources both report that to their knowledge the missions are continuing.

Since leaving Nam Lieu, Poe has spent most of his time at Udorn air base, although one source reported that Poe continued to do "odd jobs" on the Thai-Cambodian border. Those who know him say he is unhappy away from Nam Lieu.

Poe is an ex-Marine noncommissioned officer, wounded at Iwo Jima, who remained in Asia after World War II. In the 1950s he helped organize CIA-trained Tibetan insurgents, escorting them to Colorado for training and going back with them into Tibet.

Later he worked in the Thai-Cambodian border area with the Khmer Serai, anti-Sihanouk guerrillas receiving assistance from the CIA, and other parts of Thailand. He has been in and out of Laos since before the Geneva Accords of 1962 and was one of the first Americans involved in arming and training paramilitary groups in Laos.

Poe is considered stubborn and brusque, sometimes going into fits of anger over the radio, his lifeline with the outside world. He is said to prefer working with hill tribes to working with Americans and looks down on most American operations because of their heavy reliance on American personnel.

He has been wounded at least once during his career in Laos, and reportedly a price has been put on his head by the Pathet Lao. He is perhaps the only American legally married to a hill tribe.

ATLANTA, GA.
JOURNAL
E - 257,863
JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION
S - 536,4972 0 1979

STATINTL

Tell It Straight

IMAGINE, if you can, hill tribesmen from South America, armed with Russian weapons, long-range radio and dispatched from a secret enemy intelligence outpost, probing as deep as 200 miles into the United States.

Hard to believe.

Rather unlikely with the reputed capability of spy-in-the sky satellites circling the earth. The satellite spies are certainly less offensive.

Now comes a surprise.

Reporter Michael Morrow, in a copyrighted report for Dispatch News Service International, distributed by the Los Angeles Times-Washington Post Service, says that such is the nature of U.S. intelligence operations launched from Northern Laos into China.

According to sources close to the Central Intelligence Agency and confirmed by Western diplomatic sources in Vientiane, Laos, says Morrow, hill tribesmen armed with American weapons are operating in China, tapping Chinese telegraph lines, watching roads and doing other types of intelligence gathering.

"There is always a team in China," a source close to the CIA told Morrow.

This may give some in America a greater feeling of security. But, under close scrutiny, it can be viewed as an unnecessary risk and a dangerously provocative act. There are other more sophisticated ways of intelligence gathering that can serve American needs without endangering efforts to open Western political and economic ties with China.

The time has come when the world's most populous nation, and most dangerous emerging nuclear power, can no longer be ignored and callously provoked.

A good place for Washington to begin is to

work for admission of Peking in the United Nations and to call off the U.S.-backed armed intelligence probe within Chinese borders, if such reports are accurate.

If they are not accurate, the American public should be so informed.

Increasing concern over the extent of indirect American military involvement in Asia demands it.

E - 172,411
S - 200,516

STATINTL

JAN 18 1971

Sources Confirm CIA Backs Spy Missions Probing Deep Into China

Times-Post news service

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According to sources close to the Central Intelligence Agency, and confirmed by Western diplomatic sources in Vientiane, the CIA is sending out hill tribesmen armed with American weapons, a 3-pound radio with a range of 400 miles and equipment to tap Chinese telegraph lines, watch roads and do other types of intelligence gathering.

"There is always a team in China," according to sources close to the CIA.

STAGING AREA

Staging area for the operation is a small, mountain-valley airstrip called Nam Lieu (also known as Nam Yu). The strip, which one Air America pilot describes as "difficult as hell to get into," is surrounded by mountains. It is serviced by both Air America and Continental Air Service and is also a way-station for opium traders from northern Laos and Burma en route to drug factories at Houei Sai.

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Houei Sai on the Lao-Thai border. They also run intelligence gathering missions, on a road being built by the Chinese government (under an agreement reached with the now defunct coalition government of Laos) in the same vicinity.

Until mid-September of last year, the Nam Lieu operation was headed by a tough-and-tumble veteran guerilla organizer named Anthony

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The CIA in China

MICHAEL MORROW
DISPATCH NEWS SERVICE

HOUEI SAI, Laos (LNS) -- This sleepy Mekong River town is as close as a journalist with any regard for his safety can get to a secret CIA outpost which is the staging area for armed reconnaissance teams being sent by the U.S. into China.

Sources close to the CIA pinpoint the staging area at a small mountain valley airstrip called Nam Lieu (Nam Yu) fifteen minutes flying time north of Houei Sai. According to the same highly reliable sources, "there is always a team in China."

The teams are armed with American small arms, a special three pound radio with a range of four hundred miles, and other special equipment. Their missions are to tap Chinese telegraph lines, watch roads and do other types of intelligence gathering. Teams have gone as far as two hundred miles into China.

Each team is said to consist of about fifteen men, most of who are Yao hill tribesman. Yao are used because this tribe lives in large numbers along the mountainous frontiers of Laos, Burma, Thailand and China. There are approximately two million Yao living inside China, and some of the mercenaries have family connections there. Meo and Lao Theung tribesmen are also used for similar reasons.

The teams are normally flown to a sod airstrip known as "Site 93" of "Moung Moune," about twenty kilometers north of Nam Lieu, near the Mekong River where it forms a border with Burma. Sometimes they are put down right on the banks of Mekong by helicopters. They carry instantly inflatable rubber rafts to use crossing the Mekong into Burma. From Burma they continue northwest, entering China about fifty kilometers from Site 93.

The teams from Nam Lieu are gone three to four months, maintaining contact by radio with Nam Lieu and with airplanes which fly close to the China border in order to pick up their broadcasts.

On at least one occasion an airplane has been almost shot down for straying into China. During July 1968, an Air America "porter" single-engined plane with two aboard crossed the Chinese frontier near the tri-borders of Burma, Laos and China. Parts of both wings were blown away by anti-aircraft fire, but the plane was able to limp back to base.

Several of the teams inserted into China

have been captured, and some have switched allegiance, returning to Nam Lieu as counter-spies.

There has been at least one occasion when a returning team brought Chinese back with them. During 1968, five local Chinese functionaries ousted from their posts by the Cultural Revolution in China defected to a Nam Lieu reconnaissance team. They were brought back to Nam Lieu by the team. There they were well-treated by the Americans for a time but eventually turned over to the Royal Laotian government. According to sources close to the CIA the five were thrown into the Laotian equivalent of a "tiger's cage" -- a twelve-by-twelve-by-twelve foot pit exposed to the elements and without sanitation facilities -- and eventually executed.

Like most CIA operations in Laos, the one at Man Lieu is directed from a super-secret headquarters at Udorn airbase in Northeast Thailand. There are four Americans in Nam Lieu, however, headed by a veteran clandestine mercenary organizer named Anthony Poe. In addition to activities inside China, Poe and his team also work with hill tribesman in the area, organizing "SGU" (special guerilla units) and Thai Army which they direct at Xieng Lom south of Houei Sai on the Lao-Thai border.

Poe is an ex-Marine non-commissioned officer, wounded in landing at Iwo Jima, who remained in Asia after World War II. In the fifties he helped organize Tibetan CIA-aided insurgents, escorted them to Colorado for training and finally went back with them into Tibet. Later he worked in the Thai-Cambodian border area with the "Khmer Blue" anti-Sihanouk forces receiving assistance from the CIA, and in other parts of Thailand with other mercenary groups for a total of five years. He has been in and out of Laos since before the Geneva Accords of 1962, and was one of the first Americans involved in arming and training hill tribe paramilitary groups in Laos.

There are reasons to believe Poe's operations at Nam Lieu are just the tip of an iceberg of U.S. activities in China and Burma. Take for example:

--Sources close to the CIA report that the CIA is working with Shan mercenary groups moving into China from northern Burma. Ac-

SAN FRANCISCO, CAL.
CHRONICLE

M - 480,233

SEP 7 1970

Editorials

The CIA's Dark Trail Into China

THE REPORT OF Michael Morrow of The Chronicle Foreign Service and Dispatch News International that the Central Intelligence Agency is regularly sending armed mercenary and espionage bands as far as 200 miles into Southern China exposes the recklessness and irresponsibility of this agency. The news will surprise no one familiar with the CIA's demonstrated capacity for national embarrassment.

It is particularly dismaying to read, coming as it does during an Administration that is pursuing a cautious change of course toward the Communist Chinese. President Nixon has slightly loosened the tight prohibition against trade with Peking and has authorized the issuance of passports allowing certain persons to travel to mainland China. His Guam Doctrine of last year and his earlier speeches have indicated that he believes that the era of confrontation must be succeeded by the era of negotiation.

THESE OVERTURES, the first indications of hopeful change after two decades of official resistance to trade with the Red Chinese, were welcome and were accompanied by evidence that the China Lobby of the 1950's no longer packed any political joss.

But any efforts toward reconciliation, or only toward a reasonable modus vivendi, are seriously encumbered, if not terminated, if the Nation, through the CIA, is simultaneously sponsoring Terry-and-the-Pirates, clandestine forays across China's national frontiers. These derring-do "insertions" of agents thus present a serious problem.

JUDGMENT MUST BE PASSED on this basis: is a list of local Central Committee members or Peoples' Army provincial commanders worth additional jeopardy of peace?

The spooks obviously must be told that they have no legitimate reason or gainful purpose for this type of operation within China. They must be leashed; the cause of future peace with China demands it.

Super-Secret Missions

CIA's Spy Teams Inside Red China

STATINTL

Tribesmen On Roving Patrols

By Michael Morrow
Chronicle Foreign Service

Houei Sai, Laos

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The teams are equipped with American small arms, a special three-pound radio with a range of 400 miles, and other special gear. Their missions are to tap Chinese telegraph lines, watch roads and do other types of intelligence gathering. Teams have gone as far as 200 miles into China.

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Several of the teams inserted into China have been captured, and some have switched allegiances, returning to Nam Lieu as counter-spies.

CHINESE

There has been at least one occasion when a returning team brought back a woman with it. During 1963, five lo-

cal Chinese functionaries caught up in the purges of the Cultural Revolution in China defected to a Nam Lieu reconnaissance team.

They were brought to Nam Lieu by the team. There they were well treated by the Americans for a time but eventually turned over to the Royal Laotian Government.

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DIRECTED

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In addition to activities inside China, Poe and his team also work with hill tribesmen in the area, organizing, training, equipping and resupplying them. There is also a joint operation between the "SGU" (special guerrilla units) and Thai Army which they direct at Xieng Lom south of Houei Sai on the Lao-Thai border.

Poe is a legendary figure in Laos, known best for his dislike of journalists, disregard for orders and radio codes, capacity for Lao whiskeys and expertise at clandestine guerrilla operations.

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He has been in and out of Laos since before the Geneva Accords of 1962, and was one of the first Americans involved in arming and training hill tribes paramilitary groups in Laos.

He refuses to have his picture taken, and once literally threw a journalist's camera away for taking a picture of him. He has refused to obey higher orders commanding him to commit his paramilitary guerrillas to large-scale attacks away from their home area, and often disregards radio procedures.

Those who know him say his drinking stems from the dangerous life he leads, particularly the flying he does through the treacherous mountains of northern Laos. Poe is highly respected by some but hated by others involved in secret operations in Laos for his brusque and stubborn manner. He is said

to prefer working with the hill tribes to working with Americans and looks down on most American operations because of their heavy reliance on American personnel.

Poe is said not to have been back to the U.S. in 15 years. He is perhaps the only American locally married to a woman of the hill tribes

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E - 19,543
 S - 20,039
 JUN 23 1970

Our Man In Washington

Student Swap With Red China Eyed

By TOM OCHILTREE
 Daily Olympian Correspondent

AN INDIANA UNIVERSITY professor believes the American academic community should begin preparing now for the time when the United States and Communist China agree to exchange scholars, a step he thinks could come during this decade.

Professor Robert F. Byrnes made the point that such an exchange, if properly carried out, would offer important opportunities to scholars in both countries and promote greater understanding.

But many hazards also would have to be overcome. He said great care would be needed to see that neither the Red Chinese nor the American governments corrupted such a program by attempting to use the scholars for espionage or subversive purposes.

The time to think about all these problems is now, Byrnes stressed in a memorandum he submitted to the Senate National Security Subcommittee headed by Senator Henry M. Jackson, Washington Democrat.

Administrators at Michigan, Michigan State, Purdue, Notre Dame, Indiana and the universities of Washington State and Idaho clearly could find it profitable to study Byrnes' thinking on this subject since he visualizes a broad program that undoubtedly would take in those universities as well as the Ivy League schools and institutions of higher learning in other parts of the country.

THE IU HISTORY professor did not deal with present domestic troubles in his memorandum. Clearly, however, those troubles on American campuses and in the streets could be increased by

a sloppy handling on our part of a student exchange arrangement.

Byrnes was firm in his belief that the Red Chinese could be expected to try to use an exchange of scholars "to spread their revolutionary ideology and to attain political influence within the large Chinese community (in the United States), among groups of disaffected and romantic students and among blacks. They may also seek to use the exchange program for subversion and intelligence purposes."

He saw two ways which American university leaders, if they get on the ball now, can help head off such a development.

First, the American side in negotiating the exchange should seek to pitch the program on the whole spectrum of academic disciplines.

Otherwise, Peking would tend to limit the areas of scholarship open to American students in China prohibiting studies in such fields as recent history and economics, for example. Also Peking would tend to send to America only students in scientific and engineering courses "in order to benefit in those areas of study in which we have a clear superiority and in which they have direct technical needs."

BYRNES PLACED equal stress on his second point — the need for American universities to carry out exchange programs with a large degree of independence of Washington so as to be true to their own primary educational goals.

There would have to be a government-to-government arrangement of course, but there also would be parallel arrangements of uni-

versities to universities, under his concept. The aim would be to eliminate domestic and international political considerations as much as possible.

Recalling experience he gained through the years while chairing a similar scholar exchange program with the Soviet Union, Byrnes said the American academic community avoided the mistake of getting tangled up then with the American intelligence community. The lesson was clear: a similar careful approach should govern the relations of American universities with Chinese institutions of higher learning. American students should be just that, not thinly disguised CIA agents.

He also suggested that we should not attempt to smother the Chinese with waves of students to try to stimulate change there but should emphasize the quality of the students we send, as was done in the case of the Soviet Union. In his view, using American students overseas as an instrument of political policy is not a proper function for American universities.

BYRNES suggested that the exchange program be limited to graduate students. Those selected to go to Mainland China will find very little "Joe College" atmosphere there. They will have to have mature, stable personalities and a strong sense of purpose.

"Everyone involved in the selection process should recognize that high personal qualities are required for production work in a country ruled by Communists, that living and working in Mainland China will involve particular strains and pressures, and that not all the mistakes

made in selection will be invisible," he said.

Byrnes thought the universities interested in participating in the program should begin to get together to form a league with one administrative headquarters. When the exchange comes about a national selection committee should choose the American participants in a national competition.

Senator Jackson, in commenting on Byrnes' analysis, said the professor's memorandum now should serve to "encourage productive discussion and decision" by those in the university community and the government who will be involved in the exchanges.

24 MAY 1970

Pigs and Periodicals

Getting the Facts on Life in Red China Becomes a Major 'Growth' Industry

By Jack Anderson

DAY AFTER DAY, the dapper man from the U.S. consulate used to stand in Hong Kong's Lo Wu border station counting the pigs that came in from Communist China.

Some days, as many as 6,000 porkers, squealing and wriggling, would be carted across the border in trucks, boxcars and carts—all headed for sweet-and-sour pork or some other succulent dish.

When the consulate man left Lo Wu each day, he not only knew more than he cared to know about the pork trade, but he also knew a little more about what was going on inside China.

My associate Les Whitten, writing from the porcine lookout, explains that the pig shipments come from all over South China. During the recent convulsions on the Chinese mainland, the consulate man could tell from his pig watch which towns and provinces were calm. For cities in turmoil shipped no pigs.

Other consulate men scrounged provincial newspapers that may have been brought back by some of the 300,000 Hong Kong residents who visit friends across the border each year. So secretive is the Peking regime that it's against the law to take a provincial paper out of China. But not even the Communists have been able to overcome the Chinese habit of wrapping purchases in newspapers.

The Central Intelligence Agency, meanwhile, carefully monitored the provincial radio stations. Tall antennas, both in Hong Kong and Okinawa, bring in China's radio and television programs. If there were no pigs from a district and the radio station warily broadcast only "feeds" from Peking, then it was a good bet that the local Red Guards and the Communist cadres were struggling for power.

The porcine data, provincial papers and radio reports were funneled into the U.S. consulate on Hong Kong's hilly Garden Road, where 30 to 40 specialists processed, evaluated and analyzed the information in the back rooms.

THEY READ newspapers, periodicals and technical publications prodigiously. They study films of Mao Tse-tung. One conclusion from Mao's inability to recognize an old comrade until they were face to face: his eyesight is poor.

They also carefully study how other Chinese leaders are ranked in relation to Mao on festive days. And, of course, they interview every refugee, diplomat and visitor from Red China who will talk to them.

From all this, the specialists piece together the facts of Chinese life like artisans making a mosaic. Sometimes the pieces don't fit quite right, but usually America's watchers get the picture.

In Hong Kong, diplomats from all over the world keep a wary watch on Mao and his masses. But it is agreed that the Americans are the best China watchers in the business.

Some of the best information comes from the spy satellites and Chinese Nationalist surveillance planes, which have been able to keep an accurate watch on Red China's nuclear missile operations.

Paid agents—all natives of China, all trained by our intelligence agencies, all risking their necks daily to secure information needed by the United States—also slip in and out of China between the slats in the bamboo curtain.

Our secret operatives usually are smuggled into China along the mudflat, canal-streaked coast between Hangchow and Swatow. The junks that sneak them ashore are run by "sleepers," as our friends inside China are called, or by Chinese pirates

The infiltrators must be masters of disguise and must pay attention to the smallest details. Some agents disguised as peddlers have been trapped because their feet were too clean. The Communist police know that native peddlers, after years of trudging around in clogs, have an impenetrable coat of dirt on their feet, gnarled and cracked toenails and soles hard as shoe leather.

One agent dressed as a peddler was caught because his little toes turned inward. This telltale sign told the police that the "peddler" had once worn Western-style shoes.

ALL AGENTS are given specific assignments. As a CIA man explained: "It's like sticking a needle in a fat pig. If you jab at random, you probably will hit nothing but fat. But if you poke the needle in a vital spot, you can hurt the pig."

To check rumors of a Red Chinese assault against the Nationalist-held offshore islands, agents once were asked to look for life preservers. These islands are protected by reefs that would snag most landing craft 10 to 20 yards offshore. This means invading troops probably would have to swim ashore. Despite the example of Mao's publicized plunges in the Yangtze, most Chinese are poor swimmers who would need life preservers.

China's Erratic Space Plans

Bemuse West

By Thomas O'Toole
Washington Post Staff Writer

FOUR CENTURIES AGO, a Chinese inventor named Wan Hu strapped a pair of home-made rockets to a chair and tried to blast his way off the earth.

He failed, of course, but legend and a little history made him the first man to make an attempt at space flight. Today, a Red Chinese satellite is in earth orbit, circling the globe every three hours and broadcasting for all the world to hear that Wan Hu's dream of a Chinese presence in space is at long last a reality.

"Tung Fang Hung," the Chinese satellite sang—"The East Is Red." But beyond this touch of theatrics the only thing about the 381-pound sphere that surprises Western observers is that the Chinese took so long to put it up.

"They've had the tools to orbit a satellite for well over a year now," one veteran China watcher said last week. "The fact that they've only just done it raises questions about whether or not they're having new troubles inside their scientific establishment."

These are questions China watchers have been asking for the past four years, ever since the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution closed down technical schools, purged the ranks of the Chinese Academy of Sciences and stopped publication of just about every scientific journal being printed in mainland China.

"The only thing still in publication is China Medicine Today," said a member of the National Science Foundation, which received and translated six major Chinese journals before 1966. "And to be frank, China Medicine Today is a semipopular magazine with more Mao in it than medicine."

In a sense, it's a miracle that any science was done on the Chinese mainland these last four years.

The Chinese Academy of Sciences has been under military control since December, 1967, and the People's Daily carried a story not long ago that academy members were engaged in "self-education and self-examination" and were busily studying the thoughts of Chairman Mao "under the assistance of People's Liberation Army Units stationed in the academy premises."

By June, 1968, two academy vice presi-

dents and no fewer than 15 key academy members had been arrested or charged with crimes that ranged from opposition to the Cultural Revolution to being agents of the CIA and the Soviet KGB.

About the same time, the Minister of the State Council's Seventh Ministry of Machine Building was removed from office—a serious removal since his ministry was responsible for development of aircraft, rockets, missiles and their accessory electronic parts.

It's quite possible his presence won't be missed, since Red China hasn't developed an airplane of its own (outside of crop dusters) in the 20-year history. Chinese fighter pilots still fly the 10-year-old MIG-19, and only this year did Chinese factories begin making the TU-16 bomber, which was developed by the Soviet Union 17 years ago.

Paradoxical Success

BUT IF CHINA is backward, it is also a land of paradox. The biggest paradox is that it has managed to make progress in nuclear science and rocketry even in the face of civil chaos and what seems to be an almost calamitous notion of how to achieve its scientific goals.

Take its atomic program. The Red Chinese exploded their first atomic bomb in 1964, their first thermonuclear hydrogen weapon four years later. Their last two atomic tests were even more interesting. One was the atmospheric test of a three-megaton (equal to three million tons of TNT) weapon and the second was an underground test of a much smaller weapon.

This was the first Chinese underground atomic test (its date: Sept. 28, 1969), which suggests four explanations to China watchers.

The first is that the Chinese are worried about world reaction to continued testing in the atmosphere. The second is somewhat tied to the first, and says that the Chinese have begun a broad program of underground testing because they might want to sign the limited test ban treaty that forbids atomic testing in the atmosphere.

The Institute for Defense Analyses has two different explanations. The first is that the Chinese have progressed to the point where they can more easily control their tests and where they can better analyze their effects. The second is that the Chinese

are now more interested in keeping atomic debris out of the atmosphere, where Western and Soviet sleuths might examine it and deduce what kinds of weapons the Chinese are testing.

"The more controversial explanation," IDA's Alice Langley Iisich recently told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, "is that the Chinese may be experimenting not only with reducing the size of the device but with minimizing the amount of fissionable material in the device to develop a tactical nuclear weapons capability, that is, weapons that could be carried by a fighter or fighter-bomber."

Capacity to Deliver?

IF TRUE, THE IRONY of this explanation lies in the fact that it coincides with the first launch of a Chinese satellite, which suggests that the Chinese also have a means of delivering an atomic weapon with a ballistic missile.

"We don't think they have a good delivery system (ICBM, with a 6000-mile range) at all," one observer said last week. "We think it might be 1975 before they get this capability, and they might not have it even then."

What the Red Chinese do have is a version of a medium-range (1500 miles) ballistic missile, possibly fitted out with a second stage rocket able to place a small satellite into earth orbit. This doesn't mean their scientists can easily escalate their rocket to one with four times the range.

"It would take a quantum jump to do that," one source said, "and while they're not incapable of quantum jumps, I don't think they're close to making this one."

Despite such judgments on Red Chinese science, the China watchers go right on being amazed by what they see through their looking glasses.

DALLAS MORNING NEWS
13 April 1970

CIA Said Brewing Revolt

By TOM JOHNSON

American pilots working with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) are making low-level, night-time flights over Communist China to further dissension and eventual revolution, The Dallas News has been told by a former government flyer.

"Our boys are doing quite a bit of flying into China," said John Wiren in an interview. "They fly upriver at night in old PBVs.

"They drop (Chinese Nationalist) guerrillas and supplies put in there to stir things up."

Wiren, who flew from one end of Southeast Asia to the other under government contract from 1962 till 1968, said the clandestine flights are made into China as part of a long-range strategic plan.

"The big plan is for revolution in China," he said.

WIREN IMPLIED the North Vietnamese cities of Hanoi and Haiphong haven't been reduced to rubble by U.S. bombing because of the adverse psychological effect it would have on virtually all Asians.

He said in effect that American destruction of those cities would even turn mainland Chinese — who might one day rise up against the regime of Mao Tse-tung — against the United States.

Wiren, who spent much of the 1960s flying for the CIA-sponsored airline "Air America" in Laos, said the conflict in that small, landlocked country is every bit as brutal and savage as the war in Vietnam.

"THE HILL PEOPLE of Laos are caught in the middle between the Pathet Lao-North Vietnamese forces on the one hand, and the Royal Laotian troops, supported by the United States, on the other," he said.

"These poor people — some of them don't even know they're in a country called Laos — constitute the buffer zone," Wiren went on.

"It's still genocide, any way you cut it. Boys nine and 10 years old are being given rifles by both sides and put in the lines. What chance do they have?"

Wiren, now Dallas sales representative for a general aviation magazine, said atrocities occur on both sides of the Laotian insurgency.

"THE MEO FORCES (guerrilla-type troops on the side of the Royal Laotian government) regularly shoot prisoners," he said. "They keep them around long enough to find out what they know and then they shoot them.

"I can remember drinking with (government) Laotian generals," Wiren said. "Sometimes, when they'd had quite a few, they'd say to me:

"Want to have some fun? Want to cut some cars off? Want to shoot some prisoners?"

"I couldn't fathom it. It sure wasn't my idea of warfare," he said.

Wiren, who flew with the Marines in the Korean war, said recent headlines telling of the spread of the Southeast Asian conflagration to Laos are rather misleading.

"IT'S BEEN GOING back and forth and back and forth like this for some time," he said, "at least since 1962, when I first got over there.

"The headlines seem political to me. It sounds like some of these senators are just trying to get on the bandwagon.

"I had (Missouri Democratic Sen. Stuart) Symington over there (Laos) on a flight in 1965. He knew what was going on then. So did Congressman Olin Teague (of College Station).

"I took both of them upcountry. We're no more involved in Laos now than we were eight years ago," Wiren said. "Why's everyone so excited all of a sudden?"

He cited as an example of this pattern the seizure by Communist forces last month of the junction of Highways 13 and 7.

"THIS ROAD JUNCTION is just west of the PDJ (Plain of Jars)," Wiren said.

"They had it but we took it back several years ago. Now they take it again. It goes back and forth."

He said he seriously doubts the North Vietnamese want to overrun all of Laos.

"No one can govern it as it is. What would they do with it if they took it? All they really want to do is protect the Ho Chi Minh trail into South Vietnam.

"These recent feints in the vicinity of the PDJ serve only one purpose: to influence American public opinion.

"They very much want U.S. newspapers to carry stories to the effect that 'Nixon has let the war spread into Laos' and that sort of thing," he said. "It tends to turn U.S. public opinion against the war in Vietnam."

Wiren said he flew a variety of aircraft in Laos. Most of his missions were to supply government forces stationed at outposts, but he also dropped rice and other food-stuffs to peasants whom the government wanted to resist the Pathet Lao.

He said he drew ground fire almost daily and was shot down once. A helicopter rescued him the next day.

Asked for his overall assessment of Southeast Asia in general and Laos in particular, Wiren said:

"There are too many tribes and factions for it ever to be cohesive. Winston Churchill said we ought to let them stew in their own juice.

"But since we're in there, I think we ought to get something out of it all."

TALKS WITH CHINA

THE MILITARY SABOTEURS

JOSEPH C. GOULDEN

Mr. Goulden, a Washington journalist, is the author of *Truth Is the First Casualty, on the Tonkin Gulf incidents* (Rand McNally).

Washington

Separate but related scraps of information, and the sotto voce complaints of middle-echelon State Department officials, suggest that the greatest barrier to substantial progress in the Warsaw talks with China is the intransigence of the U.S. military. President Nixon, as a matter of declared national policy, wants to "think in terms of a better understanding with Red China" (press conference, March 4, 1969). Secretary of State William Rogers, in his first appearance before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said: "We continue to hope for a reduction of tensions . . . [and] to seek ways in which we may be able to contribute to an improved atmosphere" (March 27, 1969).

Yet Secretary Rogers and President Nixon must implement this policy in the face of military obstructionism—aided by persons within the intelligence community—that comes uncomfortably close to insubordination. The question quietly coming to a head is this: shall U.S. policy toward China be set by the President, or by generals in the Far East? The sequence has gone as follows:

Early in 1969, Peking was ready to resume the Warsaw talks after a break of thirteen months. These sessions, which began in 1955, have produced few concrete results, but professional diplomats consider them an invaluable conduit to the Chinese leadership. China's involvement in Vietnam is another factor: as one State official put it, "In case of an emergency, we wanted a way we could talk to Peking in a hurry."

Preparing for the resumed talks, the Nixon Administration drew up background papers that proposed an exchange of journalists, scholars, scientists and scientific information, and the "regularization" of postal service and telecommunications. If these overtures proved successful, the Administration was ready to move, in Secretary Rogers' words, toward "an agreement on peaceful coexistence consistent with our treaty obligations in the area."

Then came trouble. On January 24, Liao Ho-shu, the Chinese *chargé d'affaires* in The Hague, fled his post and asked the United States for asylum. As defectors go, Liao was low-grade ore. He had not left The Hague for four years, he had no intelligence duties, his assignment was routine paper shuffling. Liao was about as important a catch as would be the assistant agricultural attaché in the U.S. Embassy in Dar-es-Salaam.

The intelligence community has a rather well-established (if unwritten) set of rules about defectors: if some one comes to the attention of the intelligence community, he is to be accepted and given refuge, regardless of his motivation or value. However, a defector is not usually publicized unless there is some overriding reason to put his name on the front page. It is reliably estimated that no more than one-third of defectors from Communist nations are ever publicly acknowledged.

For reasons that no one here is willing to explain, the CIA decided to "surface" Liao Ho-shu with substantial ballyhoo. The Free China Relief Association, a Chiang Kai-shek propaganda group, sent the Nationalist Chinese Embassy in Washington a cable saying Liao would be welcome in Taiwan. And Peking angrily canceled the Warsaw meeting, charging (falsely) that Washington had induced Liao to "betray his country" in order to create an "anti-China atmosphere."

State Department officers wearily packed away their Warsaw background papers, and China watchers in both Washington and Hong Kong raised their eyebrows over the CIA's decision to "merchandise" Liao.

The eyebrows moved again in mid-summer of 1969 when Hsinhua, the New China News Agency, in several broadcasts significantly moderated some of its standard propaganda. It had said previously that improvement of U.S.-China relations depended, among other things, upon withdrawal of the Seventh Fleet from the straits separating Taiwan from the mainland, and upon the dismantling of U.S. military bases on the island. The Chinese broadcasts suddenly fell silent about the bases; they referred only to the straits patrol.

Intelligence analysts in Hong Kong promptly evaluated this semantic nuance as a signal that the Chinese were once more ready to talk. (Probably because of the increasing border tension with Russia.) Recommendations were sent to Washington that the Navy vacate the straits or, at a minimum, cut the patrol to a token force. State Department officials based in Hong Kong argued that U.S. patrols were of minimal value, since the Chinese, after two decades, were unlikely to take the suicidal risk of attempting to seize Taiwan.

The U.S. military on Taiwan resisted, and vociferously. Their case was presented by a remarkable major general, Richard G. Ciccolella, commander of the military advisory group there. Ciccolella has been called (by his friends) a "modern MacArthur." He was on the UN negotiating team at Panmunjom, and takes a bitterly negative view of meeting Communists at the conference table for any reason whatsoever. In a 1969 speech, for example, Ciccolella referred to his first-hand experience with the "duplicity, deceit and intransigence with which Communists pursue their objectives while conducting so-called negotiations."


Ciccolella sent several stern cables to Washington stating that the U.S. military would not accept a defector like Liao Ho-shu.

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Continued

Flying the U.S. into Laos

STATINTL



IN THE CLOSING DAYS OF THE 1968 presidential campaign, the Democrats made an eleventh-hour bid for the presidency through a White House announcement that all bombing in North Viet-Nam was being stopped and that serious peace negotiations were about to begin. This move was apparently torpedoed within 30 hours by President Thieu of South Viet-Nam who publicly rejected the coming negotiations. Three days later, the Democratic candidate lost to Richard Nixon by a narrow margin.

After the election, it was revealed that a major Nixon fund raiser and supporter had engaged in elaborate machinations in Saigon (including false assurances that Nixon would not enter into such negotiations if elected) to sabotage the Democrats' plan. It was also revealed that, through wire taps, the White House and Humphrey knew of these maneuvers before the election and that a heated debate had gone on among Humphrey strategists as to whether the candidate should exploit the discovery in the last moments of the campaign. Humphrey declined to seize the opportunity, he said, because he was sure that Nixon was unaware of and did not approve of the activities of his supporter in Saigon.

The supporter in question was Madame Anna Chennault, and her covert intervention into the highest affairs of state was by no means an unprecedented act for her and her associates. Madame Chennault's husband, General Claire Chennault, had fought in China with Chiang Kai-shek; after the war he formed a private airline company. Both husband and wife have, through their involvement with the China Lobby and the CIA's complex of private corporations, played a profound role throughout our involvement in Southeast Asia. General Chennault's airline was, for example, employed by the U.S. government in 1954 to fly in support for the French at Dien Bien Phu. It was also a key factor in the new fighting which

had begun in Laos in 1959; moreover, it appears that President Eisenhower was not informed and did not know when his office and authority were being committed in the Laotian conflict, just as Nixon did not know of the intrigue of Mme. Chennault. But that is precisely the point of parapolitics and private war enterprise.

In its evasion of Congressional and even Executive controls over military commitments in Laos and elsewhere, the CIA has long relied on the services of General Chennault's "private" paramilitary arm, Civil Air Transport or (as it is now known) Air America, Inc.

[HOW AIR AMERICA WAGES WAR]

AIR AMERICA'S FLEETS OF TRANSPORT planes are readily seen in the airports of Laos, South Viet-Nam, Thailand and Taiwan. The company is based in Taiwan, where a subsidiary firm, Air Asia, with some 8000 employees, runs one of the world's largest aircraft maintenance and repair facilities. While not all of Air America's operations are paramilitary or even covert, in Viet-Nam and even more in Laos, it is the chief airline serving the CIA in its clandestine war activities.

Until recently the largest of these operations was the supply of the fortified hilltop positions of the 45,000 Meo tribesmen fighting against the Pathet Lao behind their lines in northeast Laos. Most of these Meo outposts have airstrips that will accommodate special Short Take-off And Landing aircraft, but because of the danger of enemy fire the American and Nationalist Chinese crews have usually relied on parachute drops of guns, mortars, ammunition, rice, even live chickens and pigs. Air America's planes also serve to transport the Meos' main cash crop, opium.

The Meo units, originally organized and trained by the French, have provided a good indigenous army for the Americans in Laos. Together with their CIA and U.S. Special Forces "advisors," the Meos have long been used to harass Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese supply lines. More recently they have engaged in conventional battles in which they have been transported by Air America's planes and helicopters (New York Times, October 29, 1969). The Meos also defended, until its capture in 1968, the key U.S. radar installation at Pathi near the North Vietnamese border; the station had been used in the bombing of North Viet-Nam.

Further south in Laos, Air America flies out of the CIA operations headquarters at Pakse, from which it reportedly supplies an isolated U.S. Army camp at Attapu in the south-east, as well as the U.S. and South Vietnamese Special Forces operations in the same region (San Francisco Chronicle, October 15, 1969). Originally the chief purpose of these activities was to observe and harass the Ho Chi Minh trail, but recently the fighting in the Laotian panhandle, as elsewhere in the country, has expanded into a general air and ground war. Air America planes are reported to be flying arms, supplies and reinforcements in this larger campaign as well (New York Times, September 18, 1969).

by Peter Dale Scott

29 January 1970

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of this document than previously.

Tonkin Bay: Was There a Conspiracy?

Truth Is the First Casualty: The Gulf of Tonkin Affair—Illusion and Reality
by Joseph C. Goulden.

A James B. Adler Inc. Book,
published in association with
Rand McNally, 283 pp., \$6.95

Peter Dale Scott

Seaman Patrick N. Park, on the night of August 4, 1964, was directing the gun-control radar of the *USS Maddox*. For three hours he had heard torpedo reports from the ship's sonarman, and he had seen, two or three times, the flash of guns from a nearby destroyer, the *Turner Joy*, in the rainy darkness. But his radar could find no targets, "only the occasional roll of a wave as it breaks into a whitecap." At last, just before midnight, a target: "a damned big one, right on us... about 1,500 yards off the side, a nice fat blip." He was ordered to open fire; luckily, however, not all seamen blindly follow orders.

Just before I pushed the trigger I suddenly realized, That's the *Turner Joy*.... There was a lot of yelling of "Goddamn" back and forth, with the bridge telling me to "fire before we lose contact," and me yelling right back at them.... I finally told them, "I'm not opening fire until I know where the *Turner Joy* is." The bridge got on the phone and said, "Turn on your lights, *Turner Joy*." Sure enough, there she was, right in the cross hairs... 1,500 yards away. If I had fired, it would have blown it clean out of the water. In fact, I could have been shot for not squeezing the trigger. Then people started asking, "What are we shooting at...?" We all began calming down. The whole thing seemed to end then.

Goulden's fascinating book, which has gathered much new information about the Tonkin Gulf incidents, sees the experience of Patrick Park as, with one exception, a microcosm of the entire Tonkin affair—

illustrating the confusion between illusion and reality and the inclination of man to act upon facts as he anticipates they should be, rather than what rational examination shows them to be. The exception is that Park refused to squeeze the trigger. In Washington acted on the basis of assumption, not fact—hastily, pre-

sarily—firing at an unseen enemy lurking behind the blackness of misinformation.

Not all will accept the analogy between Washington and a confused young seaman, but this hardly lessens the importance of Goulden's patient researches. The author of a book on AT&T and a former reporter for the *Philadelphia Inquirer*, Goulden has made good use of his years of experience in Washington. He has not really written a "thesis" book; his method is to stick closely to official documents (above all the neglected Fulbright Committee Hearing of 1968)¹ and first-hand interviews with witnesses the Committee failed to call, including Seaman Park. At times he can be faulted for believing so much what was told him in the Pentagon. Even so, the

result is devastating. It is now even more clear that the Tonkin Gulf Resolution (in his words) "contains the fatal taint of deception." The Administration had withheld much vital information in formulating the simple story of "unprovoked attack" by which that resolution was pushed through Congress.

The *Maddox*, according to McNamara in 1964, was on a "routine patrol in international waters." In fact it was on an electronics intelligence (ELINT) or spy mission for the National Security Agency and CIA. One of its many intelligence requirements orders was "to stimulate Chicom-North Vietnamese electronic reaction," i.e., to provoke the North Vietnamese into turning on their defensive radars so that the frequencies could be measured. To this end, between August 1 and 4, the *Maddox* repeatedly simulated attacks by moving toward the shore with its gun control radar mechanism turned on, as if it were preparing to shoot at targets. In so doing, it violated the twelve-mile limit which Pentagon officials thought North Vietnam claimed for her territorial waters.² Far from being "routine," this was only the third such patrol in the Tonkin Gulf in thirty-two months; and the North Vietnamese had to assess it in the context of a recent US build-up and South Vietnamese threats to carry

On July 31, just before the patrol the South Vietnamese had for the first

heard North Vietnamese orders to position a defensive ring of PT boats around Hon Me after the first South Vietnamese attack on the North Vietnamese islands, as well as speculations about the possible link between the *Maddox* and the raids.

Near Hon Me on the morning of August 2 the NSA technicians intercepted orders for PT boats to attack the *Maddox*. Captain Herrick aboard the *Maddox* cabled to his superiors in Honolulu that "continuance of patrol presents an unacceptable risk," but was ordered to resume his itinerary. The *Maddox* returned to a point eleven miles from Hon Me island, and then heard a North Vietnamese order for its attack. This was the prelude for the first incident of August 2—it is clear both that a North Vietnamese attack was ordered and

According to *The New York Times* (Aug. 11, 1964, p. 15) the *Ticonderoga's* Task Force Commander Rear Admiral Robert B. Moore "indicated that the destroyer might have been two or three miles inside the 12-mile limit set by Hanoi for international waters."

McNamara told the Committee that the *Maddox* could simulate an attack on the coast by turning on special transmitters, but the Pentagon later said the ship carried passive equipment and could only listen.

Deepening Cambodian Commitment

The increased American involvement in Cambodia occurred shortly after Defense Secretary Laird visited the area, so it can be presumed he was aware of the impending escalation if he did not order it. But a different impression was given out after Mr. Laird discussed the Cambodian situation with U. S. commanders in Saigon.

Last Thursday the word from Washington was that Mr. Laird had rejected a request by the Joint Chiefs of Staff that American transport planes and helicopters be permitted to ferry ammunition and South Vietnamese reinforcements to South Vietnamese forces operating in Cambodia. The Chiefs argued this was not specifically barred by the Congressional proscription against the use of American ground troops, but Mr. Laird said it would violate the spirit if not the letter of the ban.

But if the spirit was willing the flesh, apparently, was weak. Eight-jet B-52 bombers had been flying support for South Vietnamese and Cambodian ground troops and they were joined, it was disclosed early in the week, by U.S. helicopter gunships and ships of the U.S. Seventh Fleet anchored in the Gulf of Siam. And the Defense Department claimed U.S. aircraft could properly be used to ferry troops into Cambodia, or from one place to another inside Cambodia.

There is no doubt a difference between a soldier walking on the ground and one hovering 50 feet in the air, and when a pilot lands to pick up or discharge passengers he is still not on the ground, only a few feet from it. But this is splitting hairs, and the question is if the Pentagon can so quickly put aside the spirit of the law, how long will it take for the letter to be abandoned?

Or has it already been abandoned? The Army

is making a mystery of a uniformed American photographed in Cambodia. How many more mystery men are there? And what better way to counter the evidence of a photograph than to pose a mystery and start an "investigation."

The pressures may increase, at least until the spring rainy season dampens the fighting. The Cambodians, praised by Mr. Laird for their enthusiasm, are small in number and ineffective. South Vietnamese troops are providing the principal ground opposition to the Communists, but even with American air support they have not been able to free the main road from the seacoast to the capital of Phnom Penh. The situation is so serious that Cambodian Premier Lon Nol scheduled a trip to Saigon for consultations.

The worrisome aspect of the latest Cambodian escalation is that it seems to reflect a determination by the military to intensify the war while claiming to stay within the guidelines laid down six months ago by President Nixon and the restrictions imposed by Congress only last month. When this is coupled with the recent revelation that the Central Intelligence Agency has been sending armed reconnaissance teams from northern Laos into China there is a feeling that the whole thrust of Washington is still toward enlarging the Southeast Asia operation, not winding it down as Mr. Nixon maintains.

Even if accomplished, pulling American troops out of Vietnam (some 248,000 are expected to remain there as of May 1) will be a fraud if the war grows elsewhere; and an intensified war in Cambodia would provide an excuse for maintaining troops in Vietnam. What the American people want is the withdrawal of their troops from Indochina, not new excuses for keeping them there endlessly.